To: Branch Chairs, Vice Chairs, Secretaries & Convenors
Family Court SEC (for info)
Cc: NEC Reps Napo Officers and Officials
Dear Colleague,
QUESTIONS:
1. What support are the CRC's currently providing to the NPS in terms of working across the divide, sessional work supervising cases/acting as duty etc? This is likely to vary around the country.
2. Access to nDelius and OASys records for CRC staff. The MOJ are denying that there is a problem with staff accessing records. In particular those in interventions. We need members in the CRC's to confirm if there is still a problem accessing records? How easy it is for NPS staff to allow access and if this is being done routinely? What information is available on the "front sheet" and how helpful is that to staff?
3. Further to above have any CRC managers seen the proposed extended front sheet due to be released in December? If so how helpful is this for CRC staff seeing NPS offenders in the absence of NPS staff being available?
4. Workloads - We need to gain a picture of what workloads are like across both the NPS and the CRC's. In particular workloads according to grade. Are PSO's still holding high risk cases? Are there examples of caseloads of 50+? TPO's holding complex cases above their training and experience?
5. Risk escalation process- The MOJ is asserting that very few CRC staff have needed to use the Risk Escalation Process implying that risk escalation is rare. Napo believes that at least 5% of offenders are subject to risk escalation during their sentence but we need evidence to support this. How often is the risk escalation process being used? How much more complex the process compared to processes prior to the 1st June?
URGENT REQUEST FOR INFORMATION FOR JUDICIAL REVIEW
Further to Napo's announcement to proceed with an application for Judicial Review, both Napo and our legal team are going through the Treasury Solicitors response and have identified areas where we require further information from the front line in order to challenge the MOJ on certain points. As such we urgently require the information outlined as attached. As much or as little detail as you are able to give would be extremely useful at this stage.
This is urgently required and we would ask Branches to try to respond by 5pm Monday 3rd November where possible to tbassett@napo.org.uk
BR 132/2014
URGENT REQUEST FOR INFORMATION FOR JUDICIAL REVIEW
Please try to respond by 5pm Monday 3rd November where possible to tbassett@napo.org.uk
1. What support are the CRC's currently providing to the NPS in terms of working across the divide, sessional work supervising cases/acting as duty etc? This is likely to vary around the country.
2. Access to nDelius and OASys records for CRC staff. The MOJ are denying that there is a problem with staff accessing records. In particular those in interventions. We need members in the CRC's to confirm if there is still a problem accessing records? How easy it is for NPS staff to allow access and if this is being done routinely? What information is available on the "front sheet" and how helpful is that to staff?
3. Further to above have any CRC managers seen the proposed extended front sheet due to be released in December? If so how helpful is this for CRC staff seeing NPS offenders in the absence of NPS staff being available?
4. Workloads - We need to gain a picture of what workloads are like across both the NPS and the CRC's. In particular workloads according to grade. Are PSO's still holding high risk cases? Are there examples of caseloads of 50+? TPO's holding complex cases above their training and experience?
5. Risk escalation process- The MOJ is asserting that very few CRC staff have needed to use the Risk Escalation Process implying that risk escalation is rare. Napo believes that at least 5% of offenders are subject to risk escalation during their sentence but we need evidence to support this. How often is the risk escalation process being used? How much more complex the process compared to processes prior to the 1st June?
http://www.theguardian.com/politics/2014/oct/31/fiona-woolf-resigns-chairman-child-abuse-inquiry
ReplyDeleteNever mind what CRC are doing for NPS what about what the NPS have being doing for private company.
ReplyDeleteWhat is that all about ?
ReplyDeleteI have been assigned to NPS but am doing work for CRC
DeleteOh were u directed to?
DeleteThe risks escalation process is a real nightmare. Took me from 10.30 to 15.00 to get one over to NPS ppu yesterday .Delius eat the first attempt, not joking! Then it failed to save TM comments on 3 separate occasions! Very stressful nightmare for CRC admin.
ReplyDeleteThe bureaucratic nightmare that is the risk escalation process will make it less likely that staff will follow it - why spend several hours filling in a bloody form when you could be doing something that will actually help manage the situation? Obviously that's not the 'right' thing to do according to the process, but until they manage to drain all of the public service spirit out of us, that's what people will do.
DeleteThat sounds like the kind of example that needs to be sent in!
ReplyDeleteDon't forget the many colleagues who are on half term leave - they need to aware of the deadline too. I think the week that was has been prefaced on the reduced level of staff around due to childcare issues at haĺf term.
ReplyDeleteLove McDowell's comment to the Guardian: "they won't get me". Presumably in the context/wake of Woolf & Butler Schloss?
ReplyDeleteMr McDowell, whatever hapened to integrity? HMIProbation should not be leaving 6/21 (Nigh on 30%) of its inspections aside because of one person's ego & until-recently-undisclosed personal interest.
Would any PO get paid 100% salary for a 70% role? I think not.
DeleteI understand the quote is "I will not be got at by anybody."
DeleteWell, Pauly my old son, I'm a nobody. So, by not being anybody, I think you and your missus have been less than honest with everyone. As a nobody, I think you believe that Grayling's blessing makes you and your missus invincible. I think, as nobody, that you've been played by Grayling to allow Mrs McDowell to bring Sodexo (formerly UKDS) through the tradesman's entrance.
Do the decent thing. Cough, stand down & be absolved. Or, if you'd prefer, stand your ground & be the fall guy.
Having read this article I am stunned that this couples main area of interest, after all it is even how they met in the first place, could possibly be "off limits" to protect them against possible conflicts of interest. It is beyond credibility.
DeleteCertainly the wife will have performance related pay given who she works for and her senior level, this may be share related and should be reported to the Stock Exchange for potential insider trading. She should be scrutinised by the company's own compliance committee ( normally devolved from the Board). It is impossible to argue that he will not benefit from any exchange of information, given their relationship any stock sale or profit related pay of the spouse will benefit the mutual finances ( or are we expected to believe they too are ring fenced)?
Then we come to his position...at this critical juncture, when tax payers money is at such risk, how can the public have confidence in his position? How can the staff involved in the inspection process have confidence in respect for their confidentiality? Finally, how can the service users have any confidence that he is independent given his close links to Probation for Profit company?
It is utterly improbable that they avoid any conflict of interest discussions given the normal support offered between husband and wife.
http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm201314/cmselect/cmjust/640/640.pdf
ReplyDeleteThe publicly released document relating to appointment of McDowell
"HM Inspectorate of Probation is an independent inspectorate, funded by the Ministry of Justice. "
ReplyDeletetaken from above report, says it all really because once Grayling is involved he thinks he owns you body and soul. He is incapable of listening to any view other than his own so really "independent" doesn't wash does it?
Duplicated offender files are created when an operator fails to find the offender on nDelius or eoasys based on the details they have been given and wrongly create a new offender record to hold details of their current offence(s). The reasons for not finding an offender are many and various but the point is that every time it happens somebody has to try and make a judgement about the risks an individual poses based on a fraction of the information that should be available to them. Even worse is the fact that in most duplicate cases the information they have about the offender’s history will be solely derived from what that offender chooses to reveal – told from their own perspective – instead of from the hard evidence of the court records and CPS files.
ReplyDeleteThere are thousands of Duplicate Offender Files – and that is just the ones we know about
Is it worth an FOI to the MOJ asking how many Duplicated Records have been flagged for merger as this will give an indication of how often officers are having to make decisions about risks based on partial or incomplete information?