What the Inspector Found in the Midlands

Here we have another inspection report that more than adequately provides yet more evidence for the comprehensive failure of TR. This time, rather than focus on the key failures and short-comings, I thought it would be worthwhile to highlight some of the forensic narrative that demonstrates beyond doubt why this whole thing was only ever going to be a bloody omnishambles. It's worth remembering that this is just one CRC - all the chaos, uncertainty, upheaval etc has been visited on every one of the 21 Contract Package Areas - and for what exactly?   

Foreword

We report here on our inspection of work in West Mercia by the Warwickshire & West Mercia Community Rehabilitation Company (CRC) and the Midlands division of the National Probation Service (NPS). Both organisations need to improve the quality of their work. 

The NPS had experienced staff who managed offenders well and delivered good-quality interventions overall. Cases were not reviewed often enough or well enough, however. Due to inefficient court liaison processes for capturing and exchanging information, both local sentencers and (in many cases) the CRC find themselves under-informed and at a distinct disadvantage. 

We found a further anomaly: despite NPS leaders’ clear intentions, NPS staff were not using the wide range of interventions on offer from the CRC to the extent expected. Offenders may be denied the best help as a result, and the interventions themselves will be less viable over time, if they are not used enough. This is not the first time we have found this situation, and I do urge the NPS to review the position nationally. 

CRC staff had manageable workloads, certainly when compared to those in some other CRCs. Yet basic offender management was not good enough. Not enough was being done, and offenders who missed appointments time after time were rarely taken back to court. This is a dispiriting picture: we saw good-quality work being done by some staff, while others with equal caseloads and experience lacked motivation and impact. The CRC was dealing with under-performance by practitioners in acute cases, but generally staff supervision and oversight were inadequate. 

This CRC is in single ownership. It is doing some things well – for example, delivering effective unpaid work and providing services to women. Like others, it has had to make compromises in the way it operates, for financial and other reasons; nevertheless, much better overall performance should be within its grasp. However, senior managers’ overriding concern is to contain and reduce costs, for pressing financial reasons. Substantial cuts in CRC funding to partners supplying effective interventions are on the cards. That is particularly regrettable, given that interventions delivered by this CRC’s providers appear to be generally well regarded, and as other aspects of the CRC’s offender management are so wanting.

Dame Genys Stacey

The operating model 

The CRC sought to avoid disrupting the effective operating model it inherited from the probation trust, but agreed changes to it during initial contract negotiations with the Ministry of Justice (MoJ). Those changes had not been successful, and aspects of the model have become unaffordable due to lower than anticipated caseloads. Despite initial promise, the operating model is now compromised in a number of ways. 

The probation trust had delivered services locally, in a decentralised model particularly suited to the rural area it covered and with services often provided through partnerships between the trust and local independent sector organisations. Potentially higher delivery costs were offset by the ability of partners to match probation funding from other sources and by a low reliance on accredited programmes that can be costly. 

This legacy is well suited to the current legal framework, in which non-accredited interventions can be provided through rehabilitation activity requirements (RARs). The contractual arrangements finally agreed with the MoJ, however, provided for delivery of probation services to be concentrated in large CRC offices, to be known as STEP centres. In addition, a new initial assessment and planning tool, the Rehabilitation, Assessment and Progression Plan (RAPP), was introduced to enable sentence plans to be put in place quickly for community sentences. 

STEP centres were to become multi-functional offices from which the CRC and all organisations working with it would deliver services to offenders, alongside the offenders’ routine reporting. Cafés were to be included within the centres, to provide training and employment opportunities. 

The CRC conceded on inspection that the RAPP was not an assessment tool it would have chosen; despite revisions, it did not fully meet operational requirements, and led to work having to be completed twice. The CRC’s preferred option, to revert to an ‘OASys only’ model, will involve the slow bureaucracy of a contractual change. 

The vision of one-stop probation bazaars that put offenders at the centre of community-based networks of help, support and encouragement, along with significant material backing to realise it, had been well received by staff. Bright, spacious, well-appointed and freshly refurbished office accommodation designed and obtained with this vision in mind is now mostly empty, however. The STEP centre approach was partially in place in Telford, but in Worcester, the largest centre of population in West Mercia, it had not proved viable, largely because the volumes of work were too low for this model of delivery. 

Partners had to provide a presence every weekday to encourage the take-up of their services, but the daily throughput of offenders had not been high enough to make this viable for the partners. As a result, offenders continued to access services by individual appointment at the provider’s own premises, undermining the STEP centre concept. 

Meanwhile, the CRC had chosen to reinvigorate and expand provision of accredited programmes, encouraged by the funding attached. The CRC faced a continual struggle to maintain sufficient throughput on accredited programmes to justify the fixed costs, however. The new NPS arrangements for court work limited the number of programme requirements ordered. 

PeoplePlus had subsequently adopted a strategy of making minimal changes to its CRC operating model. Combined with the CRC’s strong focus on hitting performance targets, this had contributed to the CRC not incurring any penalties under Her Majesty’s Prison and Probation Service’s (HMPPS) performance regime. 

More recently, funding shortfalls had led PeoplePlus to try to minimise its losses by planning funding cuts to contracted suppliers and further changes to arrangements for service delivery. The Chief Officer was determined not to reduce front-line staffing further, but faced the possibility of further cuts and, therefore, a hard choice: either the same number of staff would have to undertake additional work that had previously been contracted out, or services could continue to be outsourced and funded by a reduction in staff. A third option, to simply deliver fewer services within the same or a reduced budget, ran the risk of causing outcomes for offenders to deteriorate. 

Leadership and management 

PeoplePlus saw the CRC business and its staff as an integral part of its organisation, but was happy for CRC staff to see themselves as separate if this supported a loyalty to the CRC and its objectives. CRC managers with corporate responsibilities said they struggled to maintain working relationships with colleagues in PeoplePlus because of frequent staff changes. They observed that they were continually having to educate new members about the CRC business. 

The CRC was anxious that the overriding concern of PeoplePlus was now to manage the cost base, and this created a tension between the priorities of the organisations and senior managers. 

The CRC was engaged in local inter-agency partnerships at a senior level, although its input was constrained by the small size of the senior management team (SMT) and the number of authorities and organisations it had to cover. Strategic relationships with key partners were preoccupied with handling reductions in CRC funding and alterations to service requirements. 

Members of the CRC’s SMT attempted to maximise their presence in their respective delivery units. However, that was not always easy given the large area covered by the organisation and the pressures of their role within a reduced SMT. Practitioners nonetheless complained that senior managers were not sufficiently visible or accessible. Senior managers were aware of the potentially isolating nature of their role in a rural area, but aimed to meet weekly and appeared to work well with each other. 

There were staff meetings at team and LDU level, but as in some other CRCs, staff complained of being managed in an impersonal way (via email) that was at odds with working in an organisation whose function was to work with people to bring about change through personal interaction. 

The organisation was being driven by performance targets, as one might expect, and there was a strong central drive to discern how to meet targets and then do so. Managers and practitioners both recognised that this had little to do with delivering positive outcomes for individual offenders. Success in managing performance targets was not matched by efforts to maintain and raise the quality of offender management and to achieve positive outcomes with offenders.

Staffing and caseloads 

The CRC was organised into geographically-based generic offender management teams, with separate units for accredited programmes, Through the Gate (resettlement activity) and unpaid work. Unpaid work teams took full responsibility for offenders with a single requirement for unpaid work (or unpaid work coupled with a restrictive requirement such as a curfew). Other unpaid work cases were allocated to one of the offender management teams. 

The average caseload of the responsible officers within our sample was 50 cases per full-time equivalent responsible officer. This was in line with average figures for West Mercia produced by the CRC. Local data showed that workloads were rising, mainly because of staff reductions. The number of probation services officer (PSO) posts had been reduced, while the CRC continued to carry vacancies for probation officers (POs). The CRC found it difficult to recruit POs because of the more attractive remuneration packages offered by the NPS. As a result, the CRC relied on the longterm and expensive use of agency staff. 

Many responsible officers considered their caseloads to be high and told us that this contributed to deficiencies in their work, although we saw some cases managed very well by officers with equally high caseloads. Under-performance appeared to us to be caused by general dissatisfaction with their situation rather than by the size of their caseloads, which were generally lower than in some other CRCs. Many were anxious about their future in the organisation and concerned about the impact of changes on their ability to do the job. Figures supplied by the CRC showed a fairly low level of staff sickness. Monthly absence rates for October 2016 to June 2017 ranged between 3.8% and 6.2%. 

Frequency of formal supervision meetings varied widely, from monthly to less than quarterly. Most staff welcomed that local team managers were available for consultation about work on an open-door basis. Generally, supervision focused on performance management rather than on developing practice and skills, and some practitioners complained about the superficial nature of supervision. Discussion about difficult cases was limited to those presented by the practitioner rather than a random or targeted selection of cases by the manager. 

Senior managers recognised that staff reductions had left the organisation less able to carry underperforming staff and were taking a more active approach to managing capability. The CRC contract included the routine observation of practice by managers as part of the training and development strategy, but this was not happening. 

The CRC had a comprehensive learning and development plan. Training was provided through generic online computer tools, as well as conventional training events. Responsible officers had recently attended training in sentence planning and a five-day course to deliver the Becoming Respectful programme. We identified a further need: for refresher training in the assessment and management of risk of harm.

Unpaid work 

In the CRC’s bid, unpaid work was to be delivered through a community interest company. The company would charge the beneficiaries for the work done, and the proceeds would be used to support local community projects. This approach made little sense, given that the unpaid work itself is of benefit to the community. It would have been equally beneficial and administratively less complex to simply not charge for the work, and leave the money with the community project receiving the labour. 

In practice, the community interest company model has not been pursued and unpaid work is delivered directly by the CRC. It charges for the work provided to some organisations (where they are willing and able to pay) but not for others. It avoids setting charges at a level that would prevent it from finding sufficient work to meet the number of hours being ordered by the courts. 

Managers were unclear about what happened to the money raised from unpaid work, and how much of this income, if any, was being used to fund the service. Unpaid work staff complained that they were not told where the money went, and so they could not answer when the beneficiaries of the work quite reasonably asked what happened to the charge they paid. This had caused some local public relations difficulties. 

The management of unpaid work had been neglected in the recent past, but the CRC has addressed this over the last year to ensure that unpaid work is delivered more safely and effectively. Single placements are now subject to a CRC risk assessment and induction, with clear negotiated arrangements for giving feedback to the unpaid work unit. CRC staff have developed good working relationships with placement providers. There was, however, a missed opportunity to provide detailed information about the performance and progress of individuals in their case files, to aid responsible officers.

Willowdene 

Willowdene is a well-established day and residential provision offering a wide range of services and interventions for both male and female offenders. Its services are available throughout West Mercia, although they are difficult to access from those parts of the area furthest from the project. Services include a range of rehabilitative and restorative activities; skills training programmes; and direct access to multi-agency support services in: physical and mental health; substance misuse; accommodation; employment, training and education (ETE); domestic and sexual abuse; and finance and debt. 

Willowdene provides a 12- to 25-week counselling and skills support programme, including accredited qualifications, delivered through RARs, and work placements for unpaid work. On average, about 100 people per year have benefited from the counselling and skills support services alone. This provision is, however, less accessible to those living in Herefordshire. A similar project based in Herefordshire was no longer available. 

The unique service provided by Willowdene is considered an excellent resource by probation staff, sentencers and other agencies. However, the CRC plans to reduce its funding to the project and end its use for delivering RARs. Willowdene had originally been a key component of the STEP centre delivery model, but its on-site presence at the centres did not generate sufficient additional referrals, and its withdrawal from this arrangement contributed to the abandonment of the STEP centre model. Managers at Willowdene observed that the cost to the NPS of purchasing its services via the CRC rate card had been considerably more than the cost of providing them, and this had been a possible disincentive for the NPS to use them. This had led to tension in the senior management relationship between the CRC and Willowdene.

YSS 

YSS is another well-established project. It provides an Enhanced Support Service, delivered using RARs, and a Meet and Mentor service as part of the Through the Gate provision. Its intensive packages of supervision played a key role in many Integrated Offender Management (IOM) cases. YSS employs keyworkers and uses volunteer mentors to carry out tasks including support with registering with doctors, opening bank accounts, and applying to other agencies for assistance, such as housing. Its services are available throughout West Mercia. They are delivered from the CRC’s offices in Hereford and Telford and from YSS’s own premises in Worcester. YSS contact takes place in various other venues, and includes home visits (supported by a full risk assessment from the CRC or NPS on referral). 

YSS also faces planned funding cuts by the CRC. Once implemented, the organisation will only be funded to work with IOM cases and others with a high likelihood of reoffending. YSS expressed concern that lower usage by the CRC, and the resulting cut in funding, would increase its unit costs and put match-funding at risk. YSS attributed this risk to the Transforming Rehabilitation model rather than a lack of demand for its services.

--oo00oo--

This is how the Worcester News summed up the report:-

Probation services must improve says report

PROBATION services in the county need to improve, according to a report published today. Inspectors found the private company Warwickshire & West Mercia Community Rehabilitation Company (CRC) - which supervises medium and lower risk offenders - compared well against national performance targets but assessed poorly in key areas including protecting potential victims from the risk posed by people under supervision. Improvement was particularly needed in cases of domestic abuse and those involving the safeguarding of children.

The report by chief inspector of probation, Dame Glenys Stacey, was based on inspections made in July 2017. The report said: "The organisation was being driven by performance targets, as one might expect, and there was a strong central drive to discern how to meet targets and then do so. Managers and practitioners both recognised that this had little to do with delivering positive outcomes for individual offenders. Success in managing performance targets was not matched by efforts to maintain and raise the quality of offender management and to achieve positive outcomes with offenders."

The report also noted the rehabilitation company delivered effective unpaid work and services to women. Whilst staff had manageable workloads, staff supervision and oversight was inadequate. The inspection also covered the work of the Midlands division of the National Probation Service (NPS), which supervises higher risk offenders. The report said the NPS has experienced staff who managed offenders well and delivered good-quality interventions overall.

However, despite NPS leaders’ clear intentions, NPS staff were not using the wide range of interventions – programmes to support offenders – that were on offer from the CRC to the extent expected. The report said: “Offenders may be denied the best help as a result, and the interventions themselves will be less viable over time, if they are not used enough. This is not the first time we have found this situation, and I urge the NPS to review the position nationally.”