A Catalogue of Errors

Today, Justin Russell, HM Chief Inspector of Probation has published a 62 page damning review of issues arising from the case of Joseph McCann. The BBC make the following observation and in my view this whole tragic case must be viewed through the chaos caused by Chris Grayling's omnishambolic TR:-

In the first of two reports from his review, Mr Russell said: "McCann was managed by an unstable team, lacking experienced and skilled practitioners. They suffered from poor management oversight, high workloads, poor performance and high staff turnover. There were signs that he posed an increasing risk to the public. There was evidence of his potential for sexual offending."

Mr McCann committed multiple violent and sexual offences in April and May 2019. At the time of the crimes, he was under the supervision of the National Probation Service after being released from prison on licence. He was given 33 life sentences in December 2019.

The Justice Secretary asked HM Chief Inspector of Probation Justin Russell to conduct an independent review into this case. Today’s report is the first part of the review and focuses on the circumstances leading up to the offences. The second part of the review will look in more detail at recall policy and process:-

1. Foreword

The impact of violent and sexual offences for the victims may be life-long and cannot be underestimated. For the victims of Joseph McCann this impact is worsened by the knowledge he could have been in prison when the offences occurred. If the right actions had been taken by the probation service, he would have been kept in prison until the Parole Board determined he was safe to release. 

Joseph McCann was being supervised by the National Probation Service (NPS), following his release on licence from prison, when he committed a series of violent and sexual offences that resulted in him receiving 33 life sentences in December 2019. We have examined in detail the case management and policies in the period leading up to these offences in April and May 2019 and identified significant failings in local supervision but also some issues that need national attention. We make a number of recommendations in relation to these issues. 

A primary role of the NPS is public protection. To ensure the public are protected from offenders such as Joseph McCann, who present a high risk of serious harm to other people, the NPS has the authority to recall offenders from the community back to prison when they are in breach of the terms of their release or when it seems that their risk can no longer be managed in the community. Using this authority requires skilled judgement by practitioners and managers to decide when someone can continue to be managed safely in the community or when public safety demands they return to custody. 

In this review we found that serious mistakes were made and this judgment was not properly exercised. No fewer than eight opportunities were missed between 2017 and Spring 2019 to ensure Joseph McCann could not be released from prison without a further Parole Board hearing or to recall him to prison. Indeed, on two occasions a decision was taken to revoke his Imprisonment for Public Protection (IPP) licence but for a variety of reasons these were not executed. The individuals responsible for these failures in his supervision have rightly been held to account. We found, however, that their decisions were taken against a national policy context which emphasised that ‘alternatives to recall’ should be used whenever it was safe to do so, given increasing pressures on prison capacity in 2017 and 2018. 

Joseph McCann is a complex, dangerous offender who can be intimidating and controlling, yet was able to present himself positively to staff. Those making the decisions about him should have taken account of his long history of serious offending, his poor compliance with court orders, his behaviour in prison, and indications of his increasing risk. Information and intelligence about his behaviour was available but was spread between various criminal justice recording systems and not easily retrieved. Most worryingly, prison staff did not proactively share information with NPS staff responsible for his management. 

As a result, those managing Joseph McCann did not have a clear picture of who they were dealing with. Their decisions and actions were based on inadequate and incomplete assessment, were not scrutinised sufficiently and sometimes not implemented. 

Probation staff managing high-risk individuals require well developed skills: to interview effectively; to seek out and analyse information from a range of sources; to see beyond superficial compliance. They also need their managers to provide good oversight, investigative supervision and effective support. The supervision of Joseph McCann took place in an environment where, as we noted in recent previous reports, probation officers and managers were faced with intolerable workloads and little access to the necessary, high quality professional training.

Individual errors in the case have received appropriate attention. In this report we have highlighted the need for broader changes across the probation system to ensure that staff and managers have both the skills and the resources required to undertake the task of protecting the public from dangerous offenders. We have made a number of recommendations to HM Prison and Probation Service (HMPPS) and the NPS that we believe will improve the ability of the probation service to protect the public. 

Justin Russell 

HM Chief Inspector of Probation

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16. Conclusion

As we have noted before, when an offender is being supervised in the community it is simply not possible to eliminate risk altogether, but the public is entitled to expect that the authorities will do their job properly, that is to take all reasonable action to keep risk to a minimum in order to protect actual and potential victims. That did not happen in this case. 

Mistakes and poor judgement by several individuals meant that JMc remained in the community when he could, and should, have been recalled to prison. These issues of individual professional negligence have been examined in the internal SFO review, and appropriate action has been taken. 

In our review, we have examined these individual failures within the wider context of probation policy, procedures and operational reality. Inadequately trained and overworked staff and managers, as identified in this case are not new findings; we have highlighted these issues in several of our core local inspections and in our report on the central functions supporting the NPS.

In this report we have also highlighted areas where HMPPS must take action to improve the role the NPS plays in protecting the public from dangerous offenders.

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As far as I can see the key recommendations are:-

It is recommended that HMPPS should:

• ensure that probation staff are able to access all relevant information about an individual, including from historical case records.
• ensure prisons comply with the requirement to share all relevant information, including from prison security departments and records of prison behaviour with the Parole Board.
• require prisons to share all relevant information, including from prison security departments and records of prison behaviour with probation offender managers in prison and in the community to assist with parole reports and recommendations and with planning for release.
• ensure there are clear and responsive arrangements for emergency referral to approved premises where required to manage offenders who present a high risk of serious harm.
• ensure there is sufficient capacity in the approved premises estate to accommodate all high risk of harm offenders who require a placement.

It is recommended that NPS should:

• monitor the implementation of post release risk management plans presented to the Parole Board, including referral to MAPPA, access to relevant interventions, residence in approved premises, and move on plans.
• ensure that the new recall framework is fully embedded in practice.
• introduce quality assurance processes to review the consistency and outcomes of recall decisions. This should include cases where recall was considered but not instigated as well as cases where it was approved.
• ensure that recall decisions are recorded and implemented regardless of staff absence. A digital prompt should be built into the nDelius system to keep automatically reminding offender managers and their line managers of the need to execute a recall until this action is marked as completed or cancelled by the relevant ACO.
• review the Probation Instruction for case transfers (PI 07/2014) to ensure the exchange of all risk information; establish an effective communication framework between transferring areas, including clarity about roles and responsibilities; and to ensure cases are prioritised and transfer is expedited.
• ensure that probation staff have adequate time to become familiar with complex cases for which they assume responsibility.
• improve the professional training of qualified and experienced probation staff to enhance skills in interviewing; interpretation and analysis of information from different sources; and risk assessment.

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A Ministry of Justice spokesman said: 

"These were horrendous crimes and we have apologised to the victims for the unacceptable failings in this case. We have greatly improved information sharing between prisons and probation officers and all probation staff have received new, mandatory training on when offenders should be recalled."