Guest Blog 110

When the System Sets the Risk, Who Carries the Blame?

Excellent piece, particularly the acknowledgement that sometimes the difference between becoming the subject of an SFO review and never experiencing one is not necessarily professional competence, but luck.

Risk assessment is not clairvoyance. Practitioners make judgements using the information, resources and time available to them at that moment. Yet after an SFO almost every action of the individual PP [Probation Practitioner] can be reconstructed: what was recorded, what wasn’t, whether an assessment was updated, whether information was acted upon and whether recall should have been considered.

The question is whether the organisation is examined with anything approaching the same forensic intensity.

And that question becomes even more important with everything now being introduced through OFPS, [Our Future Probation Service].

HMPPS is attempting to release around 25% of practitioner capacity. A new tiering model will determine how supervision is targeted, with seven tiers and maximum rather than minimum contacts. Practitioners will have to review all of their cases as the new arrangements are implemented, including ensuring the relevant risk indicators are captured. At the same time there are changes to supervision packages, increasing reliance on actuarial tools, the removal of practitioner access to the WMT and the additional pressures coming from sentencing reform and electronic monitoring.

These aren’t simply administrative changes. They are organisational decisions about risk.

If HMPPS determines through OFPS that a particular category of case should receive less practitioner resource, and a PP manages that person within the supervision framework HMPPS has designed, what happens if that person subsequently commits an SFO?

Will the review ask whether the model itself allocated sufficient professional time to that case? Will it examine whether the tier was appropriate, whether the supervision package was sufficient, what workload the PP was carrying and what other work they had been instructed to deprioritise?

Or will we once again work backwards through the individual practitioner’s records looking for something they might have done differently?

There is a particularly uncomfortable contradiction here. HMPPS is redesigning probation specifically because it accepts there isn’t sufficient capacity to continue doing everything currently expected of practitioners. Yet practitioner access to the WMT is disappearing just as these changes arrive.

Potentially, therefore, the individual PP becomes more retrospectively measurable while the organisational constraints around their practice become less objectively measurable.

That is exactly how defensive practice is created.

And perhaps this is the real test of whether SFO reviews are genuinely about learning. If HMPPS wants practitioners to embrace a new model that deliberately targets finite professional resource according to assessed need and risk, then HMPPS must be prepared to own the consequences of that model too.

Accountability cannot stop at the practitioner when the parameters within which that practitioner was working were designed much further up the organisation.

Anon

Guest Blog 109

When Fear Leads, Probation Fails

SFOs and the culture of blame in Probation

HM Inspector of Probation, last month published a Research & Analysis Bulletin looking at how the Probation Service can learn and improve practice following Serious Further Offences (SFOs).

I read this with interest: in my time I spent as a Probation Officer I had my fair share of sleepless nights worrying someone I supervised would do something terrible. I would hear news reports about a crime and run through, in my head, whether anyone on my caseload could have been in the location it happened in, and when I would get news, someone had been arrested my heart would beat faster and I would feel panicked as I waited to hear what for.

As my career developed so did my greatest fear– fairly or unfairly – that, should the worse happen, I would be ‘hung out to dry’, and left unsupported to take the sole blame. I feared I would be shamed for negligence and incompetence that led to the harm of another person – making me as bad, if not worse, than the person who actually committed the SFO. I became frightened that one day I would wake to my name and personal details appearing in the national press – and my professional reputation forever tainted, with no right to reply or opportunity to give an explanation.

Of course, SFO reviews are intended to promote learning. But as the HMIP Report shows, staff experience the reviews as failing to reflect the complex realities of frontline probation work, and actually being about allocating blame to individual practitioners, to divert attention from the organisational and systemic factors that contribute to SFOs.

I was fortunate, no one I supervised ever caused me to be the subject of an SFO Review. Not because I was especially skilled – but because I was lucky. I saw some truly amazing Officers subject to brutal SFO Reviews and, frankly some poor Officers never subject to one. Because that’s the nature of working with people – sometimes things happen that you cannot predict. Other times you might have strong suspicions – but nothing you can evidence, or you try to get resources to help someone – and they simply are not there – or not there in time.

Of course, there are times when Probation Officers practice is poor. But – for a long time now Probation staff have worked in a very poorly performing service. Consistently, the Inspectorate reports detail a service in failure. Staff are constantly holding more cases than they should be, they are covering cases for absent colleagues, they are having to act as proxy housing officers, chasing referrals in an increasingly disjointed system.

Despite being exposed to seeing and hearing some of the worst parts of human behaviour – both in terms of the crimes the people they supervise have committed and the, often, trauma filled background those same people come from, probation staff rarely receive any clinical supervision or genuine assistance to process this.

Probation staff are encouraged to ‘build their resilience’ but little is done, to help them do that. The systemic problems in the Service, are something staff are expected to deal with and rise above – and if you can’t – well you must be to blame.

Of course, the result of a staff body living with this kind of pressure and fear is a culture of defensive practice. Every decision is seen through the lens of ‘what if the worst happens?’ Even when nothing in the person’s history suggests the worse will happen. The recall rate – now at record levels, is, in my opinion, testament to this.

The irony is, people enter the Probation Service wanting to deliver relational, rehabilitative practice. Inspectorate reports demonstrate staff worried to admit any deficits in their practice, and staff worried to commit fully to relational practice, for fear of the consequences and, as such, a learning culture is simply not possible, and Probation fails to be the service of rehabilitation it could be. It’s hardly a surprise retention is such an issue in the service.

But blame doesn’t keep people safe. Learning, ultimately does. And until probation chooses learning as the central part of its culture, rather than fear, it will never be the rehabilitative service our communities deserve.

Kelly Grehan - In Justice Blog
@kellygrehaninjusticeblog

After 20 years working for the Probation Service in London, and 3 years working for MPs with justice briefs in Parliament, I now work for a justice charity. So fed up of the false discourse about justice I have decided to start blogging about it.

After HMIP published their (excellent) bulletin on serious further offences by people on probation, I felt compelled to write about the experience of staff being on the end of these reviews.

Anger Is Mounting

Just in from a contributor:-

I have read the comments on here and feel that unless the mood is represented to the government yet again probation will take the blame. Where are the unions when needed certainly not working in our interest and probably not working. Always chuckle when I see the Probation Officer/NAPO chair at the bottom of an email, the NAPO bit why? It doesn’t get you any further or any more recognition, actually it is the badge of a shirker! 

The unions should be challenging the government asking for more money for the hard working operational PO’s. Should be having a ballot, taking strike action and let all the NPS lackeys manage the cases. Hmmm the majority couldn’t do an RMP let alone interview an offender, that is why they are up the greasy pole! Yet again we are playing probation Hokey Cokey, you put the training on, take the training off, on, off, on, off, you do the Hokey Cokey and turn around here’s an SFO!

There are limited AP places, AP’s are closing, there is no housing, you can have a tent, you cannot have UC unless you fill the application on line and it’s the summer holidays and half the probation workforce are on late starts and early finishes to pick the kids up from summer activities! Is that supervisor in possession of an up to date DBS? Successive governments have not built enough prison places, so when a police officer is killed there is not enough room at the inn because you are on EDS and not mandatory life because again the woke CJS does not want bad press.

I know what, if we knock all the very high and high riskers down to medium we can pass the case on to unqualified staff and they can take the SFO hit. Never I hear you cry, oh yes is my response you must tick the box or the SPO will throw their toys out of the pram because the PDU lead has blamed them and so it goes, sh*t only runs one way and who catches the lot?

It was a bad news day today so they announced a review of work descriptions, there will be no more money because the unions are involved bowing serf like to the bosses selling the membership out. 

Roll on Friday, laptop off until Monday, whatever happens over the weekend you don’t pay me enough to give a damn. In fact as a seasoned and experienced PO I miss the meeting the punter in the cafe for breakfast, popping to the building site for a brew, a leisurely home visit on a sunny day, that was when we had a professional, advise, assist and befriend, now its let’s do 15 months, get my degree and a DBS and off I go. 

There is no loyalty as loyalty works two ways and there is no respect, you have to earn respect and frankly I don’t respect those above me all they want is the targets met no matter how and no matter what the cost whether that be a mental breakdown or resignation. 

Happy Tuesday.

Anon

A Service In Its Own Right

In the wake of the Usman Khan inquest verdict, silence from HMPPS high command and probation about to be totally subsumed by bureaucracy, here's former BBC home affairs correspondent Danny Shaw making the case for something novel:-

"But treating offender management as a service in its own right, a service delivered by a probation system which is invested in, nurtured and valued, will undoubtedly reduce the risks and help save lives."

Risking it all

It all felt sadly, appallingly familiar.

When the inquest jury concluded that failings by the police, probation and MI5 had contributed to the deaths of Saskia Jones and Jack Merritt at Fishmongers’ Hall in London it reminded me of three other cases where those entrusted with protecting the public simply hadn’t done what they should have done. The failings in each case were similar to those which led to the killings of the two University of Cambridge graduates in November 2019 - but none involved a convicted terrorist. It serves as a reminder that we should not see what Usman Khan did at Fishmongers’ Hall as an isolated event, unique to terrorism.

In 2016, there was the case of Leroy Campbell, a violent sex offender who raped and murdered 37-year-old Lisa Skidmore, attempted to kill her elderly mother and set fire to Lisa’s flat in Wolverhampton. At the time, Campbell was under probation supervision, having been released from prison four months earlier. An official review said the “most striking” of a string of failings was a decision by probation staff “not to respond actively enough to a clear indication that risk may be increasing notably”.

The following year, 28-year-old Quyen Nguyen was found burned to death in her car, near Sunderland. She’d been held captive, tortured and raped. The two men responsible for her murder, Stephen Unwin and William McFall, were both convicted killers who’d been on life licence after being let out of prison. At the inquest into Quyen’s death, the Coroner pointed to a series of mistakes in the way Unwin and McFall had been monitored saying they’d been “emboldened in all of their unlawful activities by what they must have perceived as the failures on the part of the authorities to expose their deceit”.

And in 2019, the year of the Fishmongers’ Hall attacks, a convicted burglar, Joseph McCann, carried out a terrifying campaign of sexual violence against eleven women and children two months after he’d been released from prison. An independent report set out a number of shocking failings including the loss of crucial information as probation officers struggled to deal with their caseloads. Staff missed eight opportunities to activate the recall process and send McCann back to jail, before he launched the attacks.

The circumstances of each of these cases are different, of course, but the themes, when examined in detail, are the same: a readiness to accept the word of manipulative, dangerous offenders allied to a lack of curiosity about what they were up to; a failure by agencies and staff to share vital information; and poor case management linked to pressures of workload and inexperience. The themes will doubtless ring a bell or two for those who’ve followed the Fishmongers’ Hall inquest.

However, the focus of the Government’s response to that avoidable tragedy has been to frame it almost completely in the context of terrorism. So there’ll be tougher sentences in terror cases, with more terrorism prisoners assessed for release by the Parole Board; polygraph tests for terrorism offenders on licence will be introduced; and more probation staff and psychologists will be trained in counter-terrorism. These are welcome developments but they don’t get to the heart of the problem: the system for rehabilitating all offenders, for managing them in the community, for protecting the public has been severely stretched to the point where, in some areas of England and Wales, it is all but broken.

Although a number of agencies play a part in monitoring offenders, the responsibility primarily falls on the probation system whose deficiencies have been highlighted in a succession of worrying reports. In his annual review, in December 2020, Justin Russell, the chief inspector of probation, set out his concerns. “For more than 15 years, probation funding has been on a downward trend,” he said. “Government spending per person under supervision is down 40% in real terms since 2003/2004.” Russell said the area which suffered from the “weakest performance” and which “most concerned” him was work managing the risk of harm, in other words, protecting people. “Time and again, we are finding that some of the fundamental tasks of effective risk management have been missed,” he wrote.

So what is the remedy? Ministers are pinning their hopes on a new model of offender supervision to be implemented on June 26. It is a massive and complex change that involves staff from 54 separate organisations, including 7,500 in the private and voluntary sectors, coming together under the auspices of the state-run National Probation Service. That the preparations for the overhaul are taking place during a pandemic has made it all the more challenging. Indeed, in his latest report, Russell revealed that it could take “at least four years” for the new structure to be fully in place. “There will be inherent risks,” the chief inspector warned, citing “acute” staff shortages in some places, potential “gaps” in rehabilitation support and concerns that progress in helping prisoners resettle in communities will be set back.

The consensus is that the new, unified probation system will be more effective than the existing two-tier set up, under which low and medium risk offenders are dealt with by privately-owned community rehabilitation companies and those posing the highest threat supervised by the state. However, as Russell has noted, the reforms are not a “magic bullet” and must be backed by extra resources, particularly so that vacancies can be filled and staff receive the training they need.

For probation officers, change is nothing new. The Government promised a “rehabilitation revolution” in 2010, repeating the pledge in 2012 when its ill-conceived plans to partially privatise the system were announced. The “revolution” never materialised and in many respects rehabilitation provision and offender management have deteriorated over the past decade, increasing the risks to the public.

We will never know whether a properly funded and less battered probation service would have stopped Campbell, Unwin, McFall, McCann or even Khan. And we shouldn’t pretend that the risks posed by offenders can be eliminated through better information sharing, more sophisticated training and rigorous case management. But treating offender management as a service in its own right, a service delivered by a probation system which is invested in, nurtured and valued, will undoubtedly reduce the risks and help save lives.

Danny Shaw

Who Is To Blame?

Regular readers will be aware that the subject of SFO's have been to the fore this week as a result of the Janet Scott Inquest. We need to return to the subject as I notice a book has just been published by Alison Moss the SPO involved in the Leroy Campbell case. We covered this in a blog post 'SFO's - Who Is To Blame?' in 2019 based on an article written by Hardeep Matharu. I think it's worth reminding ourselves of the resulting exchanges that blog post generated:-

MO's were clearly designed as a way of blaming the officer while at the same time exonerating the SPO...in my time (20 years plus) I have seen the culture change from one of trying to identify systemic failures to one where because you didn't follows the action points to the letter following an MO the onus is well and truly on you and for areas that don't yet have MO's (Management Oversights) resist them with everything thing you have. Ladies and gentlemen we are truly in a blame culture...Anon.

Please read my comment below. You might need to rethink your views about Management Oversights and SPOs avoiding blame... Alison Moss

As the SPO who was sacked over the Campbell case, (not the one referred to as involved in the article) I have a great deal to say about the way the SFO was handled by the NPS and, of course, the topic of scapegoating. Also I have answers to some anomalies, for example why the inspectorate found it odd’ that no one was disciplined at the time (my own disciplinary action started 19 months after the SFO actually). But I am not able to explain the full story and the manner in which the NPS handled this until all proceedings are concluded. Alison Moss.

All the best in your battle Alison, Grayling et.al., should be in the dock for this, not you. Anon.

Thank you for your comment. I really appreciate your support. I have had very little support over the past 5 months since I got the boot, after 27 years in the job, having worked with hundreds of colleagues. But four or five colleagues have been SO fantastic that it makes up for the silence from all the others. Alison Moss

Just noticed your responses Alison - must have been extremely traumatic for you. I find it's an extremely difficult area for the blog precisely because I'm only too well aware these cases involve real people; real colleagues, but at the same time I feel it's important that the story about what really happened and where responsibility should fall is told. I can always be contacted in confidence via the email address on the profile page if you feel it might be helpful. Take care, Jim Brown.

Thanks Jim, I know what you mean about real people and real lives. Lisa Skidmore lost her life, I only lost my job and that puts it alll back into perspective. I will tell the full story on the blog and also in the wider public arena in time but it will take months before the inquest and tribunals are concluded. Just focussing on trying to rebuild my life at the moment, it is not easy. Alison Moss.

Hi Ali, As an ex Napo member I know (Just a little) of your case....your comments, above, reminded me of you ........and all the other hard working professionals within the Probation Service and CRCs who are dedicated and work tirelessly to manage risk. I can only imagine how difficult it has been and must still be for you. I wish you well .......and for what it's worth you have my support and thanks. Anon.

Much appreciated thank you. Alison Moss.

--oo00oo--

From Amazon:-

In July 2016, serial rapist Leroy Campbell was released from prison, having spent seventeen years behind bars for yet another horrific sexual offence. Just four months later, he brutally raped and murdered a stranger, Lisa Skidmore, in her own home. He subjected her to a horrendous two-hour ordeal. Weeks earlier, he had warned probation staff he felt like committing another rape. Could anyone have prevented him?

Numerous professionals were involved in “rehabilitating” Campbell and all believed he was safe to roam our streets. How did he manage to fool them all?

This is an important book: a compelling insight into this case which examines sentencing guidelines. It also gives case studies of other dangerous criminals who were under probation supervision, only to rape or murder again.

The author, Alison Moss, was the Senior Probation Officer in Campbell’s case. She describes what happened two years after the murder when the Skidmore family called upon the government, including the then Prime Minister Theresa May, to ask why Campbell was free to target Lisa. 

Only then was it decided that someone needed to be held to account for Lisa’s murder. Eventually, the blame was placed firmly on the shoulders of one individual.

End of an Era

Yesterday saw publication of the HMI Annual Report thus marking the burial of TR:-  

Chief Inspector’s overview 

This has been a year of extraordinary and unexpected challenges for the probation service; of major shifts in strategic long-term direction, but also of familiar and recurring issues as well – around resources, staffing and working environments. 

It is the end of an era, as Transforming Rehabilitation makes way for a return to public sector control, and we reflect on how the past five years have shaped, developed and challenged the probation service. 

Many have welcomed the upcoming changes, but we acknowledge that for some – such as senior leaders within Community Rehabilitation Companies (CRCs) – there is disappointment. CRCs have worked with severely hampered budgets to bring innovative and experimental operating models. This annual report recognises this positive work, as well as providing an honest take on how performance has laboured under the weight of resource constraints. 

This year we have widened the scope of what we offer the probation service; not just to identify areas for improvement in individual services, but also to highlight and disseminate effective practice too, for the benefit of all service providers. Our thematic inspections of accommodation for people under probation supervision, and the quality of Serious Further Offences (SFO) reviews are evidence of how bringing together the expertise of our inspectors across England and Wales, with our research, can provide a ‘big picture’ perspective on key areas of probation. 

A vital – although unexpected – thematic inspection this year looked at the impact of Covid-19. As detailed in this report, probation providers are to be applauded for the compassion and professionalism they have shown in changing their working methods quickly and effectively, almost overnight, in response to the pandemic. This is true for all levels of the probation system, although not without its challenges. 

Once again, public protection and the effective management of risk of harm have been at the forefront of our work. They were certainly the focus of our response to the Lord Chancellor’s request that we conduct a detailed review of the case of Joseph McCann, who committed a series of appalling sexual and violent offences while under probation supervision. Our two-part review does not just point out flaws and failures, but also provides learning with the aim of influencing the service for the better. The fact that the management of risk remains one of the weakest areas of performance for both the National Probation Service (NPS) and CRCs is a major concern, and one which we explore in this report. 

Resourcing 

For more than 15 years, probation funding has been on a downward trend; government spending per person under supervision is down 40 per cent in real terms since 2003/2004 (to just £3,550 in 2018/2019) – and flaws in the recent CRC contracts mean that this is likely to be worse for medium/low-risk offenders. By March 2018, CRCs were forecasting losses of nearly £300 million on their contracts, compared with expected profits of £269 million – a gap of over £560 million. The wider effects on the entire system are clear to see; major cuts in probation officer (PO) numbers and stalled investment in information and communications technology (ICT) infrastructure and in buildings maintenance. 

We know that probation services are part of an ecosystem which is also suffering from declining investment, and, more recently, from the impact of Covid-19. They rely on many other services to provide support to the people they work with, such as community mental health services, drug abuse treatment services, and mentoring and employment support charities. 

Perhaps the biggest concern for service users has been in regard to the provision of accommodation – more than 11,000 prisoners are released into homelessness each year. The loss of ring-fenced supported housing for people on probation; changes to benefit rules; and other barriers have created a housing crisis for many supervised by the service. This must be a priority for government action going forward. 

There are some welcome early signs that things may be improving – albeit from a low baseline; an additional £150 million has been invested by the government in probation in 2020/2021. We know that an extra £22 million per year for CRCs has made a real difference to Through the Gate services for released prisoners – we rate rated eight out of ten as ‘Outstanding’ on the quality of this work. Also, extra government money, released for emergency accommodation during the initial Covid-19 lockdown period was widely welcomed by the probation staff we interviewed. 

Transforming Rehabilitation 

We are now in the sixth and final year of the Transforming Rehabilitation reforms, given the decision by the government – in May 2019 – to end these contracts early. 

It has been a bumpy road for this operating model, and the consequences of its flaws – such as the strain caused by flawed payment mechanisms – have been apparent throughout our inspections, as my predecessor recounted in her first annual report in 2017: 

‘…we see clearly that there is a two-tier and fragmented service’ 

‘…many [CRCs] have reduced staff numbers more than once… in some we find staff with exceptional workloads working long hours and still unable to deliver to the professional standards they know are right’. 

‘… overall, not enough is being done, or done to an acceptable standard, in about half of all CRC cases we have inspected’. 

The problems did not stop there. Our early inspections also found serious setbacks in the implementation of new ICT systems. A joint thematic inspection of Through the Gate arrangements with HM Inspectorate of Prisons found: ‘…only a handful of individuals had received any real help with housing, jobs or an addiction’, and that CRCs were making ‘little material difference to the prospects of individuals upon release’. There were examples of good practice in some CRC areas, but when inspected against our new standards and ratings, 19 out of 21 were rated as ‘Requires improvement’ (2018/2019). 

In her final annual report as Chief Inspector, in March 2019, my predecessor said: 

‘…it is incredibly difficult, if not impossible, to reduce the probation service to a set of contractual requirements’; ‘… significant flaws in the system have become increasingly apparent’; and ‘it will be virtually impossible to deal with these issues if most probation supervision continues to be provided by different organisations, under contract’. 

The government had reached a similar conclusion, announcing the early termination of the existing CRC contracts in 2018. In May 2019, it declared that it would be bringing the offender management function of the CRCs (representing most of the expenditure) back into the public sector by the end of 2020, and committed to this reform happening first in Wales from the end of 2019. Since then, additional investment in CRCs has produced improvements. 

Since September 2019, we have been able to complete nine inspections leading to an overall rating. All of these services were rated as ‘Requires improvement’ in 2018/2019 – three are now rated as ‘Good’. Supervision of unpaid work was also found to be generally satisfactory, with eight now rated as ‘Good’. 

For some services, however, things have not looked so rosy. In five areas, we have continued to find budgets being squeezed, staff under pressure and unacceptably high caseloads, and this has inevitably resulted in poorer-quality supervision. Five CRCs were rated as ‘Inadequate’ for the quality of their day-to-day offender management, against all our standards. 

The onset of Covid-19 brought abrupt change – with some services, such as unpaid work, halted altogether and the suspension of the usual CRC targets and penalties. In the face of mounting uncertainty about the future, the government announced in June 2020 that it was abandoning its plans to continue to outsource the provision of unpaid work and accredited programmes and other interventions to ‘probation delivery partners’, and said that these functions would also come back into the public sector from June 2021. 

I reaffirm my view that this type of structural reform is not a magic bullet for improving performance by itself. It must be backed by real extra resources. The future of the probation service depends on it being funded properly. The quality of probation supervision will not improve merely by shifting large volumes of cases from CRCs back into the NPS next year. Vacancies for POs must be filled, and staff properly trained for their new responsibilities. The positive innovations that CRCs have brought cannot be lost and the transition period must be expertly managed. 

NPS 

Although much of the focus has been on CRC performance in recent years, the public sector NPS has also faced substantial challenges. While, in overall terms, we rated five of the seven NPS regions as ‘Good’ in our first round of inspections against our new standards, every region had at least two quality standards on which they were rated as ‘Requires improvement’. We applied this rating to all seven in relation to our standards for staffing, and to six out of seven for the quality of information services and facilities. 

Although probation services officer (PSO) numbers in the NPS have increased substantially since 2014, PO numbers remain an issue, with over 650 vacancies in September 2019 and particular issues with vacancy rates in London, the South East and East of England. 

The government’s commitment to increase the number of trainee POs is welcome and there are signs that it is starting to pay dividends – with the number of POs rising by almost six per cent in the year to June 2020 and the gap in vacancies closing to 483. Our reinspection of the NPS North West region in January and February 2020 showed that this is starting to make a real difference on the ground. We found that 153 new PO trainees had been recruited, and a full staffing complement after a long period below strength – although it was concerning to see that 32 per cent of officers had workloads in excess of 110 per cent of their expected levels. 

Poor-quality office accommodation and approved premises have also been a real issue in the NPS, with many probation staff operating from buildings that are in disrepair, and approved premises bed spaces being lost through delays to basic repairs. In 2019, only 43 per cent of facilities management jobs were completed within the 10-day target. For example, on our return visit to the North West division, we found 700 outstanding work orders. 

Protecting the public 

It should be concerning and disappointing to all that the weakest performance area we have seen in our inspections is the quality of work to manage risk of harm. 

CRCs have invested substantially in retraining staff on the basics of risk management, but we simply have not seen this translated into better care of the cases we have inspected more recently. 

On every aspect of supervision in relation to risk of serious harm (apart from initial assessment), we have continued to find that, on average, fewer than half the cases we assess in CRCs are satisfactory in relation to planning, delivery or review of actions to manage risk of harm. 

Time and again, we are finding that some of the fundamental tasks of effective risk management have been missed, such as the checks that every responsible officer is supposed to run with their local police domestic abuse team at the point of initial assessment. We have found that, on average, these checks are not being done in over a third of cases. Our joint inspection with HM Inspectorate of Constabulary and Fire & Rescue Services of Integrated Offender Management – published in February 2020 – found that these promising arrangements had been downgraded to a shadow of their past shared priority. 

I do not need to spell out the potentially disastrous consequences if risk of harm is not managed properly, but the impact on victims and their families can be irreversible. It should not be the case that the only time the public hear about the probation service is when something goes wrong. 

A lack of professional curiosity, incorrect classification of risk, poor information-sharing with the prisons and police, over-optimistic assessments of progress and premature relaxation of controls are things that we find again and again in the cases we look at in our local inspections. Our review of the Joseph McCann case found all these issues combined, to become a catalogue of errors – not least eight missed opportunities to revoke his indeterminate sentence for public protection licence between 2017 and 2019. 

Much of our focus this year has been on the important lessons that can be learned when things go wrong in such cases. As such, I welcome the decision by the Lord Chancellor to give HM Inspectorate of Probation a role in the independent quality assurance of Serious Further Offence reviews from April 2021. We have also published an effective practice guide on undertaking these reviews, based on lessons from a national inspection of practice at the end of 2019. This is all part of our broader, renewed commitment to disseminating advice on what ‘good’ looks like. 

Conclusions 

While it is not true to say that the probation service as a whole is, or was, ‘in crisis’, it has undoubtedly been severely tested by the Transforming Rehabilitation reforms and the profound impacts of the Covid-19 pandemic earlier this year, to which it responded with admirable agility and commitment. 

Of the services we have been able to inspect over the past year, it has been encouraging to see signs of overall improvement in some, and the very real progress that has been made with enhanced Through the Gate services. 

For others, however, things are more difficult. Committed leaders are doing their best to engage staff and improve delivery, but they are often fighting a losing battle as resources diminish. There is a real risk to delivery over the coming six months, as attention is diverted by the demands of transition to the new structures in June next year. 

The new, unified national offender management model is not a cure-all. Adequate resourcing is crucial, and we cannot lose the innovation that Transforming Rehabilitation has unleashed in some areas. CRC leaders have enjoyed the freedoms to try new things; to move into decent office accommodation for the first time or to work out of community hubs; and to develop better case management software. There is no doubt that service users have benefited from the real commitment shown by many CRCs to listen to their views, and even give them a role as mentors, and ultimately as paid staff – an outcome any service can be proud of. 

The road to recovery for probation services will be a long and winding one to traverse, with huge challenges ahead still to negotiate. But with the right resources and leadership, it can be managed successfully, and we will be providing an independent and unbiased view of that progress every step of the way.

Justin Russell

HM Chief Inspector of Probation

--oo00oo--

There's a lot in this Report such as the following, which I highlight given recent exchanges on here concerning role boundaries:- 

Role boundaries, the ratio of POs to PSOs and the impact on quality 

Newly recruited PSOs The approach to grading and allocation of work for PSOs varies and can be complex. In ARCC, MTC and Sodexo CRCs, we found a recognition of the importance of ensuring that novice PSOs complete core training and gain sufficient experience, before they are allocated complex casework. 

Reduced income across all the Interserve (Purple Futures) services prompted a decision to curb expenditure through a major organisational restructure at the beginning of 2019. This new operating model, however, works on the presumption of an experienced and skilled workforce. In Hampshire and Isle of Wight CRC, the restructure failed to take sufficient account of a predictable shortage of skilled staff or the time required to recruit, train and consolidate the training of new PSO grade case managers and develop the skills of existing case managers to manage complex work, including cases involving domestic abuse. We found that the number of skilled PO grade staff had fallen by 38 per cent since our last inspection. While the number of lower-grade case managers (PSO equivalent) had risen substantially, 45 per cent were new to the service at the time of our inspection. 

The quality of PSO and PO casework 

Given the right training and support, and when allocated the right number and risk level of cases, PSOs can do a good job of supervising low- and some medium-risk offenders. As the Hampshire and Isle of Wight CRC example shows, however, when inexperienced PSOs with large caseloads are substituted for more qualified and experienced POs, and asked to take on complex cases beyond their competence, the result can be a worrying reduction in the quality of supervision. 

Our aggregated results from CRC and NPS inspections show a substantial gap between our ratings of the quality of PO and of PSO case supervision – something that should be a priority for attention as the service transitions to its new unified model in 2021.

Recall and Scapegoating

Yesterday saw publication of the second part of the Probation Inspectorate's report into the handling of the Joseph McCann case. There remains widespread anger and concern amongst practitioners that they continue to be 'scapegoated' for the consequences of what are essentially organisational policies and procedures.     

Foreword 

The power to recall a person to prison is a significant one. It is one of the most important decisions probation officers make and over 27,000 of these decisions were made in 2019/2020. The immediate consequences for the recalled prisoner are self-evident, but the decision also has consequences for victims, potential victims and the public at large. In part one of this independent review, published in June 2020, we reviewed the case of Joseph McCann and expressed serious concerns about decision-making in relation to recall during the period 2017 to early 2019. We have not found a repeat of those concerns in part two, our review that looks at current recall culture and practice in the period since then. Probation staff are clear that public protection is the primary concern in recall decisions, and this was reflected in the cases we reviewed. 

Recall decisions are often complex and frequently rely on the analysis of detailed information and behaviour. It is important, therefore, that they are supported by a methodical, consistent and fair process. The National Probation Service (NPS) and Community Rehabilitation Companies (CRCs) currently have different processes for recalling individuals, and these are applied inconsistently. It is important that recall decision-making is prioritised and operational staff are given the necessary time and management support to make effective decisions. Probation staff have concerns about the professional and personal consequences if they fail to instigate a recall and a high-profile incident subsequently occurs. A professional culture needs to be at the heart of recall decisions. This requires a consistent process and operational staff having the confidence that they will be supported if they make considered, defensible decisions. 

We have found that the current system for licence warnings, which are designed to prevent the need for a recall, varies both between and within organisations and its effectiveness has not been evaluated. Nearly all of the cases we reviewed where a warning had been issued still resulted in recall, raising questions about the impact of this approach. Furthermore, license warnings are not subject to additional scrutiny outside of the normal management oversight of cases. This requires urgent attention. It potentially results in inconsistent licence enforcement and is also unfair from the perspective of procedural justice. Alternatives to recall are often used alongside licence warnings, but the effectiveness of this strategy has not been reviewed since it was implemented in 2017. We are satisfied that when alternatives to recall are considered they are balanced against the requirements of public protection, but there is inconsistency in both their accessibility and use. 

Decisions on recall and licence warnings often rely on the judgement of individual practitioners, but these decisions and practice judgements are not routinely monitored for bias and unconscious bias. Disproportional outcomes, particularly for black, Asian and minority ethnic service users, have been identified in other parts of the criminal justice system, but they are not routinely monitored in relation to recall decisions. This needs to be addressed to ensure that recall decisions are routinely scrutinised and any learning can inform improvements in probation practice. 

Decisions on recall and licence warnings are complex. Across the nine organisations we inspected, there were examples of responsible officers taking recall decisions to protect victims, potential victims and the public. There were also examples of probation staff coordinating comprehensive support packages for individuals in an attempt to break entrenched patterns of criminal behaviour. This professionalism should be built on with the aim of developing a confident, professional organisational culture. To this end, our recommendations are designed to strengthen the process and support probation staff in their decision-making.

Justin Russell

HM Chief Inspector of Probation

Executive summary 

Context of the review 

On 05 March 2020, the Secretary of State for the Ministry of Justice announced that an independent review of the case of Joseph McCann would be undertaken by Her Majesty’s Inspectorate of Probation. The review would be in two parts. Part one was to focus on the supervision of Joseph McCann by the National Probation Service (NPS) and part two would review the current probation culture and practice in respect of recall. Part one was published on 30 June 2020. This report constitutes part two of the review. 

Part two was completed against the background of COVID-19. Nine probation providers were involved in the review and 39 meetings with managers and operational staff took place remotely via video or telephone conference during July and August 2020. We inspected a sample of 50 release licence cases that had been recalled or had warnings issued between October 2019 and February 2020. Where available, we also interviewed the allocated responsible officer. The case sample predated the probation exceptional delivery model (EDM) introduced at the end of March as a result of the COVID-19 crisis. The EDM ensures that public protection continues to be the priority for probation providers. The learning and recommendations from this inspection apply to probation practice both before and after the introduction of the EDM. 

Recall decision-making and threshold 

We found that public protection and the protection of victims are central to probation service decision-making on recall. Operational staff are clear that this is the primary focus of recall practice. Alternatives to recall are routinely considered where appropriate, but this does not compromise the focus of decision-making on public protection. 

In 2019/2020, 34 per cent of recalls included a failure of the service user to keep in touch with their supervising officer as the reason. Responsible officers make impressive efforts to engage non-compliant service users and often put comprehensive support packages in place. These cases are resource-intensive and frequently result in a recurring cycle of release and recall. 

Licence enforcement and recall requires a consistent process that must allow for individualised decision-making. It is rarely a simple decision and probation practice must allow for the key information to be assessed and reviewed. Responsible officers require the necessary time and management support to obtain and analyse information and make good decisions. Office practice and procedures should enable such a process to ensure that recall and warning decisions are defensible and not overly cautious. We found that this varied between offices and organisations. 

Probation organisations have communicated the Recall, Review and Re-Release of Recalled Prisoners Policy Framework (RPF)2 to their staff, but staff and managers’ knowledge of the specific processes and criteria is inconsistent. Operational staff were, however, clear that decisions on recall must focus on increases in the risk of serious harm linked to previous patterns of behaviour. Communication of the revised framework has been stronger in the NPS than in the CRCs, but communication within individual divisions has not been part of a coordinated national strategy. This lack of coordination has reduced the impact of a key national policy. 

Licence warning and alternatives to custody 

A breach of licence conditions does not automatically result in the instigation of recall. Where probation providers assess that individuals can still be managed safely in the community, they can issue a licence warning. Licence warnings can be accompanied by amended licence conditions. These may include increased levels of contact; cooperating with activities such as drug testing; or additional restrictions in relation to residence or curfew. 

Current licence warning practice is inconsistent both between and within organisations. There are inconsistencies in the threshold, recording and delivery of warnings. This makes it difficult to identify cases where the service user has been warned and not recalled and to operate effective quality assurance processes. In most cases where warnings have been issued, recall to prison is still the eventual outcome. This underlines the need to review practice and issue a revised licence warning process. 

Practitioners now take a balanced approach when deciding between recall and alternatives to recall, and this approach is considered good practice across organisations. However, access to and use of alternatives to recall, such as approved premises (APs) and electronic monitoring, are inconsistent. Probation organisations have not analysed the effectiveness of the overall strategy on alternatives, or whether it averts or simply delays an eventual recall. The role of APs as an alternative to recall requires clarification. NPS responsible officers, in contrast to AP managers and staff, regard APs as an important alternative to recall.

Quality assurance 

Rates of recall vary both between and within organisations. This variation cannot be accounted for solely by the circumstances of the individual case. In the NPS, divisions receive information on performance on a quarterly basis. This includes the number of recalls and the reasons for them, along with the number of licence variations. There are no performance targets in relation to recall numbers, but the reports highlight local delivery units where recall rates significantly deviate from the national average. NPS divisions use this information to monitor variations. The CRCs generate information on recalls as part of their enforcement monitoring. Again, there is no performance target for the number of recalls, and organisations do not monitor any actions taken as an alternative to recall. CRCs do, however, monitor the rates of recall. For example, one CRC identified a low rate of recalls and amended its practice as a result. 

The routine quality assurance of recall decisions is reliant on each senior manager’s endorsement of the practitioner’s decision as part of the decision-making process. Licence warning decisions are not the subject of any targeted monitoring or review. Some probation providers use the national Alternative to Recalls and Recall Report Part A quality assurance tool, 3 but this focuses on recall cases only rather than looking also at cases where recall was decided against. NPS London and NPS North East have undertaken their own quality assurance and dip-sampling initiatives to monitor recall cases for disproportionality. However, probation providers do not routinely review recall decisions to check for bias and unconscious bias. 

Organisational culture 

Recall culture and practice are directly influenced by national policy and high-profile serious case reviews. In recent years there was a widespread belief among operational staff that recalls should be minimised. More recently there have been fears that responsible officers will be unfairly held responsible for any adverse consequences resulting from a failure to instigate recall. Both perceptions undermine professional decision-making, which must be at the core of the process. The current correct balance between alternatives to custody and public protection is understood by operational staff. To ensure operational staff do not become too cautious in their approach, there needs to be a consistent decision-making process both for recalls and decisions not to recall. The development of a professional culture depends on operational staff feeling confident that defensible, professional decisions will be supported if a serious incident does occur involving a person under supervision. 

There are significant differences in recall practice and culture between the CRCs and NPS divisions. These include differences in the level of management endorsement; staff expectations; the understanding of the RPF; and differences in types of recall. These differences were recognised by Her Majesty’s Prison and Probation Service (HMPPS) Wales in the training activities its staff undertook in the three months after reunification in December 2019. The NPS divisions and CRCs in England should learn from this example. Given the importance of recall decision-making, the NPS and CRCs should prioritise communicating the RPF to staff and embedding a consistent recall process when they are re-joined. 

Public Protection Casework Section (PPCS) and the post-recall process 

The relationship between the central HMPPS PPCS and probation providers operates efficiently. Emergency and out-of-hours recalls are processed promptly, and the PPCS’s advice on the recall threshold is viewed positively by both senior and operational managers. 

Following a standard recall, both responsible officers and the PPCS can review cases and decide to re-release a recalled prisoner under the executive release scheme. The operation of executive release is inconsistent. Responsible officers are uncertain about the operation of the process and the number of releases varies between providers. Consideration for release should not depend on which organisation a person is supervised by. The administration and use of the process should be reviewed. 

The PPCS must refer all standard recall cases to the Parole Board within 28 days of a prisoner’s return to prison. This includes consideration of the Part B risk management report that responsible officers submit to the PPCS within 10 days of a prisoner’s return to custody. This timescale allows time for prisoners to make representations to the Parole Board on the contents of the document. Part B risk management reports include a recommendation as to whether the prisoner should be re-released. The current process for completion is not working efficiently. To complete the report within the timescale, responsible officers must have quick access to prisoners immediately after their return to prison. Access, however, is inconsistent and responsible officers are frequently left without the necessary information to make an informed recommendation on re-release.

--oo00oo--

Comments from yesterday:-

Probation staff felt “pressure” from the government to send fewer criminals back to prison for committing new crimes or breaking their licence conditions, a watchdog has found. HM Inspectorate of Probation said a sharp drop in the rate of recall to prison across England and Wales from 2016 onwards was linked to policy changes, and that a reversal was only sparked by a high-profile murder case. Senior National Probation Service (NPS) leaders said that when an “alternatives to recall” strategy was implemented four years ago, there was "pressure from the Ministry of Justice to reduce the number of recalls in their divisions". Someone should take the hit for this.

******
"I agree. I really don't think it's fair for Probation Officers and Probation Service Officers to be SFO'd, investigated, suspended then sacked for not recalling Offenders when encouraged and pressured not to recall. I now upload all email communications to Delius that involve recall or not to recall decisions, this would have been unthinkable for me a decade ago."

Latest From Napo 210

Here we have the latest Napo Covid Bulletin No 21 published yesterday:-

Unions joint statement on risk assessments for Black/BAME staff

The current C-19 pandemic is an unexpected catastrophe that has wreaked havoc on the world economy and has led so far to over 2 million fatalities globally. Here in the UK, the statistics for infection and death show little sign of abating despite the implementation of lockdown policies that have been widely criticised as having been too little in substance and very late. Now a further debate is raging over what many believe to be an irresponsible approach by Government to start easing them.

One thing has become inescapably clear from this crisis, which is the morbidity rates of people with underlying health conditions. But the problem runs much deeper than that; with the emergence of compelling evidence which shows that Black/BAME staff are especially at risk of becoming seriously and possibly fatally ill.

There are any number of medical theories as to why this is so and what extra steps should be taken to acknowledge the position and take precautions. For many weeks now it has been truly shocking to see the number of C-19 related deaths within the care community, yet it can be argued that the disproportionate numbers of deceased Black/BAME health workers is also a national scandal which merits serious scrutiny.

While this issue is the subject of a Government inquiry, the view from trade unions and the TUC is that immediate action is needed now to address the specific risk that puts a substantial number of highly vulnerable key workers in danger of succumbing to this dreadful virus. As members would expect, Napo and our sister unions are seeking to pressure employers into recognising the threats and to issue revised instructions on customised Risk Assessments for Black/BAME staff.

This why we have today issued the following Joint Statement which will be brought to the attention of all the employers that we engage with. We will issue regular updates following engagement with employers.

JTU15-20 21 May 2020 

BLACK/BAME PROBATION STAFF AND COVID19 JOINT UNION STATEMENT 

Probation unions, NAPO, UNISON and GMB/SCOOP are working together to protect our Black/BAME members in the National Probation Service and in the 21 Community Rehabilitation Companies in relation to the increased risk from Covid19 affecting members of Black/BAME communities in the UK. 

EVIDENCE OF INCREASED RISK TO BLACK/BAME COMMUNITIES 

NHS England confirmed on 7 May 2020 that members of Black/BAME communities are among those groups who are clinically vulnerable to Covid19*. The NHS stated: 

‘We now know there is evidence of disproportionate mortality and morbidity amongst black, asian and minority ethnic (BAME) people, including our NHS staff, who have contracted COVID-19.’ 

The NHS has subsequently issued detailed guidance for NHS employers to undertake specific risk assessments of the vulnerability of Black/BAME staff to Covid19 and appropriate action to reduce exposure to, and the risk from, Covid19 for Black/BAME staff. The police service has quickly adopted the same approach for police officers and police staff. 

UNIONS DEMAND HMPPS TAKES ACTION NOW 

In a recent meeting with senior HMPPS officials the three probation unions called on the NPS and CRCs to proactively respond to the NHS statement, and follow the NHS risk assessment programme to protect Black/BAME probation staff now. We expect the NPS and the CRCs to take the same approach. 

The unions do not believe that there is time to wait for further research on the risk of Covid19 to Black/BAME communities, which Public Health England is due to publish in a few week’s time. We need action now to protect our Black/BAME members. 

NOTES: 

NHS Statement on Increased Risk of Covid19 to Black communities: https://www.england.nhs.uk/blog/note-for-all-bame-colleagues-working-in-the-nhs

Assessment Framework for Black staff in relation to Covid19: https://www.nhsemployers.org/covid19/health-safety-and-wellbeing/risk-assessments-for-staff 

Yours sincerely, 

Ian Lawrence General Secretary Napo

Ben Priestley National Officer UNISON

George Georgiou National Officer GMB/SCOOP

HMIP Report into SFO Investigations

On 14th May HMIP published their report into SFO investigations. Whilst it won’t make comfortable reading for HMPPS, it does highlight the same concerns that Napo have been raising for some time. Napo has been supporting a number of members who have found themselves under investigation from the initial stage right through to the inquest in some cases. What is clear is that the approach to SFO investigations has taken a very punitive turn which has led to members being under extreme stress, going through disciplinary hearings and in some very sad cases, losing their jobs. As a result Napo has been in a position to regularly raise members fears and concerns with HMPPS. This report is further evidence that these were not unfounded and that there needs to be a significant review of the SFO process. 

Some Key Findings:

For some time now HMIP have called for greater transparency of SFO’s for victims. Whilst the report acknowledges some headway in this area, HMIP clearly believe that more needs to be done. SFO’s can take years to complete and the although victims have access to the full review, this is often complicated, and written in jargon. Very few victims actually take up the offer and the reason for this needs to be researched further.

The purpose of an SFO investigation is to understand what went wrong, lessons that can be learnt and how this can improve practice and policy. However, HMIP found a very mixed picture. On a national level there is not enough analysis to identify themes which could inform policy and practice. On a local level it found that areas were much better at implementing lessons learnt. However, what was significant was that HMIP felt that this was overtaken by the fear the process invokes in staff, and this undermined the ability to learn. The findings in the report confirm what Napo has been saying for the last few years. Staff perception that SFO reviews focus on individuals and not on organisational responsibility were in fact true.

The central SFO unit takes too long to complete the review with staff and victims waiting on average 6 months.

There is a lack of multi-agency contributions with SFO reviews. They focus solely on probation. A multi-agency review would make it easier for victims to understand case management and provide a better context.

SFO reviews lack independent oversight, unlike domestic homicide reviews or MAPPA serious case reviews. Independent oversight ensures quality assurance, enable public reporting and allow the SFO teams to focus on the lessons to be learnt which in turn can then drive policy and practice. Napo has long argued that the review process should be in the hands of HMIP but we welcome the idea of a greater oversight by the Inspectorate.

Napo will be now pushing for HMPPS to acknowledge this and to seriously review how the SFO process is carried out. We will be calling for a meeting to specifically look at the reports findings and asking HMPPS what steps they will be taking to improve and to meet the HMIP recommendations.

A more in depth piece on the report will be published in the next Napo Magazine. A copy of the report in full can be found HERE

AP Engagement Update 13-05-20

Generic Risk Assessments (GRA)

AP’s have recently completed GRA’s relating to their place of work and the documents were shared with TU’s at the above meeting. Common themes were evident across all AP’s and these have been collated into one document with recommended measures in place. The documents are available for all AP staff to view. 

PPE

Napo raised the issue of PPE masks and the importance of staff being able to use this equipment properly. It was agreed to send a video link to staff to access guidance regarding putting on and taking off face masks appropriately. If members require this information please seek assistance from your line manager in the first instance.

AP Occupancy

All staff will be aware that to provide staff with a safe working environment a decision was previously made to have single room occupancy. The priority referral process also ensures accommodation for service users who meet the priority one criteria. These steps were taken to assist staff and residents to adhere to the social distancing guidance and provide accommodation to individuals whose risk dictates the need for close monitoring. Napo members have been informed that in some AP’s social distancing has proved very challenging, members have also raised their concerns about increasing AP occupancy. These concerns were raised and we were advised that AP staff should follow PHE/W guidance regarding social distancing for example; screens, demarcation areas, ventilation, workforce planning, and PPE. Clarity was also sought about increasing AP occupancy and we have been advised the Secretary of State has a responsibility to provide AP accommodation for individuals who are deemed to pose a high risk of serious harm to others. AP’s do need to continue to take residents who are leaving custody but we have been assured this will be undertaken in a safe and planned way with an increased level of collaboration and information from the discharging prison. If this is not happening please raise with your line manager in the first instance.

AP Staffing

We have been informed that the recent recruitment drive for areas where it has proved difficult to recruit has been successful. There were a couple of AP’s which were forced to close due to staff shortages and it is anticipated they can be reopened shortly.

Rota Review

The majority of AP’s have settled into the new APRW rota and reports have been positive. There are still some AP’s who have yet to change to their preferred rota but due to unforeseen circumstances this has not been possible. It is anticipated this will occur as soon as practicable.

Training

There are a few compulsory on-line training events for AP staff to complete if they haven’t already and all staff will be given encouragement and support to complete the necessary training. Face to Face conflict resolution training has been placed ‘on hold’ due to Covid-19 but it is hoped this will commence as soon as its safe to do.

AP Residential Worker Job Evalutation

Many RW’s will be aware their role will shortly be job evaluated. The process for this is as follows; A Job description questionnaire is completed by RW’s (this has already been done) and submitted to the Job Evaluation Scheme (JES). A panel of three people (including a TU rep) is selected from a group of TU reps who have undertaken the training and a matrix is used to score the tasks and the role will be then banded and the outcome circulated. Napo believe that RW’s undertake a vital role in AP’s and should be remunerated accordingly. I can confirm this view is widely shared.

Monthly Staff Dial In

Finally, many of you may be aware of the monthly all staff dial in. Dates, times and details can be found on the AP Directory. The call is usually 10 – 11 on the final Friday of the month, the next one is on 29th May. Napo encourages all staff to dial into these meetings if possible to raise issues directly with AP Senior Managers.

A Better Recovery

The TUC hosted a mini-conference (on zoom) to launch its new report A Better Recovery this week. The report sets out a plan to getting Britain growing out of the crisis and preventing mass unemployment. TUC General Secretary, Frances O’Grady, was joined on the panel by Shadow Chancellor, Annalise Dodds, and Financial Times Economic Correspondent, Martin Sandhu. READ MORE

Napo HQ

Lessons Not Being Learnt

Right from the start when Chris Grayling and the coalition government began to impose their omnishambolic 'Transforming Rehabilitation' on a gold-standard service, there were repeated warnings that it would lead to an increase in Serious Further Offences, and so it transpired. As a consequence, the deeply cynical amongst us have long suspected that the whole SFO investigation and reporting system has been the subject of deliberate obfuscation for political ends. Too often it's also felt as an opportunity to simply 'throw staff under the bus' rather than look at systemic failings.  

Here we have HM Chief Inspector of Probation Justin Russell with a press release introducing his latest report on the subject and unambiguously calling for an independent body to oversee the whole process in order to help restore public and professional confidence in a currently deeply-flawed system:-

Probation system ‘not doing enough to learn from past mistakes

The probation system is not doing enough to learn lessons from serious crimes committed by offenders under supervision, according to inspectors.

Nearly a quarter of a million people are on probation in England and Wales. Around 0.2 per cent of these individuals are charged with serious further offences each year while under supervision. These crimes include murder, rape, and other violent and dangerous offences.

HM Inspectorate of Probation examined the way probation services review and learn lessons in these cases. Inspectors also looked at how HM Prison and Probation Service (HMPPS) quality assure those reviews, and use information to improve national policies and practice. Victims and their families were asked about their experiences too.

Chief Inspector of Probation Justin Russell said: “Serious further offences have a devastating impact on victims and their families. The review process must examine the period leading up to the offence and how the probation service managed the risk of serious harm.

“Our inspection found that individual reviews were good in parts, but a fifth (22 per cent) of those we inspected failed to give a clear judgment as to whether all reasonable steps had been taken to manage the risk of serious harm. At a national level, more needs to be done to identify trends and themes to drive changes to probation policies and guidance.

“Until this work is done, the government and probation services are not doing enough to learn from past mistakes. Lessons must be learnt to prevent more tragedies in the future.”

Probation services in England and Wales are delivered by a mix of providers. The National Probation Service (NPS) supervises high risk offenders in the community, while 21 Community Rehabilitation Companies (CRC) supervise low and medium risk offenders.

When an individual who is on probation commits a serious further offence, a manager in the relevant NPS division or CRC conducts an internal review.

Inspectors found:

• Serious Further Offence reviews often set out the timeline of events, but are less effective at explaining why the offence took place. Reviews should draw clear conclusions on failures of probation practice.
• Serious Further Offence reviews focus solely on probation practice, unlike reviews conducted in other parts of the criminal justice system, such as those following domestic homicides. Offenders are usually known to other agencies, so these interactions are not explored and important opportunities for joint learning are being missed. Inspectors recommend external agencies that have been involved in the case, such as the police and children’s services, should be involved in the Serious Further Offence review. Consideration should also be given to whether this should be mandatory for all homicide cases not currently covered by other multi-agency procedures. There should be a requirement for SFO reviews that include findings on the actions of other agencies to be shared with those agencies.
• Individual probation officers involved in cases are interviewed by the Serious Further Offence review teams, but often do not see the final reports and have limited opportunities to question the findings. Some staff view the process negatively and believe its primary focus is to attribute blame. The Inspectorate concluded this ‘culture of fear’ undermines the ability of organisations to learn from the process.

Relatively few victims or their families ask to see the Serious Further Offence review and take up of this offer is not monitored centrally. More effort needs to be made to increase the uptake of this offer.

Victims and their families that do ask to see the review found the process open and honest about failings, and appreciated the chance to discuss the case with a senior manager.

The Inspectorate found the content and length of the reviews would be difficult for some victims and family members to digest. Inspectors also urged greater consideration to individual circumstances before disclosing reviews, for example to ensure vulnerable victims have proper support.

HMPPS is responsible for quality assuring Serious Further Offence reviews and providing feedback to probation services.

Inspectors found:

• Reviews are not analysed nationally to identify themes, which could improve policy and practice.
• Staff shortages have led to backlogs and unacceptable delays – the HMPPS quality assurance process should take 20 days but takes six months on average.
• There is a lack of independent oversight and transparency in the process with HMPPS auditing the quality of its own work.

Mr Russell said: “Significant resources are rightly invested in the Serious Further Offence review process. In our view, the current arrangements are inefficient and lack independence and transparency.

“We recommend an independent agency should get involved in quality assuring this vital work. The agency should look at a proportion of completed reviews each year and publish its findings on a regular basis. This will help to increase public confidence in the process.

“Following our inspection, we have made a number of recommendations to the Ministry of Justice and HMPPS. These aim to refocus the Serious Further Offence review process on learning lessons, improving probation policies and practice, and increasing access for victims and their families.”

Earlier this year, the Secretary of State for Justice asked Mr Russell to conduct an independent review into the case of Joseph McCann, who committed a series of serious further offences while under probation supervision. The first part of that report will be published in June 2020.

--oo00oo--

Foreword 

Serious Further Offences (SFOs) are committed by a small proportion of the probation caseload. For the victims and families involved, however, the consequences are devastating and often life changing. It is therefore essential that probation providers are accountable for the work undertaken and that the learning from such events results in improved service delivery. 

This is the primary purpose of the SFO review process, which was first introduced in 2003 to ensure rigorous scrutiny when serious offences are committed by service users subject to probation supervision. A revised process was implemented in April 2018. This was the focus of our inspection. 

A priority for the new process is to ensure increased transparency for victims and family members, and to some extent this has been achieved in that they now have access to the full review document. The reviews, however, are often long and complex documents that examine probation practice in detail, sometimes over many years. Although probation providers have ensured that the disclosure of reviews to victims is handled sensitively, it can still be confusing and overwhelming. Very few take up the offer of full disclosure, and further work is needed to better understand the reasons for this and to take full account of victims’ individual circumstances and needs. 

At the heart of the SFO review process is the aim that learning from SFO reviews should improve the management and supervision of service users. We found a mixed picture. At a national level, SFO reviews are not analysed to identify themes, inform policy and improve practice. At a local level, probation providers have procedures in place to identify learning from the reviews that they have undertaken. The fear and concern that the process provokes in operational staff, however, undermines the ability of organisations to learn from the process. Their perception is that the review focuses on individual and not organisational responsibilities, and our findings confirm this. 

SFO review cases are frequently complex, with many agencies involved. Most SFO cases, however, are not the subject of multi-agency reviews and the current process focuses solely on probation practice. Valuable learning is therefore lost. A multi-agency contribution would help victims and family members to have an improved understanding of the management of the case. 

The HM Prison and Probation Service (HMPPS) SFO review team is responsible for the central quality assurance of the SFO reviews and providing feedback to local areas. There have been unacceptable delays in this process, with probation providers and individual staff members waiting an average of six months for feedback on their reviews. 

In contrast to the process for other serious case reviews, such as Domestic Homicide Reviews or MAPPA serious case reviews, the current SFO process lacks independent oversight and transparency. Although we don’t recommend that an independent body should take on the reviews themselves, we do recommend that there should be independent oversight of the quality assurance process, by an independent body scrutinising the quality of a sample of reviews on a regular basis and reporting publicly on what they find. This would also allow the overstretched central HMPPS SFO review team to focus its efforts on drawing together the lessons learned from SFO reviews and promising practice identified across England and Wales. This in turn should be used to inform national policy and drive improvements in practice. 

Significant resources are rightly invested in the SFO review process. In our view, the current arrangements are inefficient. The potential improvements to the management of service users and increased accessibility for victims and family members are not fully realised. We make a number of recommendations to improve the efficiency and the overall impact of the SFO review process.

Justin Russell HM Chief Inspector of Probation