Setting the Record Straight

I've said on a number of occasions that one aim of this blog is to provide an audit trail so that future historians or other interested parties can set the whole TR omnishambles in context and apportion appropriate blame when it all inevitably goes 'Pete Tong'. 

I wonder how many brave souls there are left around at the Probation Association and that signed-off this remarkable final two-fingered gesture to Chris Grayling and his TR omnishambles? Appropriately entitled 'A Parting Shot - The Questions Remain', this soberly-worded document goes into some fine detail in setting the record straight as to exactly what went on behind the scenes and goes a long way to confirming what a thoroughly unpleasant man Mr Grayling is. 

So, the dog finally barked! The following extracts give a flavour of the valedictory, including this little gem, 'The interface between the PA and the MoJ was considerably more taxing than that between PA and the unions', and concludes with some extremely salient questions that remain to be answered:-  

NNC and SCCOG

The National Negotiating Council and the Standing Committee for Chief Officer Grades have existed for some considerable time as the national negotiating machinery for pay and conditions of service for probation staff. Members (Trust Chairs) of PA form the Employers’ Side. Before the publication of the Strategy paper on 9 May 2013, and in the growing realisation that MoJ was approaching the future implementation of change as though probation Trust staff were direct employees of MoJ/NOMS, the Chairman of PA wrote to Ministers to point out the necessity of respecting the national negotiating machinery in the delivery of change affecting Trust staff. This was recognised by Ministers and the NNC and SCCOG worked from August 2013 through to January 2014 to deliver a National Agreement on Staff Transfer and Protections.

Alongside this negotiating machinery, the MoJ established a forum for discussion with employers and trade unions on issues affecting staff but falling outside the remit of NNC
and SCCOG. 

The course of these negotiations, consultations and discussions in the compressed timetable allowed was demanding in the extreme, involving residential sessions, almost weekly negotiating/consultation meetings and with constant email and telephone traffic in between.

The interface between the PA and the MoJ was considerably more taxing than that between PA and the unions, and, as will be seen from the Joint Secretaries’ circulars issued during these negotiations, it was the issues over which the employers did not have discretion but were reliant on the approach by MoJ that proved the eventual sticking points.

Although MoJ did make considerable concessions in the negotiations, time – as determined by the Justice Secretary’s timetable for Transforming Rehabilitation - was insufficient to secure the agreement of all parties. 

In November 2013 NOMS/MoJ decided to issue to Trusts a National Framework on Staff Transfer and Protections, much of which replicated the unagreed documentation being negotiated through the NNC and SCCOG and which included a pre-transfer staff assignment process based on the one being discussed with the unions, though with its own significant adaptations. 

There followed a critical week, which coincided with the week referred to above in the context of the revised risk register.

• An NNC/SCCOG meeting already scheduled to take place a few days after MoJ’s decision to impose its Framework and assignment process held the prospect of securing an agreement on the texts that had been under discussion. The PA secured an undertaking from MoJ that if there were agreement, the negotiated agreement would supersede the framework imposed by MoJ but clearly agreement would be less likely if Trusts had started to implement the MoJ scheme. 

• PA asked Trusts to report on their reactions to the MoJ’s action and compilations of these reports were circulated to all member Trusts, so that each could see the approach being taken by others. PA held a teleconference with member Trusts to share views, in particular on the legality of MoJ’s action. Trusts co-operated with the request from PA to restrict themselves only to preparatory work in order to keep the possibility of a negotiated agreement alive. 

• Unfortunately notification by MoJ – later largely withdrawn – on the day of the meeting of some aspects of the agreement that were not acceptable meant that substantive discussion was timed out and agreement was not reached. 

• The subsequent advice from the PA Board to Trusts was then that, while the absence of a negotiated assignment process was regrettable, they should continue with implementation of the MoJ assignment process, and the NNC and SCCOG agreed to exclude the arrangements for assignment from its negotiations. A National Agreement, which secured significant protections for staff, was ratified by both bodies in January 2014. 

This above account does not adequately reflect the tireless and critically important role played by PA on the substance of the discussions, in the hammering out of future HR and employment arrangements for probation staff during this period, acting as a central source of expertise on probation terms and conditions, relied on by all concerned and indefatigably working through the minutiae of necessary transfer provisions.

Questions for the future

The Probation Association is departing the scene at the point at which implementation of the reforms will start to bite in operational terms. As the MoJ itself says, there will be a period of transition in which teething problems can be expected. It is too early to judge the impact of the reforms but, for the benefit of future commentators, we lay down the following as questions to which we, had we been continuing as an organisation, would have been interested to know the answers:

• By how much have the reforms reduced re-offending? The Justice Secretary has indicated that no great change from current patterns should be expected, though the current and steadily declining rate of re-offending by those under probation supervision since 2000 has been held up as a failure of the current probation arrangements. 

• Has the CRC bidding process proved successful in funding the provision of services, across all of England and Wales, to those with sentences of less than 12 months leaving prison? This extension of service is the great prize of the reforms. How effective are those services in reducing re-offending? 

• How significant is Payment by Results in the new arrangements, or are the contracts really block payments with a bit of a reward added on? The use of PbR was, of course, always the reason given for not allowing Trusts to bid for contracts.

• In addition to the declared costs, how much have the reforms really cost across the piece to implement? Staff time in the TR team and NOMS, conferences and meetings, staff time in the Trusts, secondments from Trusts to the Programme, interim appointments, the use of consultants, IT changes, communications, signage. 

• What are the additional costs of managing and monitoring contracts (in the light of recent contract failures eg on electronic monitoring)? 

• Could the cost of the reforms have been realised and used to fund an equivalent provision of services to the under 12 months’ cohort, without having the disruption and risk to services and performance caused by the TR reforms? Trusts certainly believed so – and some were already delivering the services, in partnership with PCCs and others, before Transforming Rehabilitation was published. 

• Are the CRCs any more liberated than Trusts could have been and wanted to be? 

• Has the NPS been able to sustain managing the exclusively high risk caseload? 

• Was the management of offenders jeopardised by the changes at any point? What has happened on performance overall? 

• What has been the effect on staff professionalism, morale and motivation in the longer term? 

• Was it necessary to go through everything that the system has gone through over the past year to achieve what has in fact been achieved? What would a retrospective cost benefit analysis show?

PS Just for the historical record, this blog was finally acknowledged by the PA last week when they uniquely joined the PCA and Probation Institute in re-tweeting my piece on Sue Hall's Cambridge speech. Recognition at last, if somewhat late in the day!