Probation Pay and Myths

Has anyone seen the Chief Officers Pay myth busting article today, in a vain attempt to spin it that we are and have been generously compensated over the years? For example she's stated that Band 4 (PO's) have had a massive 22% Pay increase since 2010, except that basically means we've had on average a 1.3% increase in pay each year, WOW Kim thanks! As the Chief Probation Officer shouldn't her role be to lead us, fight for us, advocate for us, inspire us, all I see is that she's a mouthpiece for her HMPPS bosses and nothing else...

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I did, it really angered me! The tone was so awful, as if we’re going to read that and then realise we’ve all been looking at it all wrong. All hail the chief PO for busting those myths and essentially calling us all liars and over-reactors. And you wonder why there’s a retention problem…

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I’ve read the Chief Probation Officer’s “myth busters” piece carefully. It sets out three main corrections and provides percentage tables to show pay growth over time. So let’s respond clearly and factually.

Myth 1: CBF is separate from the pay award

It’s correct that progression (CBF) sits within Civil Service Remit Guidance and forms part of the annual pay framework. But progression is movement within a pay band. It is not a cost-of-living increase. It does not raise the value of the band itself. It simply moves someone closer to the ceiling that already exists. Once staff reach the top of their band, progression ends. From that point on, only the headline uplift matters. So while CBF may technically sit inside the “award”, it does not function as restoration for experienced staff already at band maximum. That distinction is not a myth. It’s mechanics.

Myth 2: Only 1% between 2018 and 2021

The article states that between 2018 and 2024 average increases were 24.4% at band minimums and 10.8% at band maximums. Minimums rose faster to support recruitment. Maximums rose more slowly. That means newer entrants benefited proportionally more than long-serving staff at the top of bands. During the same period, cumulative inflation — especially post-2020 — significantly reduced real-terms value. Nominal increases without inflation context do not equal restored purchasing power.

Myth 3: Only 11% since 2010

The table shows band maximum increases since 2010. For Band 4, that’s 17.56% (22.26% including the proposed 2025 uplift). Spread across roughly 14–15 years, that averages around 1–1.5% per year. Over that same period, inflation has substantially exceeded that figure. The question staff are asking is not whether pay bands have moved at all. It’s whether pay has kept pace with inflation, expanding workload, heightened risk, professional registration requirements and responsibility creep. Those are different questions.

The 2025–26 offer remains:

• 4% uplift to pay points
• 4% uplift to allowances
• Progression where eligible

No one is disputing the arithmetic. What staff are disputing is the framing. Because when real-terms pay erosion is reframed as “misunderstanding”, it feels less like myth-busting and more like minimising. You can call it clarification. But when experienced practitioners calculate what their pay buys now compared to ten or fifteen years ago, the gap is not imaginary. It’s visible. And no table changes that.

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We are not stupid. We do not need “myth busters” to explain percentages to us. We can divide 22% by 15 years. We can compare it to inflation. We can look at our rent, mortgages, fuel bills, childcare and food costs and do the maths without supervision thanks! The issue is not misunderstanding. The issue is erosion.

Calling it a “myth” when staff point out that 1–1.5% a year over a decade and a half is nowhere near real-terms restoration feels profoundly insulting. It suggests the problem is that we haven’t grasped the figures properly, rather than the figures being inadequate. Progression is not a pay rise for experienced staff at the top of bands. It is internal movement within a ceiling that itself has barely moved. Recruitment minimums rising faster than maximums doesn’t disprove erosion. It highlights it. And presenting nominal percentage tables without inflation context is technically correct but economically hollow. We are being told, essentially: “Look at the numbers. You’re doing better than you think.”

Eh, No!

We are looking at the numbers.
And we are looking at our bank accounts.
And we are looking at workloads that have intensified year on year.
And we are looking at risk that has escalated.
And we are looking at professional expectations that have increased.
And we are looking at colleagues leaving.

The anger isn’t because we can’t do maths. It’s because we can! When a workforce under sustained strain is told their concerns are “misunderstandings,” it doesn’t feel explanatory. It feels incredibly dismissive! And that is what has landed so badly. This isn’t about confusion. It’s about value. If leadership wants trust, start by acknowledging real-terms loss without reframing it as myth. We don’t need correcting. We need recognising. There's a difference.

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What does AI say?

This article aims to address common misconceptions surrounding the pay, workload, and career value of probation officers in England and Wales, based on recent data from 2024–2026.

Myth 1: "Probation officers are well-paid for their work."

Reality: Pay has fallen significantly in real terms.
While starting salaries for qualified probation officers rose to £35,130 (plus London weighting) by 2024/25, unions argue this does not compensate for over a decade of wage stagnation. Data indicates that probation staff have faced a real-terms pay decrease of roughly 22% compared to similar professions over the past decade, with some estimates suggesting a 60% real-terms cut since 2010.

Myth 2: "The 2024/25 pay rises resolved the pay crisis."

Reality: The rises barely kept up with inflation, and negotiations for 2025 were delayed.
While a 2024 deal brought a 6.4% increase for some and brought forward pay dates, it followed years of suppressed wages. As of late 2025, unions were still in dispute, with reports of "relentless" workload pressures and no immediate 2025 pay offer, leading to threats of industrial action.

Myth 3: "Probation officers are paid equivalent to police/prison officers."

Reality: Probation staff have consistently fallen behind other justice sectors.
Comparative data shows that probation staff have received lower, or joint-lowest, pay awards compared to police staff and prison officers since 2010. As of 2024, probation pay lagged behind other public sector roles (Police Staff 20%, Health 16%, Local Government 18.4% vs. Probation 9.9% increase).

Myth 4: "The high caseloads are temporary, justifying the pay rate."

Reality: Unmanageable workloads are now considered systemic.
The service is under severe pressure, often described as "buckling" or in crisis, with high turnover, severe staff shortages (estimated at 3,150), and unsustainable caseloads. Staff describe pay as "atrocious" for the high-risk, 24/7 nature of the work.

Myth 5: "The service is now properly funded after reunification."

Reality: Despite returning to public control, funding remains a key issue.
Although the 2021 unification was generally welcomed, reports from 2025 show that the service is "under-funded, under-staffed, and overworked". The reliance on early release schemes (SDS40) has exacerbated workload issues without corresponding pay increases for the increased risk.

Disclaimer: Pay data is based on 2024-2025 union negotiations and Ministry of Justice figures. The situation regarding 2025/26 pay is subject to ongoing negotiations.

Thought Piece 8

I think what this thread has exposed isn’t just anger at one person or one union. It’s something deeper. It’s about probation staff feeling abandoned by EVERY layer of authority.

By management.
By policy-makers.
By inspectors.
By ministers.
And yes, by unions.

When people feel unheard and unprotected for long enough, distrust spreads everywhere. Leadership becomes a symbol for a much bigger loss of faith.

I don’t for one minute dismiss the criticism. Membership has fallen. Confidence has eroded. Some people have had poor experiences with reps. Some feel leadership hasn’t delivered. That frustration is real. But here’s the part that matters now. We have decisions coming up on pay and reform in the immediate term. Not in two years. Not after a hypothetical reset. Now.

If the argument is that the union is structurally compromised, then the obvious question is this.What is the concrete, time-bound alternative that increases leverage before the next pay round? Not a feeling. Not a verdict on personality. A plan.

Joining a different union fragments density further.
Leaving reduces bargaining weight.
Building a fourth union from scratch takes years.
Waiting for collapse is not strategy.

So what is the operational route that creates political or industrial risk in the next 6–12 months? Because power responds to risk. Risk comes from numbers, turnout and coordination. If we believe probation is pivotal to sentencing reform and prison capacity, then leverage only exists if it is organised and visible. Anger alone doesn’t create that. This isn’t about defending anyone’s salary or record. It’s about avoiding paralysis.

If leadership needs replacing, that requires members.If strategy needs rewriting, that requires mandate. If unity is the goal, it requires participation. Otherwise we stay exactly where we are which is divided, exhausted, and easier to manage than we'd like to think. I genuinely want to know what is the alternative that strengthens our hand before the next negotiation, not after it?

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1. Work your hours.

2. No overtime.
3. No late night reporting.
4. When re-allocated cases for those on sick or maternity, rack, pack and stack them. Prioritise your caseload and keep yourself sane.
5. Don’t take on SPOC roles.
6. Do everything within timescales.
7. Friday afternoon give your manager a list of the work you could not complete.
8. Remove the goodwill and let’s see how the management deal with that.
9. Everyone go on the sick and take at least six months.
10. Don’t feel guilty the management put you in this position.

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Love your thinking. However if you do this and then go off sick, you get victimised. Colleagues have gone through traumatising Performance Management processes for allegedly not being up to scratch and failing. Colleagues claimed in their defence that it was impossible to achieve all the dictates within contracted hours. Were told they just couldn't cut it. PDU heads and their deputies can be quite vindictive not realising they are not quite that clever despite it been brought to their attention regularly. Some clearly do not even know what ACAS is and what they do - God forbid. Employment Tribunal claims on their way and not done via NAPO either.

National Audit Office report late last year confirmed what we have been telling our esteemed employer all along. Mmmm... they underestimated the time things took despite us at the coalface telling them this consistently. They admitted it at the PAC hearings and then again decided to go against their own underestimation again and didn't deliberately correctly adjust the timings. Classic FU to their employees. Talk about deliberate perpetuation of Workplace Harm! Talk about government sanctioned Modern Day Slavery. They have no idea how to manage, don't care about their employees. If this was a private company the lot of them would have been given their P45s and would have walked out with a cardboard box of personal belongings, but no, they still in their positions and receiving performance bonuses. LIDL now pays more per hour for much less responsibility.

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I understand the instinct behind some of these suggestions. People are exhausted. They feel unheard. They feel cornered. But there’s a difference between withdrawing goodwill and detonating your own position.

Work to contract? Yes.
Stop unpaid overtime? Yes.
Document what can’t be completed? Absolutely.

That’s not rebellion. That’s professionalism. Mass resignations, coordinated sickness or banking on tribunals as a system reset isn’t strategy. It’s a series of individual risks in a system that has repeatedly shown it will protect itself first.

If this thread shows anything, it’s not laziness or cowardice. It’s something more serious, people don’t trust any layer of authority to protect them anymore. Not management. Not leadership. Not unions. That level of mistrust is dangerous in a public protection service. But fragmentation and individual legal battles won’t fix that mistrust. They confirm it.

If probation is genuinely pivotal to sentencing reform and prison capacity (and it is ) then leverage has to be credible, coordinated and collective. Not reactive. Boundaries are strength. Organisation is strength.Burning out one colleague at a time is not. If senior leaders are reading this, the message isn’t that staff want chaos. It’s that they feel abandoned. And that’s a far bigger warning sign.

Thought Piece 7

In case anyone hasn't realised it thus far, irrespective of PAC & uncle tom cobbly, NO-ONE in Westminster or Whitehall or MoJ or HMPPS gives a crap about the predicament of probation staff. Why? Because it doesn't affect *them*.

Only when someone's job or promotion or public reputation is on the line will anyone with half-a-chance of making a difference raise an eyebrow &, at a stretch, wonder what the fuss is about. They're not in positions of power because they give a crap; its because they *DON'T* give a crap. They're teflon.

The cobbler, lammy, the invisible woman, young ewan mcgregor (or whoever it is)... they're all invested in tech & prisons - probation staff are merely cannon fodder. Ask yourselves: why would they be interested in reversing all of the PR & vested interest & public cash spent building cosy relationships with the tech & incarceration industries? What is the biggest risk they take?

1. Pissing off powerful people with excellent corporate entertainment & razor-sharp lawyers? OR
2. Stuffing up a handful of whiny bastards who they've been treating like shit with impunity for a decade or two? Less than a third are in a frail union led by a hapless wannabe, and even fewer are in a union that says "yes" to every govt proposal.

As of December 2025, resident doctors (formerly known as junior doctors) in England have staged 14 separate rounds of strike action since the dispute began in March 2023. They've voted again in favour of a further 6 months of action if required:

Number entitled to vote in the ballot: 54,432
Number of votes cast in the ballot: 28,598 = 52.54%
Number of spoilt/invalid voting papers returned: 17

Result of voting:
Yes: 26,696 (93.40%)
No: 1,885 (6.60%)

27,000 of the most committed & critical workers in the country have not yet achieved their aim because the teflon-coated, cloth-eared ideologues in Westminster & Whitehall feel able to ignore them for the past 3 years. The most recent ballot *might* just have twisted Streeting's lugs BUT... I suspect it's more likely he's positioning himself as Starmer's successor & making himself out to be the resolver of the issue.

Probation staff do not have the same leverage & will not have the same effect upon lammy, a deputy pm desperate to step-up, because he's already laid out his tag'em & bag'em agenda.

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I understand the frustration behind this, but I don’t think it’s as simple as “they don’t care.” It’s worse than that. Probation doesn’t move votes. Hospitals collapsing move votes. Trains not running move votes. Doctors striking move votes. When 27,000 resident doctors vote 93% for industrial action, it makes front-page news and creates immediate political risk.

Probation? We operate in the shadows. When it fails, it’s framed as individual practitioner failure, not systemic collapse. When it holds things together, no one notices. That’s the difference. It’s not personal malice. It’s political calculus.

And right now the political calculus favours:
• prisons (because visible custody reassures the public),
• tagging (because tech looks modern and decisive),
• “tough community sentences” (because it sounds robust).

What doesn’t generate headlines?
Workload ratios.
Case quality.
Professional discretion.
Emotional strain.
Retention.

You’re right about leverage. Doctors can withdraw labour and the NHS feels it immediately. Teachers can strike and parents feel it within hours. Probation withdrawing labour would cause disruption, but it’s slower, more diffuse, easier to spin as irresponsibility. That doesn’t mean we’re powerless. It means influence won’t come from outrage alone. It comes from unity, turnout, credibility and sustained pressure.

If less than a third of staff are union members, and turnout is patchy, decision-makers will calculate that the noise is containable. The uncomfortable truth is this: power responds to risk. Until probation creates political risk (reputational, operational, electoral) it will remain a lower priority than prisons and headline management. That’s not because staff are “whiny.” It’s because we’re structurally easy to ignore. The question isn’t whether they care, the question is how we make it cost them not to.

Thought Piece 6

Firstly, I vote no!

Secondly, I agree with the Public Accounts Committee, a well-run probation service is a must-have. That much is obvious. What isn’t obvious is how anyone thinks a service on its knees can be stabilised with a measly 4% pay offer. If we’re serious about building something that actually works, then 20% is a starting point, not some wild, irresponsible demand. You don’t rescue a collapsing system with loose change, glossy adverts and motivational quotes.

No one is surprised that HMPPS’s latest shiny programme, Our Future Probation Service, is unlikely to be sufficient. A rebrand is not reform. It’s the same system, the same pressures, the same culture of JFDI and abuse just wrapped in nicer language. And the delusions of AI and increased tagging as a solution? That’s technological wishful thinking dressed up as policy.

Probation services in England and Wales can be brought back from the brink, the PAC report alludes to this, but only if leaders are willing to confront the culture and problems that’s helped drive it there. A culture built on the abuse of goodwill, routine gaslighting of staff, relentless emotional strain, and the normalisation of trauma is not a foundation. You can’t physically, financially and emotionally drain a workforce, while under resourcing the service itself, and then act shocked when the system fails.

Thirdly, can we stop with the emotional manipulation? Stop the false advertising calling frontline staff and work “extraordinary”. Stop brainwashing staff into thinking “we don’t do this job for the money”.

I do come to work to be paid. I’m not a “hero” and my work is not “extraordinary”. That’s not cynical, that’s reality. If the Chief Probation Officer and the layers of Regional Directors, Heads of Operations and Heads of PDUs truly come to work purely for the love of the job, they’re welcome to wear a cape and donate their salaries to the people on the frontline actually holding the risk, the caseloads, and the consequences when things go wrong.

Lastly, frontline practitioners already know the solutions to the probation crisis. The committees have heard us. The inspectors have heard us. The inquiries have heard us. The evidence exists. The voices are there. The only thing missing is the will of the leaders to act.

Probation Officer

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Probation services pushed to the brink of collapse in England and Wales risk endangering public

A new report from the Public Accounts Committee (PAC) warns that the Probation Service in England and Wales is being placed under significant strain, seriously impeding its ability to protect the public and reduce reoffending rates.

Read the report
Read the report (PDF)
Inquiry: Efficiency and resilience of the Probation Service
Public Accounts Committee

In 2024-25, HM Prison and Probation Service (HMPPS) spent £1.34bn on the Probation Service. The Ministry of Justice (MoJ) estimates that the economic and social cost of reoffending across adult offenders is around £20.9bn a year.

The number of prisoners recalled to prison is at an all-time high. At the end of March 2025, the recall prison population was 13,583, accounting for 15% of the prison population, a 49% increase since June 2021.

Since the Probation Service was brought under full public control in 2021, its performance has deteriorated, along with an overall rise in reoffending rates. Last year, the service met just seven of its 27 performance targets. Three years earlier it was meeting half of its targets.

HMPPS’s’ new programme, Our Future Probation Service, was introduced in an effort to combat this declining performance. However, the PAC warn that this is unlikely to be sufficient.

The MoJ does not have a strong history of implementing digital change programmes well, and crucially they have yet to make decisions on changes they plan to make to the level of supervision some offenders receive.

Given the risk these decisions could pose to the public, the PAC is calling for the MoJ and HMPPS to set clear thresholds for the level of risk they are willing to accept, to help monitor operational and public protection risks.

Evidence to the inquiry showed that people classed as low-risk often require support to prevent them reoffending. HMPPS’ planned changes to probation will likely reduce supervision for these lower-risk offenders, while involving a large increase in electronic monitoring.

Noting serious performance issues with the electronic monitoring service, including delays by Serco in fitting tags, the PAC is seeking more information on how the company is performing from government, as well as what role third sector and private sector organisations will play in probation to make up for this reduction in supervision.

The vacancy rate for probation officers increased from 14% in 2021 to 21% in 2025. Probation officers are estimated to have been working on average at 118% capacity for several years, though recent findings suggest this figure is likely much higher. The inquiry heard evidence that the Probation Service's culture is built on ‘emotional strain' and 'trauma’.

The PAC is sceptical that HMPPS has a real understanding of how many staff it needs to sufficiently improve performance. The report calls for HMPPS to set out when and how it expects to be able to provide clarity to staff on when their workloads will reduce to acceptable levels.

The PAC was concerned to learn that when evaluating the risk of harm presented by offenders, practitioners only adequately assessed 28% of cases in 2024, compared to 60% of cases in 2018-19. This report calls for the MoJ to set out a clear timeline for when it expects its performance against key metrics to improve.

Chair comment

Sir Geoffrey Clifton-Brown, Chair of the Public Accounts Committee, said:

“The probation service in England and Wales is failing. The endpoint of this failure is demonstrated by our report, which shows the number of prisoners recalled to prison is at an all-time high.

"It was deeply alarming to hear of probation staff working under immense pressure in a seemingly toxic environment, in a culture built on emotional strain and trauma. This not only raises concerns about the toll the overall system is taking on their mental health but the impact it is having on their ability to perform their duties. The public’s safety relies on them doing so.

“Unfortunately, the landscape for probation is not going to become more forgiving for a service which has slipped into decline in recent years, as plans to free up capacity, including with early release schemes, in other parts of the crisis-ridden justice system are likely to increase demand.

"Well-run probation is a must-have, helping those who have served their time find their place back in society. HMPPS accepts that the current picture is unsustainable, but its own planned changes could cause further disruption and place more pressure on overstretched staff. The probation service is already teetering on the brink. Government’s immediate goal must be to avoid making matters worse.”

Thought Piece 5

It’s almost impressive how much spin can be wrapped around numbers this bad. We’re told to feel reassured.

“Investment”
“Transformation”
“Technology”
“Opportunity”

Meanwhile HM Inspectorate of Probation has just reported that less than half of cases are meeting the standard to keep people safe. Less than half. Apparently that’s what “rebuilding the service” looks like now.

• Two thirds staffing.
• SPO shortages.
• AP beds full.
• Pre-release planning collapsing.
• Reset disrupting risk work.
• Early releases dumped on already stretched teams.

But don’t worry, we’ve got AI transcripts and tagging contracts. Because nothing says public protection like a laptop and an ankle bracelet.

The language is the giveaway. “Difficult choices will need to be made.” Translation: 

• cut contact, 
• script supervision, 
• move people through faster and hope nothing blows up.

It’s not reform. It’s rationing. They’re not strengthening probation. They’re shrinking it and calling it innovation. And the real insult? This is all being sold as a success story, while the people actually doing the job are told to clap for 4% and be grateful. If this is what £700 million buys, I’d love to see what underfunding looks like!

• You can’t run public protection on PowerPoint slides and pilots.
• You can’t replace experience with “digital solutions.”
• And you can’t collapse standards to under 50% and still pretend the system is fine.

This isn’t transformation. It’s a slow managed decline with better PR.

Anon

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Yup, and the following is just cringeworthy bollox:

"While sufficient work to keep people safe was not evident in enough of the cases we inspected, following the region’s inspection in 2024, we also saw strategic progress in strengthening public protection work, improved staff accountability and engagement, and a commitment to building a culture that supported learning and psychological safety."

Riddle me this, Jones: how the fuckity fuck fuck can "sufficient work to keep people safe was not evident" be construed as "strategic progress in strengthening public protection work, improved staff accountability and engagement, and a commitment to building a culture that supported learning and psychological safety."

It's word salad; it's meaningless drivel... it's a sequence of non sequiturs throughout. But t'was always thus in HMI probation reports, with areas/OMU's scoring teen% yet leadership rated as strong. Gotta protect that pension pot (and the gong they promised if you behave).

Anon

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It’s the classic inspection paradox, isn’t it. “Work to keep people safe not sufficient in most cases”…but somehow also…“strategic progress, strengthened protection, psychological safety, positive culture.”

If this were any other profession, failing in over half of cases would be called what it is:failure. In probation it gets translated into management poetry. Because admitting the obvious, that the service is under-resourced and unsafe, would mean confronting the people who control the budget. So instead we get paragraphs of soft language and “green shoots”. It’s not analysis. It’s cushioning.

When less than half of cases meet the required standard, that isn’t “progress”. That’s a red warning light. But red doesn’t look good in a ministerial briefing, so we get beige.

Anon

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"It’s not analysis." Fucking too right... Jones' lukewarm fudge would have been dismissed out of hand by a judge.

I know I'm reaching back in time here, bear with me... if such equivocal nonsense had ever been submitted to a court in a full PSR (remember them, peeps?) the judge/magistrate would have had a dickie fit. On one occasion the Crown Court liaison PO told me "the judge asked me to tell you to make your bloody mind up. He's adjourned the case for a week to allow you time to have a good, hard think & re-submit something of value." Those were the days when a report would be read in advance by the sentencing judge and the CCLO quizzed about any discrepancies or outlandish proposals.

I dread to think what passes as a report these days.

Anon

The Inspector Speaks

Sentencing Act January 2026

I was pleased to see the Sentencing Act receive royal asset yesterday evening, together with the government’s reassurance that the reforms are supported by plans to rebuild the Probation Service – including investment of up to £700m over the next three years, increased ability to tag offenders, and new technology aimed at reducing administration, so staff can focus on work that reduces reoffending.

It is positive that the Act will not take effect immediately, giving the Probation Service time to prepare for the incoming changes. However, we know that some measures, including the extension of Suspended Sentence Orders and changes to Remand, will come into force in just two months, while implementation planning continues for more complex changes.

I have spoken recently about my support in principle for many elements of the Act and the opportunity it provides to transform the justice system.

However, I have been clear that there will be challenges in ensuring the gap between probation resource and the requirements of the Act are reconciled, and that difficult choices will need to be made around what to prioritise for maximum impact.

I have also warned that there is a danger of the reforms collapsing public confidence in probation unless they are implemented with great care and thought, and the right investment is made in the service in the short to medium term. Failing to address these point risks setting the service up to fail.

I look forward to continuing to work closely with the Department throughout 2026 to advise on how our inspection findings can inform next steps. In particular, I will be sharing the results of our Dynamic Inspection of Public Protection programme, which publishes its first report next week (29 January), with a focus on what improved probation practice can do to make the public safer and reduce harm to victims.

--oo00oo--

Dynamic Inspection of Public Protection in Kent, Surrey and Sussex

Chief Inspector’s judgement

This review of the Probation Service’s public protection across Kent, Surrey and Sussex revealed that, whilst there had been improvements since our last inspection, concerningly, work to keep people safe met the required standard in less than half the cases inspected for ‘assessment’ and ‘implementation and delivery’. In addition, just over half the cases met this standard for case ‘planning’ and ‘reviewing’.

The region’s public protection work had been made more challenging by large-scale national changes in response to prison overpopulation. We found that more support was needed for staff managing complex cases, particularly those involving domestic abuse, and work needed to be done to ensure consistency across all cases.

A primary concern was a lack of quality information sharing of the risks posed by individuals on probation, with probation service and police colleagues highlighting the challenges faced by both organisations to balance public protection with proportionate, compliant information sharing. We were encouraged to see work underway and resource allocated to strengthen relationships. However, there remained no centrally driven directive on what should be shared. This was a long-standing issue which continued to undermine the region’s ability to understand fully the risk posed by those they supervised. A national strategic approach to ensure consistency and compliance from both probation and partners was required to facilitate effective public protection work.

The region was affected by ongoing workforce challenges, with understaffing at both probation officer and senior probation officer grades at the time of the inspection. This inevitably affected capacity to manage demanding caseloads and risk to the public. Constraints including proximity to London, associated high costs of living, lengthy vetting procedures and limited autonomy in recruitment continued to compound these workforce pressures.

In response, the region had introduced a range of innovative strategies to optimise resources, including the use of technology and artificial intelligence, and was working to address training gaps to improve the quality of case management, despite limited resources.

While sufficient work to keep people safe was not evident in enough of the cases we inspected, following the region’s inspection in 2024, we also saw strategic progress in strengthening public protection work, improved staff accountability and engagement, and a commitment to building a culture that supported learning and psychological safety.

--oo00oo--

Inspection commentary (highlights)

Case inspections highlighted that, for both assessment and implementation and delivery, less than half the cases met the required standard to keep people safe. Planning and reviewing met the required standard in just over half the cases. There were indicators that the sufficiency of work to keep people safe was on an upward trajectory in Kent, Surrey and Sussex across all the above areas. Practitioners were completing meaningful home visits and speaking to the families and support networks of people on probation where appropriate to improve risk management. MAPPA cases (multi-agency public protection arrangements) were also managed effectively. Planning for restrictions and monitoring was generally stronger than planning for interventions and programmes to address risk. Restrictions were consistently included in plans and compliance arrangements were clear, although there was less detail on interventions that would take place to address attitudes and behaviour.

Large-scale national change and responses to prison over-population, as well as delays in sentencing, had a destabilising effect on people on probation, making public protection work in Kent, Surrey and Sussex more challenging. Those sentenced and released on the day from court, due to time served on remand, meant pre-release planning could not be delivered in a meaningful way. The increase in people on probation due to early release from custody schemes also affected the time available to set services up to meet their needs and manage their risks. Short recall periods were at risk of disrupting continuity and partner agency involvement, often leaving probation practitioners as the only consistent presence throughout the sentence.

Although Probation Reset arrangements were outside the region’s control, they had a detrimental impact on public protection work. Planned service delivery including challenging conversations or interventions were often disrupted by reset, a concern that was most pronounced in complex domestic abuse cases. Regional leaders were implementing a model to transfer all reset cases to a dedicated hub, though this process was still being refined and audited. ‘Quick guides’ outlined eligibility criteria and checklists for pre-reset tasks, with guidance focused mainly on recording and concluding processes. However, casework inspections highlighted varied and inconsistent practices in which victim and risk information was prioritised at transfer, creating a sense of instability and lack of coherence. Reset hubs were in the early stages of implementation, with communication and monitoring mechanisms already in place, though their intended effect on consistency had not yet been fully realised.

Challenges faced in managing risk to the public were compounded by long-standing staffing challenges, influenced by proximity to London and the associated high cost of living. Since the previous inspection, the percentage of qualified probation officers in post had declined, with current staffing at approximately two-thirds of the target level. There was also understaffing of senior probation officers by over 10 per cent. This inevitably affected capacity to manage demanding caseloads. The region was actively implementing measures within its control to optimise resources, such as a focus on the retention of PQiPs, where significant numbers were resigning or withdrawing. However, additional constraints, such as vetting processes and limited autonomy in recruitment, continued to complicate efforts to address these workforce pressures.

In response to continuing staffing pressures, the region had introduced a range of innovative and accountable strategies to optimise resources. These included the use of technology, artificial intelligence, and the See the Way Forward approach, which streamlined complex or duplicate processes. Sometimes tasks were reallocated, to free practitioners’ time for meaningful work, including activities that promoted public protection. The region sought to identify gaps in training by conducting training needs analyses and exploring new ways to improve this activity. The region introduced a range of activities to strengthen staff capability and support informal learning. Examples included deploying quality development officers (QDOs) to provide specialist guidance and development in key areas and implementing pod structures to promote informal learning and peer-to-peer knowledge sharing. Technology had been particularly effective, offering practitioners practical support and reassurance that solutions were being developed to alleviate workload pressures. The region was proactive in engaging in trials from central HMPPS, designed to improve the recording and accessibility of information for practitioners.

Capacity issues with APs were identified in both weeks of the inspection, compounded by lack of available bed spaces, transfers, co-working arrangements, and contingency measures that were not always effective. The region was concerned about this issue and had pursued conversations with national AP colleagues, which they felt had reached a conclusion but with no resolution. People on probation posing the highest risk of serious harm in Kent, Surrey and Sussex were often refused an AP bed due to capacity issues or placed throughout the country. This contradicted public protection principles of developing stability through support networks and resettlement.

Thought Piece 4

“Meaningful engagement” isn’t complicated or mystical. It’s not an app, a script or an AI transcript.

It’s time.

It’s sitting across from someone without a screen between you and actually listening.

It’s knowing their history because you’ve supervised them for months, not just skimmed a case note five minutes before the appointment.

It’s noticing when something feels off before it shows up on a risk tool.

It’s being able to challenge them honestly because there’s enough trust for them not to shut down or walk out.

It’s the conversations that don’t fit neatly into drop-down boxes. The bits that never make it onto a dashboard but are exactly where change happens.

It’s also professional judgement. Making decisions based on experience and instinct as well as policy. Having the space to think, not just process.

When I started, engagement meant relationships. Now it too often means logging a contact, updating different systems and proving you spoke to someone for 30 minutes.

That’s not engagement. That’s admin with a pulse.

Real engagement takes continuity, time and trust. Three things the current model systematically squeezes out.

So when management talk about “meaningful engagement”, most of us just hear another slogan for “do more with less”.

Because you can’t build trust at speed, and you certainly can’t automate it.

Anon

Be A Probation Officer

The Role

Join a modern, target-driven organisation where your primary responsibilities will include

• Completing housing referrals longer than most Russian novels
• Explaining to five agencies why nothing is your responsibility but somehow still yours
• Managing prison releases planned approximately six minutes in advance
• Assessing “risk” using different IT systems that don’t talk to each other
• Recording everything multiple times in slightly different formats
• Feeding the systems first and seeing people if time allows
• Delivering rehabilitation primarily through keyboards, drop-down menus and duplicate case notes
• Absorbing the consequences of every upstream policy failure while being told this is “innovation”

Actual face-to-face work with people will be available occasionally, subject to admin demand.

What We’re Looking For

We welcome applicants who:

• Care deeply about people (this will be gently trained out of you)
• Can tolerate high workload and low trust
• Are comfortable having professional judgement replaced by templates
• Accept that experience is optional but compliance is essential
• View burnout as a personal development opportunity
• Plan to leave within 2–3 years for a better paid job elsewhere

Long-serving staff also welcome, while stocks last.

Pay & Rewards

Enjoy:

• A decade of pay “progression” worth roughly 7–10% against an 80%+ rise in living costs
• Settlements consistently lower than comparable public sector roles
• Occasional £20 vouchers as recognition for managing life-threatening risk
• A generous 4% offer described repeatedly as “beyond remit”

Retention not guaranteed.

Career Development

• Watch newly qualified colleagues leave for police, prisons or literally anything else
• Take on their caseload
• Repeat

Our Vision

To transform probation into a streamlined, efficient throughput service where:

• Process replaces judgement
• Churn replaces experience
• Surveillance replaces support
• And “capacity” replaces care

Apply now

Because if you wanted to actually work with people, you probably should have been a nurse, teacher or social worker.

Probation Service. Keeping the spreadsheets safe since 2010

Anon

Thought Piece 3

When there was or still is a crisis in APs because of bedspace issues and capacity, the community probation officer is then expected to administer a tedious crapshoot of housing referrals- the CAS-3 being War and Peace and the AP one following close behind with a Duty to Refer and then a CRS referral to Single Homeless Project etc. 

Since when did probation become an annex of Right Move and Purple Bricks? I haven't got time or energy to write out form after form after form to cover myself in terms of contingencies because there are too many releases and not enough bed spaces and only certain tiers of offender get priority for those spaces. Where is the planning for all this? Where is the contingency? Where are the temporary APs to deal with the increase? Where is the extra funding? Where is the accountability? It's a complete farce. I don't blame the AP or CAS-3 system- they must be beleaguered, but why put them in that position? 

Probation in the community is a miserable dumping ground for the ill-thought out policies that favour prisons that are in no great shakes themselves. We are sullied with this lack of professional respect and are a clearing house for failure of will, leadership, joined-up thinking and a lack of planning. Yes, the prisons need to reduce capacity. But if you don't just warehouse them in the first place and make sure their needs are identified and addressed rather than wait until they are in the community, we are less likely to have recalls. 

Having an offender off the books of prisons for a few weeks only to be placed back in there is just musical cells and distorts figures.There needs to be proper investment in community probation and for those officers to be given their dignity and professional acumen back and, if necessary, be able to voice concerns before release. It seems the most efficient thing prisons do, is have the POM's name removed on Delius about 5 seconds after they've left the prison gates: Not our problem, matey. Yours now. Ta! Ta! Although... the tapping of that Part A is often not a long way off.

Anon

Thought Piece 2

Rejoice indeed. This is narrative management at its finest.

Strip away the victory laps and what this press release actually says is this: the system was driven to the edge of collapse, and the “solution” is to move the problem somewhere quieter. Prison capacity is stabilised not by fixing demand, prevention or sentencing culture, but by exporting pressure, risk and failure into the community and calling it reform.

Apparently the Sentencing Act now “grips the crisis”. It does, provided you accept that probation is an infinite sponge. Early release. Fixed-term recalls. Expanded tagging. “Tougher” community penalties. All of it only works if probation absorbs more people, more volatility, more scrutiny and more blame, without any meaningful expansion in staffing, pay, autonomy or infrastructure.

We’re told probation is being “backed with £700 million”. Again. As if repetition makes it real. That money isn’t going to retention, workloads or professional judgement. It’s going to tags, contracts, surveillance and tech — things that look reassuring in a press release and don’t argue back. Practitioners remain the cheapest, most expendable component of the system.

The 56-day recall cap is sold as relief. In reality it turns recall into a population-management device rather than a public protection decision. Probation still manages the destabilisation, the rapid re-releases, the risk escalation and the inevitable fallout, while ministers point at the spreadsheet and declare the crisis “under control”.

What’s missing is louder than what’s said. No acknowledgement that probation was already stretched beyond credibility. No mention of record recall rates. No reference to staff safety, attrition or the haemorrhaging of experience. No explanation of how “tougher community punishments” are delivered by a service paid below comparable roles and increasingly designed to function without professional memory.

This isn’t reform. It’s displacement.

The prison crisis has been averted by redefining where the crisis lives and then congratulating yourselves for it. Probation isn’t being backed. It’s being used.

Anon