That takes us straight back to the uncomfortable question of what we actually want probation to do. If we want prevention, then practitioners need time. Not merely enough time to complete an assessment, satisfy National Standards, make the required referrals, record the contact and demonstrate compliance. Time to know somebody well enough to recognise change. Time to make the phone call that might secure the accommodation. Time to speak to the treatment service rather than simply signpost to it. Time to have the conversation that goes somewhere unexpected rather than ending it because the next appointment is waiting.
The irony is that much of the current direction seems to be travelling the other way. Reduce contact. Automate administration. Introduce online reporting. Increase caseload capacity. Measure activity. Manage risk. Recall when things go wrong. Then spend an extraordinary amount of money dealing with the consequences downstream.
Perhaps the question we should ask of every new probation policy is ridiculously simple: does this make another offence less likely? Not: does it save ten minutes? Does it produce a better-looking record? Does it improve a dashboard? Does it allow another five cases to be allocated? Does it demonstrate that a process has been completed?
Does it actually make another offence less likely? Because if prevention really is an investment rather than an expense, probation should be absolutely central to that thinking. But probation cannot prevent much in isolation either. A practitioner cannot manufacture a home, a job, drug treatment, mental-health provision or a functioning support network. Cut those things upstream and eventually their absence arrives at probation, the police, the courts and the prison gate wearing a much larger price tag.
Maybe that is the fundamental mistake we keep making. We keep trying to make the downstream response cheaper and faster instead of asking what investment upstream might have prevented the person reaching us again at all. And perhaps “advise, assist and befriend” doesn’t sound quite so antiquated when viewed through that lens. It sounds remarkably like prevention.
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A well argued point but... absolutely no-one with the authority to implement change will pay any attention to the argument. Why? Because they're all invested in a completely different set of imperatives, i.e. control & restraint via optics & metrics that nets votes for the political classes & wealth for their chums - tags, prisons, hardware/software & a layer of management to oversee it. All paid for by the taxpayer who has already been fleeced to the tune of £1billion+ by unnecesary, ineffective &/or failed projects. And STILL the emperor has no clothes!
Anon
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I fear you may be right about nobody with the authority to change things listening, but that almost makes it more important to keep asking the questions.
What troubles me is that the things we can measure and purchase increasingly seem to determine what probation becomes. Tags can be counted. Contacts can be counted. Compliance can be counted. AI can produce measurable time savings. Software can generate dashboards. Restrictions can be monitored. New systems can be commissioned and somebody can announce the number of hours or pounds they are expected to save.
What is much harder to quantify is whether a probation officer knowing somebody properly prevented something happening six months later. There is no neat metric for the conversation that changed somebody’s thinking, the relationship that meant they disclosed something before it became a crisis, or the experienced practitioner who spotted that something wasn’t right.
Perhaps that is precisely why those things become vulnerable. What is easily measurable starts being mistaken for what is valuable.
I don’t expect one blog comment to change Whitehall. But I do think we should keep challenging the assumption that because something produces impressive metrics it represents progress. Otherwise we eventually end up with a beautifully measured, technologically efficient, highly controlled Probation Service that has forgotten what probation was actually supposed to achieve. And then, as you say, everyone will admire the Emperor’s new dashboard.
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V. F. Ridgway published a paper in 1956 criticizing the measurement mantra. Simon Caulkin, a columnist, neatly summarized Ridgway’s argument as:
“What gets measured gets managed — even when it’s pointless to measure and manage it, and even if it harms the purpose of the organisation to do so”.Indeed the paper’s title is “Dysfunctional Consequences of Performance Measurements”.
Ridgway clearly was onto something in 1956. Not everything that matters can be measured. Not everything that we can measure matters.
- Ridgway observes that once a quantitative measure of performance is installed, people reorganise their behaviour around the measure rather than around the underlying purpose it was meant to track
- A single performance measure produces tunnel vision, with effort flowing to whatever is counted while everything uncounted is neglected
- Multiple measures reproduce the problem and add conflict between them, so that people optimise the easy or the rewarded number and trade off the rest.
- Composite measures, which try to solve this by rolling everything into a single weighted index, merely bury the arbitrary judgements about what matters inside a figure that then looks objective.
- The problem with measuring a construct like safety is not merely technical imprecision but the behavioural distortion that installing any metric sets off.
Goodhart's Law: Named after British economist Charles Goodhart. When a metric is used to reward performance or judge success, people change their behavior to optimize for that specific number rather than the real objective.
The Cobra Effect: A classic manifestation of perverse incentives. It gets its name from an anecdote during the British Raj in India, where the government offered a cash bounty for every dead cobra to reduce the snake population. Instead of lowering the population, enterprising citizens started breeding cobras to collect the reward. When the government cancelled the bounty, breeders set their snakes free, resulting in more cobras than before.
Campbell's Law states that the more a quantitative social indicator is used for high-stakes decision-making, the more subject it is to corruption pressures, and the more it will distort the social process it is meant to monitor.
Sources:
https://medium.com/centre-for-public-impact/what-gets-measured-gets-managed-its-wrong-and-drucker-never-said-it-fe95886d3df6
https://explore.psychsafety.com/n/ridgway-1956/