Thursday, 25 January 2018

Governors Take On the MoJ

Following the government reshuffle and the obvious disappearance of a Minister for Probation, the MoJ may feel that further progress has been achieved in their long-term aim of completely erasing the term from the lexicon of criminal justice. They've never understood us and were always nervous and irritated by our proudly independent voice and notorious historic resistance to all attempts at imposing command and control.

I have heard it said that this blog continues to be regarded as a 'risk' by the MoJ, precisely because it steadfastly remains a bastion of non-conformity and resistance to their efforts at ridding themselves of such troublesome dissident voices. So imagine how upset and uncomfortable the mandarins must be at the emergence of a much reinvigorated Prison Governors Association under the inspiring leadership of Andrea Albutt. 

Of course there was a time when the Probation Service had a similar authoritative and respected voice, but we all know where that got us. Anyway, here she is telling it how it is in the Guardian and I dare the MoJ to try and silence her:-      

Andrea Albutt: ‘Carillion has left our prisons in a terrible state’

Andrea Albutt, the president of the Prison Governors Association, is angry. The former army nurse, who joined the prison service as a young hospital officer in 1990, announced last week that despair was “running through the veins” of her organisation. With the highest rates of self-harm, suicide, drug use and violence ever seen and the recent scathing prison inspection reports on HMPs Liverpool and Nottingham, the prison system has arguably reached the lowest point in its history.

The collapse of Carillion, the construction company responsible for prison maintenance contracts, has only added to its woes. “It’s a big deal,” says Albutt. “Governors have had to run prisons with not-fit-for-purpose contracts which failed to deliver the promised service. These contracts have failed in their entirety, leaving accommodation and maintenance in a far worse state than when governors owned their own works departments.

“We desperately need a reintroduction of the prison works department. I can then say to my works guys, ‘the seg’s [segregation unit] in a mess, needs work, B wing needs new windows’. I, as the governor, the boss, tell them – and then they crack on with it. With an external contract, governors are not empowered to do that. Too much senior management time has been spent trying to deal with these contracts instead of strategically managing prisons.”

Since taking over the £200m maintenance and cleaning contracts for the prison service, agreed by the then justice secretary, Chris Grayling, in 2014, Carillion has been continually criticised by the Prisons Inspectorate and Independent Monitoring Boards (IMBs) for its failure to carry out contracted works. In its latest annual report, the Independent Monitoring Board for Dartmoor prison said that Carillion’s contract was “an ongoing source of frustration”, calling it cumbersome and expensive.

It is clear from talking to her that Albutt cares a great deal about our prisons. But, I say, why should decent, law-abiding citizens care? If prisoners are living in cells with no windows, infested with rats and cockroaches, many would say, so what? They shouldn’t have committed the crime. “We disempower people when they go to prison,” she says, “so we have to care for them. If we don’t do the best we can for them, what hope is there? You have to remember that prison could happen to anyone – a member of your family, a friend, a loved one. I know how I’d want anyone in my family treated, if, God forbid, it happened to them.

“It’s a well-coined phrase – but there but for the grace of God go any of us, really. None of us knows what might be waiting in life, and you have to remember that most people in prison will be released.” The main source of her frustration is the constant change at the top at the Ministry of Justice. This is where she gets particularly animated. “In seven and a half years, we have had six secretaries of state, which has left prison governors punch-drunk with change,” she says. “We have endured constant interference from ministers who have little or no knowledge of the complexities of prisons, and who leave our service in a disastrously worse state than they found it.

“So, we had David Lidington for six months and he didn’t do anything. It just feels like they do not care about our prisons. They chop and change secretaries of state without a thought. Ministers don’t know prisons, their special advisers don’t know prisons. They might visit them occasionally, but they haven’t a real clue about how to run one safely and effectively. Even civil servants busy writing policy – they also might have visited a prison, but they don’t know prison.”

Albutt certainly knows about prisons. She joined the prison service in the first place, she says, “just to pay the mortgage,” but it soon turned into her vocation. She spent seven years patrolling prison landings, including HMP Woodhill, a Category A prison holding some of the most dangerous prisoners in the country, before being promoted to management.

“As one of the first women into Brixton, I quickly saw that it was a brutal place – and I was just shocked at some of the things I saw,” she recalls. “As a nurse in the army I’d seen tragedy, but the violence of prison was something else.”

Initially her male colleagues were “terrible” she says. “I don’t know if they felt threatened by women entering their male environment, undermining their perceived macho culture.” In contrast, she says male prisoners were generally quite protective of her and her female colleagues. “I have to say, though, that there were times in that first six months when treatment by male colleagues was so bad, I thought about getting out. But I stuck it out and I’m glad I did. In that respect, it’s a different world in prison these days.”

What’s her advice to the new justice secretary, David Gauke? “The one positive thing is that the path we’re on now, started by Michael Gove and then carried on by Liz Truss, is helping us make, possibly – and I emphasise possibly – some inroads into the decline. I don’t know David Gauke at all; we had a brief conversation on the phone, but I just hope that he doesn’t decide to go down a completely different path.

“We lost 7,000 staff and apparently we’re getting 2,500 back. But that still leaves us with 1,500 vacancies, so in fact we need closer to 4,000. I was talking to a colleague last week, and I think they are wondering in the MoJ why things aren’t improving. Well, if you had new officers who were experienced and confident you might get some improvement. But if you’ve got brand new officers going into a place like Liverpool, it’s going to take a while for them to get confident, to acclimatise and to make a difference,” she says. “A failing prison takes forever to turn around. To get back to where we were 10 years ago is going to take years. That’s something I’m determined to get through to ministers.”

She also wants a public inquiry into government policy in the prison service over the past decade. “It’s highly unlikely we’ll get one,” she admits. “We have the Grenfell inquiry and rightly so. But if you think of the number of people who have killed themselves in prison in recent years [2,022 since 1990], so many people have died in our care in prison. We need to look and find out why.”

Career: 2015-18: operational lead for HMPPS national project; 2012-15: governor, HMP Bristol; 2010-12: governor, HMP Eastwood Park; 2007-10: governor, HMP Swansea; 2004-07: governor, HMP Low Newton; 1990-2004: prison officer at HMPs Brixton, Woodhill, Grendon, Wakefield and Eastwood Park; 1984-1990: military nurse, Queen Alexandra Royal Army Nursing Corps, serving in Germany, UK and Falkland Islands.

Wednesday, 24 January 2018

More on Tagging Omnishambles 3

The Public Accounts Committee have today published another scathing report on the tagging fiasco. Regular readers of this blog have become very familiar with the extraordinary incompetence of the MoJ in general and their contracting ability in particular. What I now want to know is, how can it be that the chief civil servants such as Michael Spurr can not only keep his job, but in the recent past, be eligible for bonuses? 

Simple idea made overly ambitious, overly complicated and poorly delivered

Offender-monitoring tags can be a cost-effective alternative to custodial sentences, but the Ministry of Justice's delivery of the new generation electronic monitoring programme so far has been fundamentally flawed.

The simple idea of replacing the contracts for electronic tags was made overly ambitious, overly complicated and has been poorly delivered. The programme has so far been a catastrophic waste of public money which has failed to deliver the intended benefits.

The Ministry pressed ahead with the programme without clear evidence that it was to be operated or that it was deliverable. Its selection of a high-risk approach to procure the new electronic tags, and its poor management of both the programme and potential suppliers, exacerbated these problems.


Huge amount of time and taxpayers' money wasted

The Ministry of Justice has ultimately wasted a huge amount of time and taxpayers' money to end up with an approach which uses the same types of tags and supplier it had when the programme started.

Many of the lessons the Ministry claims to have learned are simply common sense and should not have resulted in such a shambolic delivery of an important programme.

We welcome the Ministry of Justice and HM Prison and Probation Service's realism and candour, but this situation should not have been allowed to happen in the first place. We do not expect to see similar failings in any of the other 16 major projects currently being undertaken by the Ministry of Justice.

Deputy Chair's comment

Comment from Sir Geoffrey Clifton-Brown MP, Deputy Chair of the Committee:

"The Ministry of Justice took an all-singing, all-dancing approach to what could have been a relatively simple procurement exercise. The evidence to support a wholesale transformation of the tagging system was weak at best but the Ministry pushed ahead anyway. This ill-fated adventure in the possibilities of technology has so far costed taxpayers some £60 million.

The new tags are expected to be rolled out more than five years later than planned and, even then, the system will rely on the same form of technology that was available when the programme launched.

The Ministry accepts it got this badly wrong but admitting its failures does not excuse an approach that disregarded fundamental principles we would expect to see applied in the spending of public money. It must act on lessons learned from this programme. We urge it to demonstrate a commitment to doing so by publishing details of the steps it is taking to avoid such wasteful mistakes in future."

--oo00oo--

Conclusions and recommendations

1.The Ministry of Justice’s unjustified and overly ambitious scope for the programme has proved to be undeliverable. The Ministry of Justice (the Ministry) told us that it had been “startled and stunned” by the over-optimism of the original project. It accepted that not enough research was done before the programme was approved and that it should have piloted the programme. The programme received limited external challenge because at the time it was seen as just a simple re-procurement of an existing service. Earlier reviews would have provided opportunities to examine the justification for the programme and explore whether it was achievable. This combination of failures resulted in requirements for the programme that were far too ambitious, including the development of a bespoke tag, and a timetable for delivery that was unachievable. The Ministry accepted that it should be more ready to use off-the-shelf products where these are already available and appropriate rather than re-inventing the wheel and seeking to develop ground-breaking, untested technology. The Ministry assured us that this situation would not be allowed to happen in future. It told us that it had introduced two new governance mechanisms to better challenge its investment decisions and commercial and contract management.

Recommendation: The Ministry should ensure that it has a full understanding of the complexity and deliverability of futureprogrammes and that estimates are tested for optimism bias and subject to proper levels of external challenge.

2.The Ministry’s weak management of the programme meant that it failed to spot and manage problems. The Ministry had a fundamental lack of knowledge of electronic monitoring services or how they operated when the programme started as the service had always been outsourced. Yet it chose the highest risk procurement strategy in adopting the ‘tower model’ for delivering the programme. This split the end-to-end service into a four-supplier ‘tower’ structure, with an integrator to bring the four contracts together. The Ministry was unprepared for what emerged to be a transformation programme rather than a simple re-procurement. It lacked the capacity and capability to manage the difficulties and delays that it created. The Ministry discovered during the procurement process that it had been overbilled by the existing suppliers of electronic monitoring services, which better contract management by the Ministry would have addressed. This has resulted in a repayment of £179 million from Serco and G4S. This matter has been referred to the Serious Fraud Office. The programme lacked continuous leadership, having been led by five senior responsible owners (SROs) in its six-year life. The Ministry now recognises that the model it had adopted will not deliver the system that it wants. It has brought the integrator function in-house and strengthened its commercial and project delivery functions. The Ministry accepted that its oversight of the early stages of the programme and previous contracts for electronic monitoring had been too light but told us that it was confident that it now had the skills to succeed.

Recommendation: The Ministry should ensure that it puts the right skills in place to properly oversee future projects from their outset and keeps them there, particularly those being delivered by private contractors.

3.We are deeply concerned that, despite the programme already running five years late, further delays are now expected. The Ministry originally expected the new tags to be deployed from November 2013. But the programme has been subject to serious and successive delays, including two failed attempts to procure the new tags. At the time of the Nation Audit Office’s report in July 2017, the Ministry expected to start rolling out the new tags from the end of 2018. The Ministry told us that owing to further delays, the new tags are now expected to be ready in early 2019. While the Ministry assured us that it was “absolutely confident” that the programme will succeed, we remain to be convinced that the programme will be delivered to the new timetable.

Recommendation: The Ministry should, by the end of March 2018, write to the Committee with a full breakdown of the timetablefor the programme, and write to us with details of any further slippage as the programme progresses.

4.The Ministry of Justice’s approach to involving small and medium sized enterprises (SMEs) in the programme meant that they were set up to fail. The decision to adopt a ‘tower’ structure for the programme was driven in part by the Ministry’s aim to increase competition and participation by small and medium sized enterprises. But the terms it imposed on SMEs were unreasonable and its approach ultimately failed. The Ministry appointed an SME, Buddi, as its preferred bidder to develop and produce the new tags in August 2013, but ended the company’s involvement in March 2014 after being unable to resolve fundamental differences. In particular, the Ministry expected Buddi to hand over its intellectual property for nothing. Also, different companies in the supply chain were supposed to work with each other but there was no contractual relationship between them, only with the Ministry. It contracted another SME, Steatite, to develop and produce the tags in July 2014, despite the fact Steatite had scored below the minimum benchmark in the procurement. The Ministry ended its contract with Steatite in November 2015 after growing delays to the programme. The Ministry failed to adapt its approach to help smaller suppliers, or to take into account their more limited staffing arrangements and financial resources. The Ministry told us that it regretted that it had been unable to agree a contract with Buddi, and accepted that it would have been better to re-open the procurement exercise rather than to rely on Steatite as the last remaining bidder. We were concerned that this programme is a bad advertisement for SMEs working with government and extremely damaging to SMEs’ confidence in government programmes.

Recommendation: The Ministry of Justice should, by March 2018, write to the Committee with details of where it has adapted its approach to working with SMEs to ensure that they are able to participate in similar projects in future.


5.The programme has so far failed to deliver the intended benefits and potentially undermined confidence in electronic monitoring services, wasting at least £9 million of taxpayers’ money. The Ministry spent £60 million on the programme up to the end of March 2017, yet still relies on the service that was available when the programme started in 2011. The costs it has incurred so far include paying Steatite £4.4 million (plus VAT) in compensation for ending its contract for the programme, on top of the £3.3 million (plus VAT) paid during Steatite’s contract. The programme was originally expected to reduce the cost of tagging by between £9 million and £30 million a year but has failed to deliver any tangible benefits so far. The Ministry over-estimated the number of people who would be subject to tagging. The number of offenders who are subject to tagging orders has been falling and is now well below expectations, which could suggest that confidence in electronic monitoring has been undermined. The Ministry of Justice does not know why the take-up of offender tagging has declined. It told us that it was working with stakeholders so that they better understand the role of tags to ensure that they are used more fully as an alternative to custodial sentences where it is appropriate to do so.

Recommendation: The Ministry should, by the end of March 2018, write to the Committee with an update on how it is working with decision makers in the criminal justice system to ensure they have confidence in the electronic monitoring service and understand their options to use tagging as an effective alternative to custody.

6.The Ministry has paid dearly to learn lessons which should have been common sense, and we are not assured that this situation could not happen again. We were not convinced that the Ministry should have paid such a high cost to learn the lessons it described. The fundamental over-ambition of the programme should have been self-evident. The Ministry accepted that it did not have sufficient knowledge of electronic monitoring services or how they operated as they had always been outsourced. It told us that it was now piloting GPS tagging to understand better where decision makers within the system will choose to use location monitoring as a sentencing option. The pilots should have been undertaken at the beginning of the procurement process, not four years later. The Ministry asserted that it was learning lessons from the pilots which will inform the future delivery of the programme, but it did not explain what these were or how they would change the programme in practice. The Ministry currently has 16 major projects in addition to electronic monitoring, almost all of which are rated as amber or less in terms of confidence in their ability to deliver.

Recommendation: The Ministry should, by the end of March 2018, publish the lessons it has learned from the programme and how it has used these to improve delivery of its current portfolio of programmes.

Tuesday, 23 January 2018

Napo and the PAC

Here we have the latest blog post from Napo General Secretary Ian Lawrence regarding the Public Accounts Committee hearing last week:-

PAC hearing, here is what was said.
As promised and with massive thanks to Kath Falcon here at Falcon Road here is a summary of the key exchanges from last weeks hearing of the PAC which I mentioned in my last posting. This will provide Napo with substantial information to take forward in our continuing parliamentary and campaigning work with politicians as well as in our exchanges with the CRC owners. My aim is to bring maximum exposure to bear on the problems that are clearly identifiable, ensure that our members interests are protected in the event that any CRC goes out of business and to ensure that an incoming Labour administration is able to tap into the expertise of Napo members as it sets about restoring probation back into public control.

Your views please?
Further observations from Napo Branches and members to these exchanges are welcomed as is up to date intelligence about the current activities of CRC’s against the claims made by the PAC witnesses. These should be forwarded to Gensec@napo and copied in to your Napo Link Official or in the case of NPS issues, your Napo Link Officer.

The hearing was chaired by Gareth Snell MP in the absence of Meg Hillier. Witnesses were Richard Heaton (Accounting Officer MoJ) and Michael Spurr (Chief Executive HMPPS)

The Chair explained the context of the inquiry. PAC had last considered TR in July 2016 and had concluded that the ‘reforms’ were not working as well as anticipated and called for action to address various issues, not least the commercial difficulties which had been subject to NAO investigation. The current inquiry was to question how far progress had been made in addressing them.

The Committee started by asking about the impact of the Carillion liquidation on the Prison and Probation contracts. What discussions had taken place following Carillions Profit Warning and what plans were in place to manage the contracts now and ensure a stable future for the contract.


  • RH/MS set out the situation. The major exposure to Carillion was that they were FM provider for half the public prisons (55 prisons). They also held the contract for FM provision at a handful of courts and there was a small impact through the contract for the legal aid hotline (signposting callers).
  • Plans were in place to ensure the work of vital services in the prisons was maintained, Carillion staff were continuing to work, and talks with the Official Receiver about the shape of the contract going forward were in their final stages.
  • Work was also in hand on the future management of the contracts. RH said he was reluctant to give more details of longer term plans as these were subject to consultation with the trade unions and discussion with the Receiver.
  • The costs were being carefully assessed, financial information was being gathered etc.
Caroline Flint MP asked detailed and probing questions about discussions in the department following the profit warning and the whether the impact of a poor quality service had contributed to prison unrest.

  • RH and MS said that discussions had taken place; that services from Carillion were not perfect and that the department had already been working with the company to improve these.
  • There was a general rise in violence and vandalism in prisons. This was added to by poor FM – but it also meant that reactive maintenance increased to the detriment of preventative maintenance, with a result that more cells were going ‘off line for longer’ resulting in issues about getting basic jobs done, as highlighted by the Prison Inspectorate. 
  • The department had recognised the need for more staff on site and had been working with Carillion to address this. 
  • They were confident they could manage the situation going forward.
The CRCs

The Chair asked for a progress report on addressing the problems with TR reforms highlighted by the PAC in 2016. 


  • RH replied that they were ‘not at the end state’. The department had been working to address the problems arising from the discrepancy in volumes between those anticipated when the contracts were drawn up and what had happened, and to stabilise the contracts in the light of this and improve revenue from the contracts for the providers. 
The Committee questioned whether the TR process had frozen out the 3rd sector providers. as one of the aims of TR was to increase diversity in provision!

  • RH/MS replied that the situation varied across CRCs. Some had good and creative relationships with the 3rd sector and one CRC is a joint venture. However they agreed that many charitable organisations would say they feel more squeezed and smaller 3rdsector providers would say they haven’t been able to progress as they wanted to do. It was ironic that one of aims was to ensure diverse supply and a wide range of providers, but one of consequences of having less funding was that CRCs were working with fewer 3rd sector providers than anticipated.
  • It was interesting that expanding the service to provide statutory support to 40,000 short term prisoners on release meant that now everyone got some support but the very good voluntary organisations that had provided excellent support had been lost. Previously some prisoners got very good support but now everyone got some support even if not as good as expected. The loss of some long standing charitable organisation providers is something which he was looking in to in terms of how the contracts are delivered
The Committee questioned whether TR was working in terms of ‘Through the Gate’ and the aim of reducing reoffending among short sentence prisoners on release. They also asked specifically about whether the probation providers were able to provide the service when it was dependent on so many other agencies – health and local government – outside their control.

  • RH and MS responded that offenders need a multiplicity of support from services such as health, drug services, etc. So it is not the CRCs alone but the laudable idea was to give the responsibility to an agency that worked with offenders already so they could marshall support from other agencies.
  • It was too early to say if TR was working in terms of reducing reoffending. The first set of data – the binary (YES/NO has an offender continued into reoffending) data – showed a 2.1% fall across the whole of the cohort and 13 of the 21 CRCS showed a statistically significant reduction. However they were waiting for the data on frequency of offences committed by those reoffending, which was due at the end of the month. The interim data in this area was not as good. 
The PAC asked probing questions about the £278 million provided for the CRCs. What were the ‘unforeseen circumstances’ necessitating this?

RH responded:
a. First and obvious one that the number of cases sent from the courts to the CRCs was higher than expected – i.e. a shift in volume. When they made assumptions about volume they didn’t purport to be making a forecast. They drew a flat line and it was for all parties, including the CRCs, to challenge this if they didn’t agree or thought it would work differently. So it was a working assumption with no guarantee from the MoJ.
b. The working about the flexibility of the CRCs cost base had been wrong. The assumption was that the CRCs could vary (bring down) their costs much more flexibly than had proved to be the case. The assumption, taking as its base line how the Probation Trusts were arranged, had concluded that 80% of costs were likely to be flexible. This turned out not to be the case with a good 15% of this 80% being fixed. It was thought that the comparison with Probation Trust was a decent starting point but it turned out not to be a good model.
c. Sentencing behaviour had changed. Courts were tending to make fewer conditional orders i.e. with programmes attached. It was these orders that attracted greater remuneration – therefore there was a shift in the volume. The drop off in specialist orders goes to sentencing behaviours and there may be different reasons for it – greater speed and quicker disposals and possibly lack of confidence by sentencers.
The PAC specifically questioned whether there was a lack of confidence in the CRCs among sentencers and what the Department and the CRCs were doing to address this.

  • RH/MS agreed this was a factor as ‘everyone knows some CRCs are not working well in some areas’. They said they needed to work through to a period of stability to restore confidence. Part of this was the work to get the contracts working better so the CRCs would have more money to invest and to provide more programmes. 
The PAC questioned how, given that from the start of TR the Ministry had way underestimated on a number of aspects of the contract, there can be confidence that the reforms will actually work? In 2016 the PAC had asked for the provision of more reliable performance data. Is this now reliable?

  • RH/MS said that the divergence was not as great as suggested. The point of the adjustments made now was to increase the fee for service element against the Payment by Results element which should make it easier for the providers and make the contracts less volatile. 
  • They believed the data was now more reliable and said the MoJ was holding the CRC’s to account. MS admitted performance was not where they would want it to be. Some of this was about the service and some about the funding position the CRCs are in, which is what was being looked at. 
  • The issue of the variance in the proportion of fixed and variable costs became very important because that was genuinely miscalculated. Variable costs were assessed as costs that could be changed in less than 3 months, partly-variable as costs that could be changed in between 3 and 12 months and fixed costs as those that could not be changed in less than 12 months. Staffing costs were originally put in the partly variable category. In reality though, as the volume of orders changed it was found that staffing costs could not be adjusted in less than 12 months. So making the adjustment to change staffing costs to fixed costs was correct, which is why this was done. It was not ‘bailing anyone out’ it was a case of adjusting the first set of contracts to reflect the real situation. The NAO report had found there was a rationale to the changes.
The Chair and Chris Evans MP asked a series of question about why performance was so bad. They also asked about performance targets. For example one of the targets is housing, an area not in the CRCs control and a target not being met by any of the CRCs. Do the targets need looking at to make sure they are fit for purpose?

  • MS noted that performance was variable between the CRCs. The Department had implemented a range of improvement plans requiring CRCs to demonstrate how they will improve to hit targets. There were 67 separate improvement plans. 38 had been discharged. 29 were still live. Some of the problems were because the CRCs were not investing to the extent anticipated when the contracts were let. That was why the contracts had been adjusted.
  • With regard to targets he said that the main driver was to reduce reoffending and this was not to be driven by targets but by payment by results. So the targets are process based rather than performance based. But it might be reasonable to reassess how much onus should be placed on the individual to galvanise others and it was legitimate to keep them under review.
  • RH said that the contracts were complicated. If they were to start again they would make them less so. One of the changes made was to remove some of the service level requirements to simplify the contracts.
The Committee asked about ICT issues. Lack of investment by the CRCs in this affects productivity and data reliability and puts added pressure on hard pressed staff. How confident were they that the contract changes will address this and in what time scale?

  • RH said that greater investment on the part of the providers had been anticipated. 
  • There had been a delay in getting the Strategic Partner Gateway up and running. This had been projected to be available by June 2015 but was not in place until autumn 2016. Also none of the CRCs had linked in to it yet and 3 had decided they were not going to. The first CRC was due to switch in April 2018, subject to testing. It is expected a number will move over in the course of the year, but it is their decision. If they use their own systems they must be compatible – so it was a business choice. But investment is a big factor as in the variance in different IT systems, so it was a complicated area.
  • MS said that the contract changes will address the imbalance in the way fixed and variable costs are assessed. This will provide greater revenue from fee for service payments. The adjustment would mean the income to the CRCs more accurately reflected the appropriate costs putting them in a more stable position so they can invest, but this will also depend on what their expectations are as the PBR element is geared to increase into the life of the contracts. 
  • RH said the Ministry’s delay in implementing the Gateway (delayed by a year) had been a problem. Since then they had lent the CRCs a group of MoJ IT people to make sure they can build their systems – but would not venture to estimate the timescale in terms of how many months.
  • The CRCs had not been given a cheque for £278 million. The additional £278 m was the estimate of the amount which would be spent by 2022.
Evans asked further questions on Through the Gate and the impact on reoffending. The NAO report says that most CRCs are struggling financially and have invested little more than the minimum contract expectation. 

  • MS admitted this was one of the areas of most concern as had been identified in the department’s own reviews and by the Probation Inspectorate. It was variable across the CRCs but more investment support needs to be provided because if the CRCs are successful with TTG and the 40,000 short term sentence cases per annum receive better support they will make more money through PbR. The expectation was that this was where most of the investment would take place. 
Chris Evans questioned if there had been progress on the PAC recommendation in 2016 that there be more sharing of good practice and examples of what works. Also he noted that the NAO report says that links aren’t being made with other agencies e.g. police and other providers and asked what could be done to address this.

  • MS said that the Department does share examples of good practice but the providers can decide their own models. This was part of the aim of TR to increase diversity of provision.
  • They were doing more with NPS to enable it to act as a conduit for links with sentencers and the police and had created provider forums. However because this was one of the areas in which the CRCs are not required to engage it was not given priority by them in the face of squeezed finances. They had been looking at ways to encourage the CRCs to look outward and work with others. They needed to look at the contracts going forward to decide how much to specify for this activity in the contract. He explained that at present the contracts were deliberately light on specifics because they were geared towards flexibility and based on PbR.
The PAC asked detailed questions asked about the overpayments that had been made to the CRCs because of their under performance. The MoJ had indicated that they had not decided whether to take back all or part of that. They also questioned whether the lack of performance against targets also indicated that the performance of the CRCs was getting worse?

  • RH said the reason for this decision was so as to keep £9 million in reserve for use in the continuing negotiations with the CRCs. 
  • MS explained that in some cases they had taken service credits from CRCs when they had failed to deliver; in some cases they had accepted that the reasons for the failures were reasonable; and in other cases rather than taking service credits they had required the CRCs to invest the money to improve services.
  • Targets had been ‘rationalised’ and reduced from 17 to 12 in July 2017 and overall performance against targets was improving, however the quality of work was still not where they would want it to be and was still a significant issue. The Inspectorate would be inspecting each of the CRCs over the course of the next 12 months. 
Shabena Mahmood MP closely questioned RH and MS on why the problems outlined with the contracts had not been foreseen as all these matters were in the purview of the Ministry so could have been anticipated. The caseload was increasing by 20% as a result of the policy decision on statutory provision for under 12 month sentences. She could have told them that this would happen given the problems of working with this group. She said she was worried that all the expertise and all common sense seemed to desert officials at the point of setting up contracts.

  • MS said the contracts had recognised they would be volume change but the extent to which the more profitable orders i.e. accredited programmes had fallen against less well paid activities had not been i.e. the shift of fee for service provision against TTG PbR had not been.
  • The department had deliberately given all the information available to all the providers and the data lab had been set up to share all the historical data, so it was not only the MoJ that had underestimated the extent of change but also the providers.
  • RH said the costing of the new cohort of offenders had been clear from the outset. Also the higher caseload of people coming out of prison – TTG work –is less well paid because it is based on PbR with the expectation that if the CRCs were successful they would get more reward. What they didn’t anticipate was the change in sentences i.e. the drop in orders with activities and programmes (the better paid work).
  • RH said he thought it demonstrated the complexity of trying to deliver 1st generation contracts in a service which is subject to volatility from other factors.
The PAC questioned whether if, as indicated in the NAO report, the situation will be worse next year, how would they manage to operate? She further asked why TR was not piloted.

  • RH said it will be mitigated by the changes put in place which lifts some of the low level work up against the weighted annual volume range – i.e. they will pay more for the lesser activities. But it is hoped this won’t continue and they were working with sentencers to revive the use of programmes etc. so they hope this will improve matters.
Shabeena Mahmood further questioned therefore if TR was the right model then, why did their seem to still be a high risk to the public if things go wrong? She further asked if TR should not have been piloted. There was reference to the Doncaster and Peterborough PbR pilots, which showed PbR didn’t work well and asked given this data why was it decided to go down this road?

  • MS stated again that 40,000 offenders who had received no support or supervision now get some on release. 
  • Also he said it is still early to say if it is working as just one set of binary data is available at the moment. 
  • RH said this was getting into political decisions. The JSC was looking in to this and the arrangements. It was the officials’ job to make the arrangement work and the contracts to deliver as well as they can.
  • Under further questioning on pilots he admitted ‘we might have learned some things from pilots, but they would not have been able to deliver to the timetable set to start TTG supervison.
  • MS said there was some benefit in pilots and there was a pilot of PBR – but there was also the sentencing change and piloting this would have needed to be carefully worked through.
  • The Doncaster and Peterborough were different as it wasn’t based on a statutory requirement and it was a different approach.
  • It was a valid point about piloting but the political ambition was to move forward fast.
Caroline Flint MP pursued this pointing to the failings in terms of custodial rehabilitation, and asking if it wouldn’t have been better to work at improving that area before moving on to a far more challenging area. Were they over ambitions?

  • RH said the timescale was ‘pretty brave’ and it would have been nice to see the Peterborough Social Impact Bond pilot through to fruition. But he wouldn’t come down on one side or the other – it was for members of the Committee to decide.
SM returned to the ‘bail out’ and asked was he certain that the financial problems of the CRCs were solely related to volume of work and not other problems e.g. incompetence or issues of poor performance on the part of the companies.

  • RH said they wouldn’t have put the money in to the CRCs if we didn’t think they were good companies. 
  • MS said they had identified poor performance and addressed that. You wouldn’t expect a new service with new providers not to have problems and it would have been inappropriate not to address the real disconnect in the contracts.
SM pressed them further and said would he not accept that might be a concern among the public in the light of Carillion?

  • RH said that even if all of the £278 allowed for the contractual variations it would still be under the original budget.
Sir Geoffrey Clifton-Brown MP asked was not the reason they were spending less because of the reduced volume?

  • MS said it was not less work just different work i.e. more lower paid work. It was his responsibility to run an effective service and to look at what the service was providing and how much it was providing in terms of income.
The PAC noted that despite the additional £278m going into the CRCs but they were still projecting a loss of £443m. 

  • MS said this did not mean they were losing more. This was projected losses based on outcomes from PbR. The £278m is to stabilise the current level of income i.e. fee by service payments, but the projected loss will be based on PbR.
Caroline Flint pursued this further asking if the adjustment was made because administration had to be moved into fixed costs to make it fairer; can they provide a breakdown by CRC of fixed costs, because there is a huge variation across CRC’s? She also asked was he assured that some of this money isn’t going back to the parent companies.She cited Cheshire and Greater Manchester (Interserve) as an example of high admin costs and asked were they looking at whether some of the admin costs are going back into debt laden parent companies.

  • MS said the staffing adjustments in probation staff to address variance in volume and the change in activity is what can’t be done in under 12 months. The variation across CRCs reflects geographical location and cities versus country areas.
  • RH promised he would write and share as much as he could with the Committee in terms of financial information from the CRCs. The fixed staffing costs are not admin they are frontline probation staff. 
  • RH said they had an open book relationship with CRCs through external auditors. He was confident they were not paying for Head Office staff under the guise of probation, but would look at the two cases she had raised.
Shabeena Mahmood returned to the level of service and the service credits. She quoted the MoJ had allowed £3.3m of reinvestment in lieu of service credits, waived £2.2m and only taken £2m of the £7.7m due in service credits. She asked where is the ‘hard hitting penalty for poor performance’?They waived £2.2m of service credits for not good quality work – how bad do they have to be? She said all the risk seemed to be taken by the taxpayer. The department had just accepted ‘we got this wrong in the first place’ and kept paying out. 

  • RH said they were experienced contract managers. It was in no ones interest to push the contracting partner until they fell over. They were robust and rigorous; they had waived some service credits but not others.
  • It was necessary to take account of the whole position. The aim was to get the best quality of service for the public. The contracts were light on specifics with regard to performance because of PbR, so where they waived service credits they made it clear they wanted to see improvements outside of contractual requirements. 
  • MS pointed out that the CRCs were still projecting losses and overall the Department was still paying less than budgeted for. He was clear they were not paying for a service they weren’t getting but it was necessary to be fair and realistic about what the costs to the CRCs were.
  • RH said the department was not a push over but was involved in tough negotiations. However the CRCs continue to be loss making and it was about keeping the services going not increasing the CRCs profits. 
Caroline Flint said that if the CRCs are loss making how can it be certain the services they provide to reduce reoffending will work?

  • RH said there was another round of negotiations to come. They did not want to pay more than they had to but they did want to ensure the services continue.
The PAC asked when this would be?

  • RH said the key date would be when the PbR reoffending statistics come out later in January.
Shabeena Mahmood said as one of aims of the Reoffending Revolution was to produce innovations in reducing reoffending, could they outline the top 3 truly innovative initiatives to come from the CRCs. The PAC questioned if the projected income from PbR would be sufficient incentivisation for the CRCs? It seemed that the rate of reoffending was falling but the frequency rate of serial reoffenders was going up.

  • MS protested that it was unfair to expect him to provide these unprepared. Different models were being applied by the CRCs and there were some very different approaches e.g. engaging with those released following short term sentences in the community rather than bringing them in to the office and handing over direct engagement with offenders to mentors, etc. 
  • The focus was on making the system work and some CRCs would say they couldn’t do as much as they would want to.
  • MS said this was a key question to discuss with the CRCs when the frequency results were available. There was no comparison data for the under 12 month cohort because this was new – so they would need to see what it meant in reality in terms of profit and loss. 
The PAC questioned whether the matrix for PbR and not assessing results for payment until 2 years was fair on some CRCs who may have more prolific offenders.

  • MS said the aim is to incentivise CRC to work with ‘hard to work with’ people as they are the most difficult to stop reoffending. The next review based on outcomes should be in the public domain.
The Chair asked how long the next review would take i.e. when should the PAC look at this again?

  • MS said the results would be available at the end of January but they then need to discuss them with providers and engage with Ministers. They have stabilised the current provision. PbR comes in over the life of the contract and they will continue to look at it over the next 6 months. 
Chair asked them to keep in contact and report to the PAC. Caroline Flint asked if there had been discussions about what the position would be if a CRC goes bust in terms of staff pensions and the fact that the government is responsible for the pension bonds.

  • RH promised to write to the PAC about this.
Final quick questions

Q – was there competitive bidding for all the contracts?
MS – Yes

Q – Might some of the bidders have foreseen the problems and therefore put in higher bids based on a different way of operating?
MS – 5 of the CRCs were left with only one compliant bid at the end of the process.

Q – The risk of rewriting contracts after they had been let was that there might have been other and different bidders and bids if the contract had been like that from the start.
RH – assured the committee that they had taken legal advice and complied with EU procurement rules.

Q – given the reluctance to allow CRCs to fail is this the right model?
RH – provision of public services was the driving factor rather than not allowing CRCs to fail.

Monday, 22 January 2018

The Carillion Fallout

There's absolutely no doubt about it - the political fallout from Carillion's collapse is massive and at a stroke, completely altered the whole position relating to any further privatisation agenda the Tories might have been considering. In addition and as a bonus, it serves to highlight even further the failures of already outsourced public sector services and as if that wasn't enough, it's drawn renewed attention to the disaster called PFI, so beloved of Brown and Blair. 

Try as she might to put a brave face on things, - 'I will fine greedy bosses who betray their workers' - Theresa May and her government has now comprehensively lost the argument in the public/private debate with such hollow words. Jeremy Corbyn has been given a massive amount of ammunition in order to seize the non-Brexit agenda thanks to the public now being well aware of what happens when favoured private sector behemoths fail. There is very much a feeling in my mind of a number of celestial bodies coming into alignment and it must surely be good news for us and the criminal justice sector generally?

Lets start with a bit more insight into things leading up to the Carillion failure with this edited extract from the FT:-

Lack of political support doomed Carillion

As Carillion’s seven-strong management team sat down with its 160 bankers and advisers in Clifford Chance’s offices in Canary Wharf last week, they were confident they could still save the company from collapse. There was just one hitch. All the deals relied on state backing. By Sunday, and seeking just £25m in forward funding at an “ill-tempered” Cabinet Office meeting, Keith Cochrane, the company’s interim chief executive, found that support for the company had finally run out.

“We were reasonably confident,” says one person close to the board of Britain’s second-biggest construction company. “The one aspect that was vital was the support from the government.” What the Carillion team did not know was that when ministers arrived at the meeting, they had all but made up their minds. The political heat was high. Carillion executives left Westminster empty-handed.

By 7am on Monday Carillion, a business worth more than £2bn only 18 months earlier, was forced to announce that so dire was the state of its finances it would be liquidated, not put into administration. The decision sparked one of the largest financial collapses in recent UK corporate history; its effect seen on countless deserted building sites across the UK, hitting tens of thousands of workers, and in its operations in Canada and the Middle East.

The repercussions of Carillion’s spectacular bankruptcy after executives left the business with just £35m in cash, more than £1.35bn in debt and a £587m pension deficit have only just started to unfold. And fingers are being pointed at the management. “In the good old days the commercial rottweilers would have been through any contract. They never would have made lossmaking bids. But that all had changed. There was too much emphasis on short-term cash and they never really kept a close watch on the business,” says the person close to the board.

Less than a year ago, Carillion was still in favour among institutional investors in the City of London. Auditing firm KPMG had raised no serious questions as it signed off on the accounts. Richard Howson, chief executive at the time, had told the company’s annual meeting that it had “made an encouraging start to the year”.
 

--oo00oo--

Remember when the Forensic Science Service was abolished and replaced with a free-for-all range of alternatives? It's all going wrong as reported in the Guardian last week and this bit sounds very familar:- 
"Conservative ministers wanted to create a market in which independent companies competed for business."
Falling forensic science standards 'making miscarriages of justice inevitable'

Police forces are failing to meet the official standards for forensic science, making miscarriages of justice inevitable, the government’s forensic regulator has said. In her annual report, Gillian Tully highlighted her growing concerns about the failure of some forensic firms used by the police to meet basic quality standards. It means innocent people could be wrongly convicted and offenders escaping justice.

The routine outsourcing of criminal forensic work to unaccredited laboratories worries Tully, with some not subject to independent oversight. She told the Guardian that without urgent action there would inevitably be miscarriages of justice, including in cases involving murder, rape and child abuse. “If you’re not finding indecent images of children on someone’s phone when you should be, that’s a miscarriage of justice as much as if someone was wrongly convicted of a crime,” Tully said.

The government abolished the Forensic Science Service in 2012, which was the primary provider to the police and courts, resulting in forensic work being transferred to in-house police laboratories and private providers. Conservative ministers wanted to create a market in which independent companies competed for business. But most forces appear to be behind schedule in bringing their own laboratories into line with official standards, the regulator’s latest report shows. Just a few met the October deadline to gain formal accreditation to carry out digital forensic science work.

Police are also outsourcing large volumes of digital forensic science casework – the analysis of phones, computers and CCTV – to low-cost private forensic labs without any accreditation or oversight, the report said, describing this as “unacceptable”.

“Quality standards are not a nice-to-have extra that, if we have any money left, we’ll do some quality,” said Tully. “Doing something that you can’t necessarily stand behind in court is just inappropriate at every level.” The regulator said she would be examining whether failures to follow correct procedures in digital forensic science could have played a role in a number of high-profile rape cases that collapsed before going to trial. “I have formally requested more information on those recent cases,” she said.


--oo00oo--

With HMP Liverpool in the media spotlight last week following the official publication of the damning HMI report, the POA representative - I think it might have been their new Chair Mark Fairhurst - gave a bravura TV performance that covered the failure of 'Fair and Sustainable', regional and National HMPPS management, the MoJ, Carillion and in the process, made it plain the previous Governor had been scapegoated. It really must be time for Michael Spurr to fall on his sword in order to try and protect the Minister and failed Tory Party policies. 

Whilst we are discussing the dire problems at Liverpool, look where the drive to cut costs gets us as part of this whole contracting-out culture. This on the BBC website:-

Healthcare budgets have been cut at a prison described by inspectors as "Britain's worst".

A damning report on HMP Liverpool on Friday said it was "squalid". The BBC has now learnt Lancashire Care NHS Trust is leaving its contract with the jail in March citing the £6.7m it is paid to provide healthcare as "unsustainable". NHS England has offered new providers a five-year contact at £6.5m per annum - £200K less than Lancashire Care. It has said when a new provider is found, it can bid for additional money to develop the service.


Since 2011, there have been at least 17 suicides at the Liverpool prison, one of the highest figures in England. Healthcare staff have told the BBC that in recent months, pressures in the unit have contributed to at least three deaths, and the inspection report said staff shortages had had a negative impact on all aspects of health services.

Lancashire Care NHS Trust told NHS England, which commissions services, it had exhausted all efforts to recruit new staff and the price it was paid made the service "financially unsustainable". NHS England has advertised a five-year contact at £6.5m per annum but so far no providers have been forthcoming. The BBC understands NHS England will now speak to other trusts to persuade one to take over the healthcare services at HMP Liverpool.

--oo00oo--

Things are moving fast and there are already signs that politicians are beginning to sense the game is up and as we know, the MoJ contracting team are particularly inept. This in the Independent:-

Urgent review of £300m arrest warrant contract needed in wake of Carillion collapse, MPs demand

A £300m state contract to pay private firms to arrest people for not settling court fines must urgently be reviewed in the wake of Carillion’s collapse, MPs on an influential committee have said. Both Conservative and Labour members warned the new deal risks creating a “monolithic” nationwide provider, unable to properly monitor staff who will probably be physically restraining members of the public.

MPs on the Justice Committee also told The Independent the deal could put service delivery at risk, by potentially putting “all our eggs in one basket”, with a single firm enforcing warrants across the country. Their call to review the process comes as the Ministry of Justice (MoJ) tries to reduce spending following years of deep cuts, with civil servants hoping the new deal can deliver £3m of annual savings.

But the department’s outsourcing activity has repeatedly come under fire, with millions of pounds wasted and lucrative contracts handed to firms like G4S, which landed a 2017 deal despite having been fined amid a fraud inquiry. Monday’s collapse of Carillion has led to checks across Whitehall to ensure further public service providers are not at risk, leading members of the Justice Committee to shine a light on the MoJ’s current tendering processes.

Civil servants are expected in February to announce winners for the new contracts, which will see either several regional firms or one large national company paid some £290m to enforce warrants of debt collection and arrest for the courts. The Independent has already reported how business insiders sounded the alarm over the tender which they say is skewed towards favouring a big national company.

Labour Justice Committee member and former police minister, David Hanson said there is now enough concern to merit the department looking at the tender again. He said: “In the light of the collapse of a major single provider, it is right that there is more due diligence done on the tender for this prior to the issuing of any contract.

“We do not want a situation whereby one huge provider tenders for business, at a rate that offers a low profit margin and then finds themselves struggling to meet the obligations as has Carillion.” He was joined by Conservative committee chair Bob Neill who said there is a “genuine worry about putting all our eggs in one basket with a single provider”.

--oo00oo--

It was interesting to see that on last weeks BBC1 Question Time, tory MP Margo James was shouted down and called a liar by an angry audience when trying to deny that privatising the NHS was on their agenda. Post-Carillion, the Tories are definitely getting rattled judging by this also in the Independent:-

Senior Conservative MP urges Jeremy Hunt to put the brakes on backdoor NHS privatisation

A senior Conservative MP has called on Jeremy Hunt to put the brakes on plans which campaigners have previously claimed could open the NHS to privatisation. Sarah Wollaston, the chair of the Commons Health Committee, has written to the Health and Social Care Secretary urging him to delay a new contract for Accountable Care Organisations (ACOs) – due to be implemented later this year. She claims there is a “great deal of concern” over the plans which she considers “have not been well aired publicly up until now”.

According to the House of Commons Library, the little-known policy is a model of healthcare organisation where a provider or group of providers takes responsibility for the healthcare provision of a certain area. The providers are expected to take responsibility for a budget. The Government hopes the plans will dissolve the boundary between health and social care systems and integrate services, with the aim of improving the health of local populations. But critics of the planned system claim it would open up the NHS to privatisation and have launched a legal challenge against the changes.

The Department for Health and Social Care have previously strongly rejected such claims, adding it is “misleading” and “irresponsible scaremongering” to suggest ACOs are being used to support privatisation of the NHS. In her letter, Ms Wollaston said she is requesting the Government delay the introduction of the new contract for ACO until after the Health Committee “has taken the opportunity to hear evidence on the issues around the introduction of accountable care models to the NHS”.

She said: “As I am sure you are aware, a great deal of concern has been expressed about the development of ACOs in the NHS. I expect the Committee to consider these concerns, and the responses to them, in the course of its inquiry into sustainability and transformation partnerships, announced last autumn.”

--oo00oo--

It's probably as good a time as any to put a tentative step into economic theory and this is an interesting piece in a newspaper we've never featured before, a Scottish one, the National and the first to my knowledge to call-out the Carillion debacle for what I think it is - an old-fashioned ponzi scheme:-  

The Carillion story is proof our economic system is obsolete

The story of Carillion going into liquidation this week is more than just another business going bust with a pension fund gap. It’s more than a business story – it’s another warning sign that one of the key foundations of our entire economic system is failing. I have been writing in recent weeks about the need for a completely new approach to economics and therefore society. It is a viewpoint I first developed back in the late 1990s and in my 2001-2002 set of reports on what we called the “e-conomy” for The Herald and Sunday Herald. Many leading economic thinkers are now calling for a new economics and more and more think tanks and institutions are lobbying for reform.

Each economist or lobby group seems to have their own pet heterodox policy that they want adopted; sovereign money (Government-owned banking and currency creation), basic income, environmental sustainability modelling, zero growth (not as dumb as it seems) and multiple fairness and equality measures that you can bolt on to our neoliberal economic system to improve it. However, I have come to believe that is part of the problem. Almost no-one is talking about redesigning our economic system from the core principles outwards.

Take for instance the adoption by David Cameron in 2010 of wellbeing as a measure of economic progress. The Joseph Roundtree Foundation, Oxfam, the New Economics Foundation and several other key progressive forces championed that well-meaning move, but if it’s only an add-on to a corrupted and failing economic system, can any new metric seeking to address the symptoms and not the root causes of economic failure ever work?

Looking at the key and interlinked cornerstone beliefs of today’s dominant neoliberal/neoclassical economic system (Financialisation, Consumerism, Small Government and Globalisation) I can see signs that they are all failing. It’s going to get worse unless we do some serious rebuilding at the core of the system rather than just papering over the cracks with nice sounding new measures that tick boxes but change nothing.

Firstly, the issue with “Financialisation” is plain to see – the UK and many other western nations became over-dependent on the finance sector. That was the first cornerstone to crack in 2007, and the risk associated with the finance sector has not fallen sufficiently, and housing in London and the south east can still be described as bubble-like. But also the financialisation of everyday lives through easy credit, and the propensity for people to borrow to fund even basic consumption rather than by residual income, could still bring a personal credit crunch.

If inflation rises further, and interest rates are used control it, debt-ridden consumers will stop spending and the economy will tailspin.

The second cornerstone – “Small Government” – could also lead to the next economic crisis. We all understand the impact of light-touch regulation on banking but the negative impacts of outsourcing are just beginning to bite. PFI costs Scottish councils a billion a year and ironically Labour (who championed PFI in government) now talk about nationalising them – but that can cost more than maintaining them in many cases. Massive outsourcing companies like Carillion, Serco, Capita and Interserve grew out of the outsourcing boom, winning massive Government contracts at ultra low margins and squeezing costs. Those companies swapped margin for turnover and long-term contracts and so had to keep growing and winning more and more government work to pay the bills, wages and make returns to shareholders.

However, with austerity, the budget squeeze means that the outsourcing companies are unable to win enough new contracts to refinance their massive contracted outgoings. We have a phrase for that – we call it a Ponzi scheme, and Carillion is the first warning sign of what might become a new financial crises.

Ironically, austerity, the automatic response to fiscal deficit if you believe in “Small Government”, the driving force behind outsourcing, is now killing it. The drive for smaller government privatised profits in the good times and now we are nationalising the losses and bailing out pension schemes. Scottish Water, the Royal Mail, East Coast Rail etc all prove that private sector isn’t always more effective.


--oo00oo--

Finally, earlier on I mentioned PFI and to round this off lets have a quick trip down memory lane courtesy of a regular reader who pointed me in the direction of a brilliant 11-page Private Eye Special Report from March 2004 An Idiot's Guide to the Private Finance Initiative by the renowned investigative journalist Paul Foot. Well worth reading in full and highly enlightening as to how we got to where we are now, here's just the opening taster:-

This is the story of the private Finance-Initiative: how it became a jewel in the crown of New Labour, its savings, its costs, its pitfalls and windfalls, and how it changed the face of British accountancy and British politics...

Wind in the Willetts

Norman Lamont tinkered with it. John Major approved it. But the intellectual thrust for the idea of the private finance initiative (PFI) came from David Willetts, the Tory frontbencher nicknamed "Two Brains". In a pamphlet in 1993 called The Opportunities for Private Funding in the NHS, published by the Social Market Foundation and financed by the private health insurance company BUPA, Two Brains came up with a brainy idea. Instead of paying for hospitals by public funding, why not get reliable old private enterprise to build and run them - and then, at the end of the process, inherit them too? 

When he wrote the pamphlet, Willetts was a consultant to Healthcall, a private health firm. (In 1997, when the Tories lost office, he became an adviser to the Dresdner Kleinwort merchant bank, which rapidly became one of the great beneficiaries of PFI.) But back in the early 1990s, two brains were rather too many for Tory leaders of the day and the idea of PFI wasn't very popular in the treasury either. Senior civil servants liked to keep tight control on NHS spending and old-fashioned mandarins there felt the radical ideas of Two Brains might be going too far. 

When Kenneth Clarke succeeded Lamont as chancellor, he endorsed PFI and wrote it more firmly into the government's programmes. But he insisted that PFI would only work if the whole of the financial risk of a project was transferred from the public sector to the private sector. This caused a lot of concern to private contractors and banks. Their directors were prepared to bid for government contracts for which the government was eventually responsible, but were not at all happy about bidding for contracts for which private contractors might be held liable. 

Another worry was the Labour opposition whose MPs were inclined to oppose such measures as "creeping privatisation". So although Two Brains' theory was officially accepted by the Tory government, it never really got off the ground. As predicted by the sceptics, the idea infuriated Labour and the trade unions in 1996 the TUC vigorously opposed PFI and in a Commons debate on 1 May the same year, Labour frontbencher Sam Galbraith got to the root of the matter. 

"The private finance initiative", he concluded, "is basically all about government bodies borrowing money but not having it set against the public sector borrowing requirement." He forecast: "Today, the private sector will only get involved in the PFI within the health services if it carries no real risk." The result, he said, was "a financial sleight of hand, a massaging of figures as a result of which the increase in the public sector borrowing requirement is not shown and is thus a matter of deceit." 

In another debate another Labour frontbencher, Harriet Harman, denounced the concept of PFI in the NHS in terms that won warm support from her colleagues. "When the private sector is building, owning, managlng and running a hospital" she declared, "that hospital has been privatised." Yet unknown to Harman, the leaders of her party were engaglng in secret discussions to make sure that if and when they came to office, the private sector would do precisely that: build, own, manage and run new hospitals. 

Sunday, 21 January 2018

Pick of the Week 39

Powerful stuff! Well done to the anonymous PO who put in this submission. I do feel for them on a personal level and can relate to much of their experiences. I hope that after their period of grieving they are able to put their talents and experience to good use. There is life after CRC or NPS for that matter and additional opportunities for this individual given that they are also a qualified social worker. YOS for example. It is just so incredibly wrong that it has come to this and I hope that exposing the truth will make a difference.

*****
Well said. I spent 38 years in the Probation Service, starting in what was then Community Service and leaving in August 2014 when I had been an SPO for 10 years. I decided to get another job as I did not want to work for the French caterers who had predictably got the contract and EVR would only go to a few. The cost was huge, both emotionally and financial but I felt I had to take some control after some many attempts to just make me, along with my colleagues, pawns on the chess board.

I do not envy that SPO in the London CRC having to impose the rubbish that is coming from the centre. A crisis or phone call will rapidly derail the 30 min rule. It is all designed to stop offering a service to the client and the public at large. The destruction of the Probation Service will be examined by business graduates in years to come as an example of how not to do things.


*****
That's a pretty good submission. As well as the obvious anger it reads with honesty and passion. There can be no doubt that the state destroyed a valuable public service, and in doing so screwed over both those that work in it, and those that use its services.

*****
Took the money and ran what about staying and making the stand with the few against the corrupt and power?

*****
What are you talking about?! Very judgemental comment. It is virtually impossible to stay in many CRC's if you disagree with the corruption and speak out. You would end up being disciplined or sacked for misconduct and would struggle to work again. Better to leave and work for a reputable service.

*****
For the record I only took the salary I was owed. Some of us did not get any of the spoils- out of principle, in my case.

*****
Not really those who scurried for anything else taking their Voluntary severance made it easy for the employer. It then in turn weakened everyone else who was left but hey who cares as long as number 1 is ok right. Sympathy for the voluntary leavers is a waste save it for the sufferers stuck in CRCs and the incredible aggressive NPS. Many stated on here make them sack you then EVR would apply but too many back watchers scurrying for what was left. No I do not care for the cowardly and lack of solidarity. You wrong about getting the sack that is what the leavers were too afraid to argue about their jobs.

*****
Okay, we've rehearsed that approach many times on here. I still disagree. Do you apply that thinking to those who felt they could not or would not work for a privatised company and who, after exhausting all avenues to remain in the public sector, chose to leave? Were they "cowardly?" 
How about those who were suffering from ill health (incl stress, depression) as a direct consequence of the bullying, lies & game-playing by the privateers? Were they "back watchers scurrying for what was left?"

The people directly responsible for the hell probation staff & service users are having to endure are NOT your ex-colleagues. Responsibility sits squarely on the shoulders of Grayling, Spurr & those who enabled TR & split the Service - including the privateers, collaborators & the financiers who wet their pants at the thought of easy money through yet another Government contract "with an average value of £20 million to £25 million over the 10-year duration", and the ex-Chiefs who prepared the ground for privatisation then left everyone in the shit whilst they took off with handsome payouts of up to more than ten times the size of any severance payment.

The unions also have to take some responsibility for the weak & bizarrely worded NNC agreement that allowed the privateers a gaping loophole through which they drove their voluntary severance limousine. The trajectory of NOMS has always been away from Probation, more so under the Tories e.g. there isn't an explict ministerial role for Probation post-Gyimah. Rory Stewart describes himself as Minister for Prisons, even though Probation is one of his responsibilities alongside prisons.

*****
Post TR and the new order is agency worker lead. I am very conflicted about this (I am not an agency worker) It would be interesting to get some more views about this. I can see there are positives and negatives for the agency staff but what about CRC? Is it really a good idea to staff teams with people on short contracts who are doing compressed hours and travelling long distances, who never really get to know service users or their patch because they move on within 6 months so no real investment. Probably tick all the boxes re targets but what about service users?

*****
The NHS have a big problem with agency staff too. Not because they don't do good work, but they cost more, and moving frequently to different placements can't imbue any great sense of belonging or create a sense of commitment to any one place.

*****
Amongst all the questions that will be raised about Carillion and their relationship with the government and public services, I hope corporate confidentiality is high on the list. If you're paid to deliver public services then the public deserve transparency.

*****
Carillion tried to bid on probation work. Questions have to be asked if any of the CRCs are in the same position.

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This is what I have suspected for a long time now. Don't forget that Working Links were bought up by a bigger company Aurelius because they were in dire financial difficulty and this was allowed by MoJ and they tried to suppress the details.

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Agreed. In the vein of Carillion, public funds & venal Tories, the failing CRCs are a far more pressing issue with wider implications than the Warboys distraction. Gauke has a tough gig ahead of him, courtesy Grayling.

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Gauke does have a tough gig ahead but I don't think he knows this, just as the rest of his predecessors have not known. They all seem oblivious to the issues or decide to take on one issue in isolation from all the others, only to drop it when something else comes along. They seem to me like small children. Or else they just don't care. Their focus is elsewhere. Something else matters more to them, their own power perhaps? That is why throwing all the reasoned arguments and logic at them, all the proof that things are going pear-shaped under their management and rule has not so far been enough to sway any of them. Stick your head in the sand and it will all go away. And, so far, it has. Why? How? What else needs to happen to change their thick sculls and hides? Is Gauke any different? Would he have gotten where he is today if he were? Their own power and image is everything to that lot. We do need reasoned arguments, but we need something else in addition and fast.

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Back to London CRC, they are reckless with their staff. They seem to want to throw everything at them, all at once. Is this to see who or how many they can get rid of through sheer threatening behaviour, bullying? There may still be staff left after that first shaking of the tree who MTC Novo don't want to keep. These will need to be ousted by slightly more convoluted and time consuming methods such as performance testing/capability, sickness procedures, disciplinary procedures. But hey, if these are applied forcefully, employing all the usual methods of undermining the subjects and disregarding proper procedure, then this project should not take too long. An MTC Novo-wide coordinated effort across the board should ensure that the already barely functioning local union branch will not be able to provide the necessary individualised assistance required to save the day for any of their members. Easy peasy. And then what after that?

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After that you get Sodexo. Their 2015 clearances have left an ominous silence, save for a temporary whimper about Wimpy-style booths. The Message? Brutalising your workforce gets results, as does riding roughshod over any namby-pamby workplace legislation. MTCNovo are just getting started...

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Please please please let Interserve follow Carillion.....

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It could happen, they are certainly strapped for cash and another layer of middle managers due to be culled (UPW). Beginning of the end I feel - we're not making a profit and Interserve should hand the keys back.

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Astonishing to hear Lidington on Sky News express sadness at the impact of Carillion's demise upon "the Board". I'm assuming he meant the accountants & chancers who not only mismanaged the company but who paid themselves lottery jackpot salaries & bonuses AND changed the company's constitution in 2016 to make clawing back the cash bonuses to senior execs almost impossible? Unless he got confused & meant the Parole Board?

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It's not just Carillion is it? Whilst this is a disaster and I am sorry for all those concerned - service users, workers, supply lines etc, what I want to know is what will the government do about the process of privatisation full stop? Who monitors the performance of these private companies? Does anyone remember the process of contract compliance introduced by Labour-controlled local authorities in the 80s? It worked brilliantly then. We need it now!

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The Carillion collapse is huge, and will have a domino effect globally for some time to come. It's devastating for thousands of employees who've rinsed their credit cards and bank accounts to pay for Christmas and are expecting their first pay cheque of the year at the end of the month. But I would argue that it's even bigger than what we saw being discussed on the TV all day yesterday, and the government know it. It's considered disastrous enough to hold a COBRA meeting last night.

It's not just the big departments of government that have contracts with Carillion, it should be remembered that many local councils also have contracts with Carillion also. Birmingham for example use Carillion to manage their Christmas light displays. The collapse of Carillion saw all the other big outsourcing companies making gains on the stock market yesterday. With Carillion gone competition is reduced, and the likelihood of G4s, Interserve, Serco etc getting outsourced contracts has increased. 

There must be investigations, and serious ones too. There should also be an investigation into Graylings activities. He's already been summoned to the Public Accounts Committee over Virgin and Stagecoach, and questions were raised yesterday about why he gave Carillion huge contracts knowing they had just issued their 3rd profit warning, and announced they were about to default on their debts. Grayling was well aware of Carillions woes, and far from trying to assist them, he took the opportunity to exploit the situation.

Carillion needed contracts to convince their lenders there was money in the pipeline. Grayling knew they'd agree to any terms just so long as they could get a contract of any sort to take back to creditors. So I'd like to see just what terms and conditions Carillion had to agree to to get the HS2 contract? Grayling just wouldn't have missed the opportunity to exploit them. Shitbags like Grayling, in the end, are always found wanting. I hope this time it's his time.

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I think the above has hit a nail squarely on the head when he highlights the likely MO of Grayling doing deals. Bully, chancer, spiv - but always with someone else's money. JSC & PAC ought to be forensically combing the indecently rushed CRC contracts for his trademark hidden clauses which were probably never formally approved, just added 'on instinct', e.g. the termination penalties to effectively prevent the contracts being undone should the election have had a different outcome.

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The claim of being misled on TR contracts has already been called. It needs to be picked up and examined. If the Rt Honourable Minister is not screaming for a public apology for such an accusation then perhaps there's a bit of truth in it.

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On the one hand government spokesman saying that taxpayers will not pick up the cost of this. On the other hand all privateers who took over CRCs were given additional millions of pounds out of public purse to prop them up. What exactly did they do with this money? I see no evidence of it being spent on staff or service users. I suspect it all went to shareholders. It's our money!

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I don't know if Carillion will be a watershed, but it will cast a long shadow over the use of the private sector conglomerates delivering public services. We know private companies make excessive use of 'commercial confidentiality' until they have to go begging for bailouts. The bubble that private is best has now been burst and when the CRCs are questioned by the JSC they won't quite have the mystique they previously enjoyed. Maybe the political ground is shifting towards more public sector provision, because it carries less risk to the public finances. Whatever, I don't think it will be business as usual...

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Just my personal opinion, but I think some of the others will have already sent their begging letters, pointing out the tight profit margins they operate under, the continual struggle they face to pay creditors, it's challenging times for the outsourcing industry as the sad demise of Carillion demonstrates, we need a few more bob just to make sure we're running a stable ship. Thankyou very much Mr. Minister.

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Bankrupted Carillion = broken Tory policies of financing public services through privatised dealings. Therefore CRC time to go as the public sector should and will demand its safety and support services back. Which by the way are cheaper better more efficient and effective watch words CRCs use but clearly don't deliver as these get in the way of the wheel barrows of cash they are syphoning out the back door.

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The MoJ have serious questions to answer about their contracts with Carillion after Sam Gymah told parliament twice last year that Carillion were not performing as they should be with prison maintenance contracts. Still paid them millions though.

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Just met up with an old PO friend who told me about the farcical CRC operations in her area, so farcical we laughed despairingly. Some more humour then from the military:

'CarillionAmey want to reassure all military personnel that there will be no impact on services to your housing following the collapse of parent company 'Carillion.' 'CarillionAmey will still be late for every task, providing a shoddy standard of work using substandard materials whilst charging the sort of rate that private defence contractors expect in Iraq and Afghanistan.'

The trouble is this humour reflects a truth. For example, the basic premise of an outsourced payroll company is focused expertise that makes the correct payments, on time, to the right people. When it repeatedly does not happen they deserve at the very least some jokes at their expense. Problem is I still haven't found the humour in my depleted bank balance as yet.

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My prediction - Spurr ain't going to show tomorrow. He'll bring a note (from his mum or the Archbishop or Jesus) & retire gracefully to a place of untouchable safety before the voluminous pile of shit he's been nurturing finally hits the fan which is about to be plugged in & switched to turbo-boost. Heaton, Permanent Sec & skilled senior serpent, will undoubtedly direct everyone to the door where they can find the empty desks of HMPPS operational staff & whichever Justice Minister signed off on it.

For example, Working Links fell into the same trap as Carillion by overstretching, becoming insolvent and were bought up by a German asset-stripping fund, Aurelius. When such a scenario was raised by PAC chair it was made explicit by Spurr, Romeo & Brennan that NO CRC could sell on a contract - or be sold - without permission of the SoS (golden shareholder) and the MoJ. Who approved the hush-hush sale to Aurelius? Where is the public money going? Dino & co have been thwarted in their attempts to follow the money, so perhaps PAC could enlighten us?

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So does this mean Working Links have been illegally acquired by Aurelius? I have read Dino's Parliamentary submission recently which raises this issue in some depth. There has been no explanation or transparency from the MoJ how the asset strippers Aurelias came to own the Working Links company and MoJ contracts to deliver justice services. Has this been processed covertly? We are aware of the catalogue of scandalous, corrupt cabinet ministers being removed recently, so nothing would surprise me. Will uncovering the truth be down to the diligent and tenacious pursuit of it, by individuals such as the likes of Dino et all. How long will the MoJ remain silent while dirty deeds prevail? Aurelias and it's like will leave when the carcass is dry but no doubt they take staff the pensions to pay Directors bonuses.

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Question is.....Carillion were allowed to bid for TR contracts, what would happen now if they'd have got one? What have the MoJ got planned if one of the privateers running probation services goes tits up? Or they just want to pull out? What's the plan?

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Surely any decent journalist worth their salt can follow the snail trail from employment to justice and now transport and find a common denominator. Yes it is Tory ideology that is now unravelling but chief ideologue who has left fingerprints all over this lies with one man. I understand that backbench Tories nickname him Macavity the mystery cat..... nowhere to be seen.

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1. Excellent contribution from hostel worker
2. Interserve shares dropped by 15% this morning, but a slight rally to 9% drop just now...
3. Additional info from Carillion suggests this collapse had been long anticipated & Carillion were effectively trying to play chicken with govt over rescue package.
4. Its been suggested Grayling gave contracts to Carillion as part of this game of chance. Wonder if that was linked to Carillion's generous funding for May's leadership bid? Or the GE?

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Again it's heartbreaking to hear dedicated staff speak of being betrayed by organisations we've worked years for - working in hostels you are the first point of contact for the high risk offenders who reside there as our guest speaker stated, especially at weekends when there are no other services available. Apart from the abhorrent way hostel staff have been treated I feel for the residents of those hostels who due to their offences will be required to remain till their PO states otherwise - what effective work will be completed in order to attempt to reduce someones risk in the community if the staff they employ have no skills no expertise and are paid in washers!! - will this have a knock on effect to prison releases if the Parole Board have no faith in where an offender is to be released to?!

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Approved premises are already under strain, they are getting by on use of many many sessional workers and a small core of permanent and dedicated workers. The situation is far from ideal. I would caution the Government against facilitating further Private predation and profit in Approved Premises on the basis that the system is already strained. I also predict a flight of experience and professionalism if this were to happen which inevitably will lead to grave consequences. The outsourcing revolution has gone too far and as we are witnessing the costs of putting the house back in order is both complex and costly.

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I read with interest in today's Independent an article relating to Carillions collapse, but focusing on the not very often spoke about the "Social Value Act." I'm sure the privatised probation services flies in the face of that act as many local services that used to interact with probation no longer do.

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Enabling Environments certification is just an income generator for the Royal College of Psychiatrists - sold to Probation by snake oil sales folk. Numerous staff hours spent by staff compiling 'scrapbooks' of 'evidence' and information noticeboards to show the EE assessors.

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Another missed opportunity by the opposition to hold the government to account during PMQ’s over this fiasco. I like Corbyn the person, but he’s no leader. Missed too many open goals. You want him in your team but not playing up front. The country’s journalists are the one acting as the opposition at present. This sort of thing should be rattling the government. But they are not bothered.

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I think the Parole Board have to some degree already lost faith in AP's. As a PO at a recent oral hearing I was given quite a bit of grief for recommending an AP asking what they could do for the prisoner? I was at a loss really. The rot set in when they took away the Programmes and groups which used to be a feature of an AP. I recall a time when you had a menu of activities you could pick for your case. Long gone. For many years AP's have just been holding pens where the only thing monitored is sleeping patterns.The SU gets up, goes out and then comes back for curfew. I say this as someone who does relief. It's not the staffs fault, they are very dedicated. It's the ideology of cost cutting weasels in Government.

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AND THERE YOU HAVE IT. At timecode 15:01:25, Spurr describes the 'new idea' that isn't yet working and for which HMPPS are giving away taxpayer money hand-over-fist. It was...

"...to give responsibility to an organisation that works with these people in custody, and once they've left custody, who can marshall support from other services, who could work innovatively with those other service groups in order to support these individuals, and that was one of the main aims of the reform programme..." I can't type what I want to say next...

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When talking about Warboys' case Caroline Flint proves she hasn't a single firing neuron, despite her new glasses - but Spurr can't articulate what the situation is either. I doubt anyone would be able to make any sense of their unhappy exchange. AND THEN the Chair starts saying that HMPPS should provide the CRCs with enough money to get their ICT up & running!

Let's be clear - the privateers bid to run the contracts because it was a licence to print money. All they had to prove was that they had £Hundreds-of-Millions of financial backing - but NOT cash in their hand (see Carillion). They paid £1 for each CRC they bought, they inherited all of the CRC assets, they were given £80M to pay off staff in order to cut their overheads (although they pocketed most of it for themselves), then they were given even more £M's because they were crying about reduced throughput. Surely they should sort out their OWN ICT ffs!?

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Excellent challenge to Spurr by Shabana Mahmood about the alleged 'unforeseen' issues; Spurr's clearly irritated - almost angry - reaction is (I paraphrase): "OK, so we got it a bit wrong, but we didn't project the volumes for the bidders AND the figures were there in the databank for the bidders to see and they didn't get it right either! So we're not to blame. They are!" In my head: You got it so very badly wrong, dickhead. That's why you're handing out new contracts and more cash.

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Spurr - "blah, blah, complexity, blah, volatility, blah, first generation contract, blah, complexities, volume changes, blah..."Shabana Mahmood: "So, Mr Heaton, Mr Spurr - is this even the right kind of model that we should be considering for this kind of service given that when it goes wrong...and it does go wrong, often..."

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Flint has now started to fire those neurons & gets stuck into Spurr...Spurr (by now, riled as fuck): "The Doncaster pilot & the Peterboro pilot were different mechanisms completely, they didn't involve the statutory requirement for the under 12 month group, um, the decision was taken to go to scale on addressing the group of under 12 month offenders and the way to do that was to use the community model rather than the prison model, and that's why we proceeded with the TR reforms"

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Multi-disciplinary IOM's have been effectively dismantled by TR; but now, suddenly, the CRCs are being financially disadvantaged in the metrics by the anomaly of persistent & prolific offenders - "something we'll have to address when we adjust the contracts!"

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Under a CarilIion shadow, I thought Heaton and Spurr had a decent enough grilling by the PAC. There was a defining moment when Spurr - in light of all the claims about the innovations that the private companies would bring to probation – was asked to name just three innovations that have marked the rehabilitation revolution. He waffled in response, citing partnership working, mentoring and other commonsense practices that were core probation practices pre-TR. It was plain to all present that there has been no innovation – unless you include cost-cutting, office closures and degraded working arrangements in open-plan settings and dodgy venues.

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Interserve has signed a £12 million contract with the Ministry of Justice to run six employment workshops at HMP Berwyn, a large new prison in Wrexham for five years. Okay, so what are people going to get if they spend £200,000 a month to run employment workshops in one prison? Sounds like it must be state-of-the-art rocket science staffed by University Professors. Shall we assume 24 staff? HMPPS have already told PAC that staffing costs are the majority of rehabilitation services' fixed costs - let's assume 70%, so the 24 staff will be costing £5,000+ a month each - with about £60,000 a month for other costs. Not a bad set-up they must have at HMP Berwyn OR......a shitload of taxpayer money is disappearing into shareholder & execs pockets.

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Michael Spurr says that the £342 million paid additionally to the CRC's is windfall money simply being ploughed back into the contract. This is not even being "economic with the truth" as it is downright dishonest. If the CRC's are looking at such vast shortfalls on expected profits, as they themselves have admitted, how can there be a windfall of millions of pounds? 

There has been no cost savings as the MoJ had to pay out millions for not getting the computer systems ready to "talk to" the CRC systems on time and money has been wasted on associated projects such as monitoring the contracts (fat lot of good that is doing) and on attempting to make some headway (none so far) on Through the Gate. Spurr, like Grayling and others are not strangers to the truth - they have never even been introduced! How do we get rid of such meddlesome "priests"?

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Back in 2011/12 there was quite a focus on mutuals, and some funding for schemes were made available. Unfortunately, the neolibral desire to detach the state from anything public won through and the way to achieve that aim was to instead to focus on wholesale privatisation. I think the appetite for mutuals maybe returning now.

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Just another distraction. Mutuals may have been viable as an alternative to Trusts, but now they've sampled the 'power of power' the concept will be corrupted by the greed of egocentric vultures who have shown how willing they are to sell out their staff for handsome reward. I certainly agree the Trusts were the ideological precursor to TR, creating 42 discrete fiefdoms with 42 'chiefs' to seduce, divide & rule. For the most part they played right into the hands of the ideologues - and yes, the ideology came before Grayling & even before the coalition govt. It was a Blue Labour initiative tee'd up by the legislation snuck in by the arrogant closet capitalists in 2006/7; the very same legislation that Grayling seized upon to impose TR.

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Yes that is the honest summing up of where all this started and goes back to. Often gets lost in the even more awful implementations that followed. Absolutely why many people have realised the neoliberal so-called left agenda was in fact a wolf in sheep's clothing, and why it must stop, sooner rather than later. That is why we need a proper Labour left wing, and the party needs to defeat the dangerous Torys, (and the right of the left!) There lies some hope in the sort of values many of us want for a more human and tolerant society - which includes management of offenders, and effective rehabilitation strategies - because carry on like we are and it'll end up with the everyone death penalty, and people having their hands chopped off for shoplifting. But then we all get what we ...vote for.

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Leading up to the last election Michael Gove said that the public were fed up of experts and armchair philosophers. Well, this is a good example of that sort of rubbish. The Titanic of Probation is sinking and these two are worrying about what the orchestra is playing! What have either of these two characters contributed to the fight to preserve any sort of service? What ability do they have to influence the political agenda on Probation? What do they think they can achieve by posting this sort of stuff on Facebook? Honestly! Please grow up.

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I know it's "on probation blog" but, is probation really in any worse a state then the NHS, prisons, schools, social care, manufacturing or retail? Probation is one part of a very broken society and economic system. Understandably everyone focuses on the parts that affect them the most. But capitalism doesn't work for 95% of the population because they haven't any capital. At least not enough capital to compete on a fair plying field.

Are mutuals the answer? They're certainly better then the profit first corporations that are swallowing everything up, and not just for probation but across the social spectrum. But the real answer is the election of a government with a social ethos. People and profit can live side by side quite happily if it's not an exploitative relationship. Society functions best when the people that belong to it have some stake in it, so mutuals and cooperatives are a step in the right direction, but we need a leap. We need a change of government.

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Raho and Rogers the Rolls Royce of the union voice? A lot of reading which is really a view on the ideology without much else. Boring as it was the highlight for me was the old blue eyes brown eyes socially constructed and artificially adopted by NPS we are the new elite, my manager confirmed this. Why are we so confident, because we are the remaining public service. The rest CRC sold off as not so important. It's a poor indication the trade Union senior management engage in these musings. They should be busy in real challenges and defence of the memberships who pay their salaries. 


There should be no defence to setting public services into mutual our work going is where they are opening the door to all comers not professional PO. It illustrates further the wrong direction from this pair. They have an accord the pathway they walk is more of the same error because they agree alternative models should be state funded than wholly public sector ownership. This is enough of a reason not to support these two washed ups trying to ride two horses. Why, what sales pitch is being hawked here? The calamitous departure from national collective bargaining was orchestrated by Rolls and Royce as a pair weakening local and national structures. They have damaged the standing of the Union they are supposed to strengthen. What is going here? It is well known National collective bargaining was our unifying force. Where does this stuff come from anyway? Should it not be on behalf of NAPO and published on the NAPO site?

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Funny, I never saw the probation trusts as progressive or especially devolved as they were all too busy aping each other to show who was the leanest by cutting away as many conditions of service as possible - always with the assurance they were protecting jobs. So not a role model in my view.

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Raho and Rogers were not in anyway responsible for the end of national collective bargaining, that was never sustainable after the split. Napo did well prior to the split to get the Probation Trusts around the table and even then there were some who would rather not have been there. They observed what had already happened and anticipated the direction of travel, rather than covering this up or minimising this as some might have done. The NPS were the first to walk away and when the owners started to walk, the only option was to negotiate local collective bargaining with the CRCs and national with the NPS. Remember NPS and CRC employers found it a waste of time and served notice to quit. 

NAPO did not have the strength and the MoJ did not have the political will (Spurr?) to sustain it. Do you seriously think that the MoJ would have given two hoots if Napo had threatened industrial action over this? Do you think the public would have given a toss about it? The MoJ knew that the bids included job cuts and other nasty surprises and that is why they were and are top secret. Do you seriously think that Grayling or Spurr would have gone out of their way to empower unions to force private companies into any sort of legally binding agreement to bargain with them collectively if they weren't forced to? To think otherwise would be naive. 

Napo is fortunate that at least some of those involved are awake and know when a battle is lost. Had membership been increasing dramatically and there was a grass roots groundswell of probation staff demanding that the employers go back to the table, then perhaps one or two of them might have thought twice, but what you find with the probation employers is that they all loathe each other almost as much as they loathe probation staff and finding innovative ways to stick it to us is the only thing they have in common.

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In the media, reports about conditions at Liverpool prison focus on drones, drugs, squalor and various aspects of prisoners' safety – a third of prisoners reported feeling unsafe at the time of the inspection. The report puts some focus on prisoner-staff relations – it found that almost a half of prisoners feel victimised by staff. This includes verbal abuse and assaults by staff. There's also evidence of unofficial punishments being meted out by staff who have a tendency to wear balaclavas when unwarranted by the situation at hand.