So, How Did It Go?

With the dreadful 'Probation Day' thankfully out of the way for the second year, it's probably as well if we have a look at the recent assessment of 'Project Reunification' by the rather grandly-titled Institute for Government. We're only at stage one remember and there's almost certainly a whole lot more pain and angst coming down the line for a beleaguered service that many would say is rapidly becoming increasingly dysfunctional. Of course it was a world-leading Gold Standard service only a few years ago and before the politicians got involved.      

Reunification of probation services

Introduction In 2019, the government announced it was bringing the management of medium- and low-risk offenders in England and Wales back in house. The decision followed extensive criticism of the decision to outsource these services in 2015 and is the fourth major restructuring of probation services in 20 years, two of which have taken place in the last eight years alone. This case study looks at the Ministry of Justice’s (MoJ) preparations for the reunification of services and their transition back into the department, highlighting successes, challenges and areas of focus for the longer-term improvement of probation services.

--oo00oo--

Leadership and engagement 

With real problems associated with TR, having the right programme leadership for reunification was an important decision. Whether by design or not, the two most senior leaders responsible for the programme – SRO Jim Barton and director general Amy Rees – were both involved in TR. Learning from its failures no doubt coloured their approach – particularly with respect to engaging providers, as we discuss further below – and helped avoid a repeat of many of the same mistakes. In addition, their understanding of probation systems, processes and culture played a notable part in helping the programme navigate a complex landscape. 

A consistent theme during our research interviews was MoJ’s commitment to open dialogue and engagement. This included visits to providers, forums with staff and regular communications, all with the aim of making the changes as smooth as possible for staff and providers alike. With more than 7,000 staff across 54 affected organisations, the programme could not have been delivered effectively without a relentless focus on business change and an approach that was inclusive, bringing together the diverse stakeholders. The programme benefited from the fact that, unlike TR – which was almost universally unpopular from the off, being literally and figuratively divisive – unification was a change that many across the probation sector wanted to see. They were therefore more responsive to MoJ’s efforts to communicate and engage. Notwithstanding this, and some mixed feedback from HMIP’s survey, it is clear that MoJ set out with a genuine intention to put engagement at the centre of its programme. Its choice paid dividends. 

CRC innovations 

A key concern of providers when reunification was announced was that the innovations developed by CRCs would be lost. These concerns were valid, given the relatively limited autonomy in the civil service. And, to some extent, they turned out to be well founded – but not in the ways expected. 

The decision to jettison innovations such as case management systems was as much attributable to the tight timetable as to the restrictions of the civil service. The programme SRO acknowledged that these could have been integrated had there been more time, though this could have been a lengthy process. As it was, the need for speed meant taking a more rudimentary approach, and the path of least resistance was followed. Further, some of the innovations that were kept were largely serendipitous. For example, contact centres in Norfolk were retained partly because the contracts were too complicated to unpick in the time available. 

Overall, despite the clear commitment of MoJ to a ‘merger’, it was probably inevitable that the cultures and working practices would lean towards the NPS rather than the CRCs, as the Probation Service, like the NPS, would be in the civil service. 

Commissioning of services 

The central commercial decision for MoJ was its commissioning mechanism. It put effort into ensuring there was strong, early engagement to generate an active market of potential providers. However, despite representations to the contrary from providers, its Dynamic Framework was complex and made it difficult for smaller providers to qualify. As a result, some gave up trying to qualify, while others had to divert front-line resources to the tender processes, impacting front-line services. The approach was partly attributable to the need for speed. Faced with a challenging timetable, MoJ opted for a procurement approach that was in keeping with previous, large commercial arrangements that better suited large national providers, rather than developing a new approach that would have better supported smaller and local providers. MoJ also opted not to use grants, a key demand of the voluntary sector, for essentially the same reasons. 

Both these decisions were incorrect. More focus from the start on whether the Dynamic Framework was proportionate and fit for use by all participants would have saved time on communications and engagement as the process developed, and would have delivered a more diverse, engaged market of providers for Day 1 services. 

Richard Oldfield’s report on the Dynamic Framework, coupled with feedback, has resulted in MoJ now developing criteria and guidance on the use of grants, in partnership with Clinks. MoJ also told us that, despite challenges with the Dynamic Framework, 74% of contracts on Day 1 went to voluntary, community and social enterprise organisations. This has since grown further, and the Dynamic Framework is subject to ongoing review and refinement. 

Workforce management 

MoJ’s core message to staff was that the change was a merger, not a takeover. With TR still casting a shadow over reunification, this was the right approach. But MoJ’s desire to ‘live and breathe’ this motto, while admirable, led to difficulties. 

An early decision was to carry out a job evaluation and grading support (JEGS) exercise: a process by which each new post’s grade in the Probation Service was assessed independently. While this undoubtedly reinforced the message that the Probation Service was, essentially, a new organisation being built from scratch, it did lead to unpredictable outcomes, with some CRC staff matched into roles at grades lower than expected. This, in turn, would leave some staff on lower pay after the three-year pay protection agreed for them in the National Agreement with Probation Trade Unions came to an end. Similarly, the emphasis on a new corporate identity led to some staff having inflated expectations that unification would make an instant and tangible difference to their work, when the reality was that these changes were simply a first step. While MoJ was generally excellent at communicating throughout the process, it could have better managed expectations about the immediate impact the transition would have on working conditions and service performance. 

A recurring theme in our research into the reunification of probation was the high volumes of cases CRC staff had to deal with post-unification. CRC staff arrived having to hold on to their existing cases until a new IT system could be developed to accept them. This lack of new, integrated IT capability on Day 1, rendered impossible by the aggressive timetable, was sub-optimal. It led to unnecessary pressure on some staff and this, in turn, likely coloured the perspectives of those who already felt ‘second class’. Staff shortfalls contributed to the caseload pressures, too. CRCs were required to freeze recruitment for up to three months prior to unification to minimise the overhead of onboarding and then transitioning further staff. While understandable, this led to critical gaps in the workforce. 

The future 

The probation reform programme will be formally wound up at the end of 2022. But the longer-term programme of work to improve the performance of probation services has only just begun. The structural changes of 2021 are the platform on which deeper and difficult changes will be built. That will be a lengthy journey. 

Transition highlighted several themes that will play an important part in that journey. For MoJ’s long-term ambitions for probation to be successful, the following areas should be focussed on. 

Operational performance 

A central criticism of TR was the poor performance of CRCs. Although performance improved over time in some CRCs, TR could not completely shake the perception of poor service delivery. 

Current probation performance is ‘not great’ with four ‘Inadequate’ and two ‘Requires Improvement’ Inspectorate reports. To some extent, this is to be expected, given wider public service performance27 (post-Covid-19, in particular28), existing challenges in probation and the post-transition bumps. But the success of unification will ultimately be judged by the performance of the new Probation Service. Without swift action that leads to better services, the reform programme risks being added to the long list of unsuccessful historical restructures. 

Recruitment 

By June 2022, 1,518 new probation officers had been recruited, but staffing numbers still remain below target: as of May 2022, there were 1,106 vacancies across the Probation Service.29 The government aims to recruit a further 1,500 officers in 2022/23. If it meets this target, it will be fully staffed. But this does not allow for staff attrition or increased demand on probation services. Sustained investment is needed in the years to come. The government previously announced an additional £155m for probation services, which, while helpful, may not be sufficient given the competition from other public sector employers, such as the police and Border Force, as well as the pressure from staffing groups to increase pay in line with high levels of inflation.  

The government’s recent announcement of an arbitrary reduction of the Civil Service by 91,000 will also make it more difficult – though not impossible – to secure the necessary agreements to recruit the necessary numbers beyond 2022/23, particularly after having already absorbed over 7,000 CRC staff. 

Cultural integration 

MoJ’s tagline for the unification of probation was that it was a ‘merger, not a takeover’. But mergers require cultural and contractual cohesion. MoJ is still in the process of trying to harmonise the terms and conditions for some 700 staff who worked for parent companies or subcontractors. This will be an important step towards proper workforce integration, without which true transformation and effective delivery of probation services will be difficult to realise.