A Toxic Met

Lets face it, the 'Met' has been a problem for a very long time indeed. I well remember hearing that corruption had become so embedded by the 1970's that an exasperated Commissioner Sir Robert Mark eventually coined the now famous words 'a good police force is one that catches more crooks than it employs'. Things were so bad he threatened to put all CID back in uniform. Only the other day I couldn't help but chuckle at an early scene in the BBC period drama 'The Gold' about the Brink's-Mat robbery and the CIO warning his small team about 'no freemasonry; no overtime and no drink'. 

That was 1983 and sadly the slide appears to have only worsened to become the utterly toxic environment so forensically catalogued in the damning Casey Report published today. I can't help but put this into the context of probation's current woes, sandwiched as we are between a toxic HMPPS/MoJ employer and at least one toxic police service that we are now required to work so closely with and be vetted by. 

An independent review into the standards of behaviour and internal culture of the Metropolitan Police Service

Summary and conclusions 

The Met has faced significant challenges over the last ten years. Many of these have been beyond their control. These include austerity, changes in crime patterns, greater non-crime demand and a regulatory system that makes it difficult to get rid of people who corrupt the Met’s integrity. The Crown Prosecution Service and the courts are also under acute pressure. This impacts the effectiveness of the Met, and makes the criminal justice system overall much less effective. 

Significant societal shifts are rightly making us less tolerant of crimes such as domestic abuse, rape and child abuse as well as discrimination. Public expectations on policing are therefore greater. 

London too is always changing. Its population is expanding, and is swelled by thousands of commuters daily and millions of visitors each year. It is more diverse in terms of nationalities, ethnic and faith groups, and sexuality than other UK cities. The majority of the population are not from White British ethnic backgrounds, one in five do not have English as their main language, and London has greater extremes of wealth and poverty than other parts of the UK. 

In contrast, Met officers are 82% White and 71% male, and the majority do not live in the city they police. As such, the Met does not look like the majority of Londoners. 

Traditional volume crime (such as burglary and theft) has declined, while low volume but more serious offences such as violence against the person, and sexual offences have significantly increased from 17% of all crimes in 2012-13 to 31% in 2022-23. Such cases take longer to investigate and resolve. Domestic abuse-related crimes have doubled over ten years to nearly 100,000 a year and the number of reported rape cases have increased fourfold. But the number of officers investigating them has not increased at the same rate. This places more demand on police detective services in particular, while there is a national shortage of detectives. 

Like other public services, austerity has profoundly affected the Met. In real-terms, the Review has calculated that the Met now has £0.7 billion less than at the start of the previous decade, meaning its budget is 18% smaller. This is enough to employ more than 9,600 extra Police Constables at full cost. It has lost 21% of its civilian staff and two thirds of its Special Constables while the number of Police Community Support Officers has halved. Between 2010 and 2022 it closed 126 police stations. Specialist units and functions have been prioritised, including through ringfenced Government funding. 

Together, this has eroded frontline policing, weakening the strongest day-to-day point of connection with Londoners, as well as impacting the Met’s reactive 10 capabilities, its response levels, and its response to male violence perpetrated against women and children. 

The model of policing by consent, pioneered in London and admired and copied around the world, requires the Met to both earn and maintain public trust in everything it does. However, there is declining public confidence and trust in the institution. Public trust has fallen from a high point of 89% in 2016 to a low of 66% in March 2022. Public confidence in the Met to do a good job locally has fallen from high points of 70% in 2016 and 2017 to a low of 45% in March 2022. 

People from Black and mixed ethnic groups have lower trust and confidence in the Met, scoring 10 to 20% lower than average on trust and 5 to 10% lower on confidence, although declining scores among White Londoners mean that gap is closing. 

Among those who responded to surveys undertaken for the Review, three quarters of Met employees and two in five Londoners think the Met’s external reputation is poor. Black Londoners are even more likely to say its reputation is poor.

 A series of scandals involving the Met and the Met’s response – playing them down, denial, obfuscation, and digging in to defend officers without seeming to understand their wider significance – combined with this loss of trust, are strong indicators of fundamental problems.

In September 2022, the appointment of a new Commissioner and Deputy Commissioner with a commitment to reform marked a new, positive beginning for the Met. 

This Review, commissioned in the wake of the scandals that have rocked policing nationally, has sought to examine the Met’s culture and standards. We have not undertaken an inspection of the Met’s overall performance, efficiency and effectiveness although we have looked at some aspects of this. 

Our approach has been to talk to officers, staff and others, and review and analyse information, data, systems and operational performance for their relevance to the Met’s culture and standards. We considered how the Met's culture affects its central purpose to keep Londoners safe, how it inspires trust and confidence, and how it upholds the British model of policing by consent. 

Our conclusions are set out below. 

1. There are systemic and fundamental problems in how the Met is run 

The size of the Met makes it challenging to operate and also to change. The problem, however, is not its size but its inadequate management. The Met is run as a set of disconnected and competing moving parts, lacking clear systems, goals or strategies. It runs on a series of uncoordinated and short-lived initiatives, long on activity but short on action.

There is no workforce plan, no strategic assessment of the needs and skills of the organisation, and demand modelling is outdated. Recruitment and vetting systems are poor and fail to guard against those who seek power in order to abuse it. There has been no central record of training, so officers may well be in roles which they are not trained for. 

The management of people is poor. The Met’s processes do not effectively root out bad officers, help to tackle mediocre officers, or truly support and develop good officers. Some of this is down to national systems (including misconduct processes, under-performance regulations, and the national promotion framework). But the Met doesn’t actively intervene to make these work better for its people, and its own policies, practices and culture serve to exacerbate the problem. 

We witnessed clear signs of high stress and pressure among officers due to the nature of their work dealing with very stressful and upsetting situations, working with traumatised, vulnerable and dangerous people and facing daily abuse from the public. Frontline officers working on Response and Public Protection Teams were not being properly assisted with psychological support to protect their mental health or prevent desensitisation towards victims and the public. 

Sergeants and Inspectors are expected to manage very large numbers of constables and junior staff as a core feature of their work, without the time and the tools to do so. Under current Met systems it is easier for them to ignore poor performing officers or let those with conduct issues get away with bad behaviour. In an organisation where people are its principal asset, the vital role of Human Resources has been outsourced and is too distant from local policing needs. 

Since publication of the Macpherson report in 1999, the Met has remained largely White and largely male. If recruitment continues on its current trajectory, it will take at least another thirty years, until 2053, to reach gender balance. It will take even longer, until 2061, to reach 46% Black, Asian and ethnic minority representation – what is needed to be representative of London today, let alone the even more diverse city it will be in nearly 40 years’ time. 

The Police Uplift Programme has been a missed opportunity to improve the diversity and skills base of its workforce. There is no plan B. This isn’t about being ‘woke’ or having politically correct quotas. It means the Met is missing out on the talent it desperately needs to improve its effectiveness. It is also damaging community confidence, by failing to create a force that looks like the city it polices. This is creating a negative spiral in which some communities continue to have negative experiences at the hands of the police, trust them less, and are less likely to join. 

2. The Met has not managed the integrity of its own police service 

This Met is tasked with upholding law and order and keeping citizens safe. But it has failed over time to ensure the integrity of its officers and therefore of the organisation. Despite the obvious signals of major failure – with heinous crimes perpetrated by serving Met officers – it did not stop to question its processes. 

Policing will attract those who wish to abuse the powers conferred by a warrant card. The Met has not taken this fact seriously. Its vetting processes are not vigilant in identifying clear warning signs such as previous indecent exposure or domestic abuse from applicant officers. Transferees from other forces are trusted to be good enough. Periodic re-vetting has been perfunctory, and self-declarations are relied upon. The Met does not make ethical standards as clear as it could, and it has no systems in place to ensure staff and officers adhere to them, nor clear consequences if they do not. 

Concerns raised through the misconduct or complaints process are not well recorded and are more likely to be dismissed than acted upon. Patterns of behaviour and escalating incidents which are the hallmarks of predatory behaviour are not identified. Instead, time and time again, those complaining are not believed or supported. They are treated badly, or face counter-claims from those they have accused. Behaviour which in most other organisations would lead to instant dismissal or serious disciplinary action – particularly amongst those who work routinely with vulnerable people – is too often addressed through ‘management action’ or ‘reflective practice’. 

In the absence of vigilance towards those who intend to abuse the office of constable, predatory and unacceptable behaviour has been allowed to flourish. There are too many places for people to hide. The integrity of the organisation remains vulnerable to threat. 

3. The Met’s new leadership represent a welcome change of tone and approach. However, deep seated cultures need to be tackled in order for change to be sustained 

When he became Commissioner in 1972, over 50 years ago, Sir Robert Mark said he had ‘never experienced…blindness, arrogance and prejudice on anything like the scale accepted as routine in the Met’. The Met is a very different organisation today. But we have found those cultures alive and well. We want to be crystal clear that we are not saying everyone within the organisation behaves in these ways, but that these are the prevailing and default cultures: ‘the way we do things’. Worryingly, some of the worst cultures, behaviours and practices have been found in specialist firearms units, where standards and accountability should be at their absolute highest. 

Too much hubris and too little humility: The organisation has a ‘we know best’ attitude. It dismisses external views and criticisms, and adopts the attitude that no one outside the Met can understand the special nature and unique demands of their work. This hubris has become a serious weakness. It stops them hearing and understanding other views, including those of Londoners, and prevents them bringing in external help, co-opting experts and stakeholders to provide support and challenge. 

Defensiveness and denial: The Met does not easily accept criticism nor ‘own’ its failures. It does not embrace or learn from its mistakes. Instead, it starts from a position that nothing wrong has occurred. It looks for, and latches onto, small flaws in any criticism, only accepting reluctantly that any wrong-doing has occurred after incontrovertible evidence has been produced. 

One of the saddest aspects of this culture of denial is that many of the issues highlighted in this report – systemic racial bias in the misconduct system, poor child protection services, not recognising predatory behaviour, the dire state of property storage – have been known about, reported on and investigated before. But the Met’s culture, combined with its poor management, has meant that these issues have not been sufficiently addressed. This has allowed wrongdoing to persist. 

Speaking up is not welcome: Keeping your head down, looking the other way, and telling people – especially senior officers – what they want to hear is the way things are done in the Met. The culture of not speaking up has become so ingrained that even when senior officers actively seek candid views, there is a reluctance to speak up. Disciplined services such as policing might be more prone to such behaviours. This makes it all the more important that those who do speak up are supported, protected, and their contribution is valued. But those who speak up in the Met learn the hard way that there are adverse consequences for themselves, for their careers, and for their teams. Systems support wrongdoers. Complainants are not believed. Staff Associations and Independent Advisory Groups feel ignored. A bullying culture underpins all this. Racist, misogynist, homophobic and other discriminatory acts are tolerated, ignored, or dismissed as ‘banter’. 

Optimism bias: Following any issue, there is a strong tendency to look for a positive spin, which allows the organisation to move on. They seek to put it in the past and blame individual ‘bad apples’, rather than pausing for genuine reflection on systemic issues. The Met talks up future actions as if they were already implemented. This tendency is most clearly noticeable in a tick box approach to critical reports, inspections, inquiries and other forms of scrutiny where bigger picture issues are broken down into individual actions. Problems with culture and attitudes cannot be addressed by developing a new policy, changing the rules or developing a new process. 

‘Initiative-itis’: Instead of focusing on getting the basics right, short term projects and campaigns have been launched from HQ without seeing them through, considering their impact or engaging the organisation in embedding enduring systemic change. This particularly wears down officers on the frontline. They experience slogans and spreadsheet returns instead of a single, clear and widely understood strategy for improvement. This is exacerbated by poor management within the organisation. 

Elitism: putting frontline policing at the back of the queue: The Met has allowed an imbalance to grow between well-resourced specialist units and a denuded frontline. It has also allowed the distance between New Scotland Yard and frontline policing teams to widen. Londoners see and rely on frontline officers the most day to day, but these officers feel demoralised and let down by their leaders. 

4. Londoners have been put last 

The frontline has been deprioritised. A reorganisation moved 32 borough-based police commands to 12 units with some covering up to four boroughs. There are now much weaker connections to long established communities. Democratic borough structures and Londoners have become a step further removed from their police service. 

Local policing has been fractured by the loss of skilled civilian staff, especially crime analysts and support staff. Officers who should be on the streets of London are left to backfill some of these roles. There is less knowledge of local crime patterns and Response teams are responding to ever increasing demands on their service. The result is longer response times.

London no longer has a functioning neighbourhood policing service. Far from being ring-fenced as promised in the reorganisation, it has become a resource for backfilling other services like Response. The number of PCSOs has been drastically reduced. 

Those running BCUs do not have authority over their patch and are not responsible or accountable for the actions of specialist teams like the Violent Crime Task Force and the TSG. 

5. London’s women and children have been left even further behind 

The de-prioritisation and de-specialisation of public protection has put women and children at greater risk than necessary. 

Despite some outstanding, experienced senior officers, an overworked, inexperienced workforce polices child protection, rape and serious sexual offences. They lack the infrastructure and specialism which the Sapphire specialist command benefited from. Instead of access to fast-track forensic services, officers have to contend with over-stuffed, dilapidated or broken fridges and freezers containing evidence including the rape kits of victims, and endure long waits for test results. 

It is more than six years since the 2016 HMIC report into child protection was described as “the most severely critical that HMIC has published about any force, on any subject, ever.” But the Met’s child protection service continues to have major inadequacies. 

The Met’s VAWG strategy rings hollow since its claim to be prioritising ‘serious violence’ has really not included the crimes that most affect women and girls. Those investigating domestic abuse are also under considerable pressures, with unmanageable caseloads and poor support for victims. This has increased the disconnection from Londoners. 

6. The Met lacks accountability and transparency 

The Met is a £4 billion public institution. Therefore, it should be transparent and accountable for the services it provides and the resources it uses, while maintaining operational responsibility for policing decisions. Yet all too often, it has been unaccountable to the public and their representatives. 

The structures of governance and scrutiny are relatively weak. HMICFRS are an inspectorate not a regulator and can only really comment on what they find. They have limited levers to drive improvement. The ‘engage’ phase is a reflection of the Inspectorate’s significant concerns about the force, but it holds no real consequences for the Met. Their internal audit processes are not valued by the organisation as a process of assurance and early warning.

The Met have in the past avoided scrutiny, holding MOPAC at arms-length, and not sharing information and data. MOPAC in turn have not been able to provide the strategic oversight function that the Met needs. Holding the Met to account has become more tactical. More robust and strategic oversight, based on support, challenge and mutual respect for their respective roles, is needed. 

Within each BCU, some the size of a county police force, it is very surprising and concerning that local policing lacks the level of local accountability which would be found in a constabulary across the rest of England and Wales. Londoners are further and further from their policing service. 

The Met needs to increase its accountability to Londoners, by being more transparent with the public, with local authorities and MPs, by explaining their decisions and the reasons for them, and by acting with greater candour. 

The checks and balances provided by robust scrutiny, governance and accountability are vital for public bodies, perhaps especially the police with their duties towards and powers over the public. However, at a point where the Met requires major reform, it is even more important that those who have responsibility for oversight and inspection support it to change. 

7. Discrimination is tolerated, not dealt with and has become baked into the system 

We have found widespread bullying, particularly of those with protected characteristics. 22% of staff and officers experienced bullying. There is a profound culture across the Met that incentivises people to look, act and sound the same, and a resistance to difference. 

33% of those with a long-standing illness, disability or infirmity have experienced bullying. Claims for disability discrimination is the most frequent claim type brought against the Met. But there is no willingness to learn from these cases. 

There is deep seated homophobia within the Met, as shown by the fact that almost one in five lesbian, gay and bisexual Met employees have personally experienced homophobia and 30% of LGBTQ+ employees have said they had been bullied. Trust, confidence and fairness scores among LGBTQ+ Londoners have fallen significantly. 

Female officers and staff routinely face sexism and misogyny. The Met has not protected its female employees or members of the public from police perpetrators of domestic abuse, nor those who abuse their position for sexual purposes. Despite the Met saying violence against women and girls is a priority, it has been treated differently from ‘serious violence’. In practice, this has meant it has not been taken as seriously in terms of resourcing and prioritisation. 

There are people in the Met with racist attitudes, and Black, Asian and ethnic minority officers and staff are more likely to experience racism, discrimination and bullying at their hands. Discrimination is often ignored, and complaints are likely to be turned against Black, Asian and ethnic minority officers. Many do not think it is worth reporting. Black officers are 81% more likely to be in the misconduct system than their White counterparts. The organisation has failed to significantly improve the recruitment and retention of Black officers at all levels. This is particularly true of Black and ethnic minority women. 

Meanwhile Black Londoners in particular remain over-policed. They are more likely to be stopped and searched, handcuffed, batoned and Tasered, are overrepresented in many serious crimes, and when they are victims of crime, they are less satisfied with the service they receive than other Londoners. There is now generational mistrust of the police among Black Londoners. Stop and search is currently deployed by the Met at the cost of legitimacy, trust and, therefore, consent. 

We have found institutional racism, misogyny and homophobia in the Met. In coming to this conclusion, we have applied four tests. We believe these can be applied in respect of homophobia, misogyny and racism but we have applied them in respect of racism below. 

1. Clearly not everyone in the Met is racist, but there are racists and people with racist attitudes within the organisation 

2. Black and ethnic minority officers and staff experience racism at work and it is routinely ignored, dismissed, or not spoken about. Many do not think it is worth reporting 

3. Racism and racial bias are reinforced within Met systems 

4. The Met under-protects and over-polices Black Londoners 

Tackling discrimination is a legal and operational imperative for the Met. It needs to acknowledge the extent to which racism, misogyny and homophobia are present within its organisational processes and systems in order to move forward. 

8. The Met is in danger of losing its way – consent is broken 

The Met’s key values, the College of Policing’s Code of Ethics and the Peelian principles all provide clear standards and direction for how the organisation should operate and how it should police London. However, these values and principles have not been front and centre of the Met’s strategic or operational approach either internally or externally. It has been disfigured by austerity and the decisions that were made during that period, alongside changes in the crime mix and societal expectations. The Met has been losing its way and the worst aspects of its culture have impeded its ability to recognise this. 

The Met has become less effective and is less trusted. Public confidence has dipped below 50%. Fewer Londoners agree that the Met treats everyone fairly, and the proportion of people believing that the Met does a good job for London has also fallen. 

Public attitudes and the findings of this Review are also evidence that the Met has become unanchored from the principles of policing by consent. Consent is not passive but relies on the police operating with transparency, to be willing to explain their decisions and their reasons for it.

Domestic Homicide

Domestic violence remains a serious issue for society and the Probation Service in particular. I notice the government have published the 'Wade' Domestic Homicide Sentencing Review with 17 recommendations. 

1. Introduction 

1.1 Background 

1.1.1 This Review of sentencing in cases of domestic homicide was initiated as a response to an open letter (“the letter”) sent on International Women’s Day 2021 from the Victims’ Commissioner and the Domestic Abuse Commissioner to the previous Lord Chancellor the Right Honourable Robert Buckland MP. 

1.1.2 The letter highlighted systemic misogyny within the criminal justice system and also identified those aspects of the criminal justice process where it was thought female victims were being routinely let down. It coincided with an ongoing campaign by the families of two women who were murdered by their male partners. Ellie Gould was aged 17 at the time of her murder by Thomas Griffith and Poppy Devey Waterhouse was 24 years old when she was murdered by Joe Atkinson. That campaign also formed part of the impetus for the Domestic Homicide Sentencing Review (“the Review”). 

1.1.3 Both victims were murdered in their own homes where weapons in the form of knives had been readily available to the offender who could therefore not be said to have taken a knife or other weapon to the scene. As we explain in detail at paragraphs 2.3 2.4, if an offender who is aged 18 or over has taken a knife or other weapon to the scene of an offence intending to (a) commit any offence, or (b) have it available to use as a weapon, and (c) used that knife or other weapon when committing the murder, the starting point for the minimum term that the offender must serve in custody as part of a mandatory life sentence is much higher than it would be (all other things being equal) if the offender has not taken a knife or other weapon to the scene. There is a disparity of ten years between the respective starting points. 

1.1.4 Our terms of reference specifically task us with considering whether the issue of taking a knife or other weapon to the scene of a murder with the ulterior intent (which is described above) and then using it to commit the murder, is something which should be given particular consideration within the context of domestic murders. 

1.1.5 Thomas Griffith (17 years old at the time of the offence) and Joe Atkinson (25 years old at the time of the offence) were sentenced to detention for life and life imprisonment with minimum terms of 12 years 6 months and 16 years respectively. Legally, there is nothing wrong with either of the sentences imposed in these cases. Both offenders pleaded guilty, and the sentences imposed can neither be said to be “manifestly excessive”1 nor “unduly lenient” but questions have arisen as to whether sentencing guidelines in cases of domestic homicide reflect our growing understanding of the causes, characteristics and harms of fatal domestic abuse. 

1.1.6 Underlying these questions are broader issues such as: do the sentences imposed in the killings of intimate partners reflect the seriousness of the killings or not? Is there a need for a more specialist approach to these sentences with more account being taken of the specific nature of the offences? Is there a need for higher starting points within the context of the present sentencing framework? Finally, is it possible to address these issues short of detailed consideration of domestic homicides generally? 

1.1.7 Women comprise the majority of victims in domestic killings. Their voices are silenced not just in virtue of their killing but because at present, there is insufficient recognition in law of the harms which their killings involve. Not only are these women wronged by a breach of trust which is an integral part of domestic abuse, but the harms to them often extend to further harm to secondary victims in the form of the families (many of whom are children) and friends of the victims. There is then the harm to society in general which, to date, may not have been sufficiently considered. Where do domestic murders fit with other murders of women where the murder is clearly motivated by misogyny, but the victim and the offender are not and never have been in an intimate relationship? What inferences as to wider harms do we draw in circumstances where there is no domestic history to contextualise the killing? 

1.1.8 As far as sentencing for murder is concerned, there is a tension, which is often not acknowledged by proponents of the call for higher starting points or longer sentences. This tension lies in the fact that women, who are victims of domestic abuse and coercive control, sometimes kill their abusive partners. Such women are victims as well as being perpetrators. It would not be in the interests of justice for these women to receive longer minimum terms. Even allowing for judicial discretion, longer minimum terms would be a concomitant of simply increasing starting points for minimum terms. 

1.1.9 At the outset, it is necessary to remember the purpose of sentencing which is described in the Sentencing Act 2020. In cases of murder, the protection of the public is afforded by the life sentence, which includes a minimum term which must be served in full before the offender becomes eligible for parole. After release, he or she is on licence for life. However, the punishment of offenders requires us to identify the conduct and fault to which culpability can be ascribed. This assists with the reduction of crime (of which deterrence is only one part) because identification of the levels of culpability together with the relevant circumstances in which it is formed, means that it is possible to identify and quantify risk. Once risk is appreciated, then we can begin to prevent domestic homicide.

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Dominic Raab published a statement:-

WRITTEN MINISTERIAL STATEMENT 

Domestic Homicide Sentencing Review 

Tackling violence against women and girls is a top priority for this Government and we are committed to ensuring that the most serious offenders spend longer in prison. Women should feel safe in their own home and our sentencing framework must reflect the seriousness of violence and abuse committed by those closest to them. 

The Government commissioned an independent expert, Clare Wade KC, to review sentencing in domestic homicide cases to establish whether current law and sentencing guidelines are fit for purpose and identify options for reform. 

Today, I am publishing Ms Wade KC’s Domestic Homicide Sentencing Review (the ‘Wade Review’) and announcing a package of proposed reforms to change the law so that sentencing reflects the seriousness of domestic homicides. The published review can be found here: https://www.gov.uk/guidance/domestic-homicidesentencing-review. 

The Wade Review makes a number of other recommendations and the government's position will be outlined in a full response to be published before the summer recess. The measures announced today demonstrate our commitment to delivering tougher sentences for the perpetrators of these horrific crimes and allow for necessary legislation to be introduced as soon as possible. All recommendations in the review and the measures announced today apply to England and Wales. 

We will increase sentences for murderers with a history of controlling or coercive behaviour against the victim. 

The Serious Crime Act 2015 introduced the criminal offence of controlling or coercive behaviour. Controlling or coercive behaviour can comprise economic, emotional or psychological abuse. It does not relate to a single incident, but a purposeful pattern of behaviour over time. Controlling or coercive behaviour by the perpetrator towards the victim was identified in 51% of the murder cases analysed for this Review. 

Despite around a quarter of all homicides being classed as domestic, the legislation which sets out the sentencing framework for murder does not currently specifically account for the abuse that the victims in these cases often experience before death. 

The review recommends that a history of coercive or controlling behaviour should be added to the statutory aggravating factors to murder. We will introduce legislation to make this change as soon as possible to ensure abuse experienced before death is properly considered and serious offenders are kept off our streets for longer. 

We will consider further reform by consulting on whether the starting point should be 25 years for murders preceded by controlling or coercive behaviour. 

While the addition of a history of coercive or controlling behaviour as a statutory aggravating factor to murder will be an immediate step to increase sentences, we do not rule out further reform to ensure perpetrators are kept behind bars for longer. 

We will launch a public consultation this summer seeking views on whether there should be a starting point of 25 years for cases of murder where the perpetrator has controlled or coerced the victim before killing them. The current sentencing framework recognises the particular seriousness of the illegal possession and use of knives in public with a 25-year starting point for murders where a weapon used has been taken to the scene with intent. It is important that this starting point is maintained and therefore we will not be accepting the recommendation made in the Wade Review to disapply it from domestic cases. The sentencing framework must recognise the seriousness of anyone who walks onto our streets with a knife, intending to use it to cause harm. However, the changes announced today will ensure that the framework also recognises the particular seriousness of domestic murder, and this consultation will ensure all reform options have been fully explored. 

We will make ‘overkill’ a statutory aggravating factor in the sentencing framework for murder.

Overkill is defined in the Wade Review and wider literature as the use of excessive or gratuitous violence, beyond that necessary to kill. It amounts to violation of the body and causes intense distress to the families of victims. Overkill is prevalent in domestic murders and was identified in 60% of the cases analysed for this Review. 

The Wade Review recommends that overkill should be added to the statutory aggravating factors to murder. This would mean that a judge must consider increasing an offender's minimum custodial term where overkill has occurred. We will introduce legislation to make this change as soon as possible. It will ensure that the horror of overkill is recognised in statute and that the anguish it causes the families of victims is taken into account when sentencing such cases. 

Building on our ban of the ‘rough sex defence’ in the Domestic Abuse Act, we want to see longer sentences for perpetrators of so-called rough sex manslaughter. We are requesting that the Sentencing Council update their guidelines and will keep under review the need for legislation. 

The government is clear the ‘rough sex defence’ is not recognised in law as a person is legally unable to consent to “serious harm”, including where it results in death. However, there continues to be concern about apparent low sentences given in some cases of manslaughter where consent to so-called rough sex is argued. 

The review recommends manslaughter sentencing guidelines should be amended to consider the offender highly culpable where death occurs during violence alleged to be consensual during a sexual encounter, and therefore impose a higher sentence. 

The production or revision of sentencing guidelines is a matter for the independent Sentencing Council. However, today I will ask the Council, which has a statutory duty to consider my request, to consider revising sentencing guidelines to reflect the recommendation made in the Wade Review. While this is our preferred approach, we will keep legislative options under review to ensure we can deliver reform. 

These measures build on our zero-tolerance approach to violence against women and girls by ensuring that sentencing delivers justice for the victims and families. 

I am very grateful to Clare Wade KC for her work on this review. I would also like to pay tribute to Carole Gould and Julie Devey for their tireless campaigning after the tragic murders of their daughters, Ellie Gould and Poppy Devey-Waterhouse.

Dominic Raab MP

Deputy Prime Minister and Lord Chancellor and Secretary of State for Justice

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Clare Wade KC has responded:-

The Government has responded in part to the recommendations which are contained in my Review.

I am pleased that the issues which are raised in the Review are being taken seriously. I have concerns that Domestic Homicides comprise so many of the killings of women by men. In particular, I welcome the news that the harms consequent on “overkill” (as defined in the Review) are to be recognised in law.

However, the model which I have used in the Review has been constructed in an attempt to address all of the harms which obtain in these types of cases while simultaneously avoiding unintended consequences. This was implicit in my terms of reference which involved looking at the sentencing of killings by perpetrators of domestic abuse and at sentences for perpetrators of killings who are victims of domestic abuse. The Review makes clear the law in this area is gendered.

It is important that women who are the victims of controlling and coercive behaviour have access to justice when they have struggled, and sometimes, fought to resist the fear and entrapment caused by controlling and coercive behaviour. If controlling and coercive behaviour is to be a statutory aggravating factor then it should also be a statutory mitigating factor because ultimately it is a way of ascribing seriousness to the individual offence. This is what I recommended. The Government has only so far announced that it is to be a statutory aggravating factor.

I fear that making overkill a statutory aggravating factor in the absence of adopting the other recommendations I have made will lead to injustice. In relation to controlling and coercive behaviour, there should be training across the criminal justice system and controlling and coercive behaviour should mitigate the seriousness of murders committed by victims who kill their abusers.

I am concerned that, to date, there has been no response to my recommendations on strangulation and the use of weapons. Both issues present the gendered nature of the law in acute form.

I would encourage people to read the Review in its entirety as the theory and policy underpinning the 17 recommendations which I have made cannot be fully appreciated by looking at recommendations in isolation, in part, or in the abstract.

Ultimately I would like to see a proper forensic approach to domestic abuse within the criminal justice system. This is what is lacking at the moment and that is what the proposals in the Review are designed to achieve.

I note the Government’s intention to consult on the idea of a 25-year starting point for domestic murders. For the detailed reasons which are set out in the Review, I am against the idea of introducing more starting points into the sentencing framework for murder.

I welcome informed debate on the issues raised and on all of the recommendations and look forward to the full Government response.

Clare Wade KC

Guest Blog 92

Taking the P*ss?

I'm in all day in on-sofa mode: hideous cold, if I was a bloke it'd be flu. Negative Covid test, but other covid type viruses are available.

Text from a colleague on Friday afternoon to forewarn me that any routine working from home is now not allowed. Not allowed in my area anyway I've been working Mondays from home routinely. I'd be interested in feedback from around the place.

So much for "Smarter working" ...a positive from the Covid era (not over, please note we've got outbreaks in offices). Leaders were keen on "Smarter Working" for while. This, it turns out, was driven by Estates who reckoned that with scrupulous clear desks and hot desking, they'd get 100% of the workforce housed in 60% of the office space. That project has, it seems, been abandoned. They're pressing on with installing narrow mean desks with no drawers, think call centre, but home working now not a right so they're just going to ram us into our call centre desks, abandoning Smarter Working along with any recognition of the genuinely heroic work we did to keep the show on the road through a catastrophic pandemic.

Jim, should we make a call for stories about what we accomplished? I'm proud of mine. The narrative is being set that poor performance is all the fault of Covid. Not Grayling, reorganisation, poor training and Civil Service strangulation of Probation.

The recruitment of droves of PSOs and PQips is doubtless a factor in the Estates abandonment, its now pack 'em high and pay them cheap.

Anyway, the cessation of home working is now the rule in my office. The JRM effect. The workers can't be trusted. Of course, some staff were taking the p*ss. Those staff will take the p*ss regardless of the arrangements. Same in any workplace. If only we had empowered middle management and a functioning HR department. On the other hand, the values-driven loyal have used the flexibility to encompass the work and their other demands effectively. We are after all, an increasingly young and female workforce juggling poor wages and the plate-spinning required to keep the family and work demands met.

The working from home deal has also played into the hands of employers. Given a punitive sickness absence policy, the standard conversation when a sick employee phones in sick, is "Can you work from home?"

Well, I'll be phoning in tomorrow. I'm sick, and apparently not allowed to work from home (which was the plan).

And in the mood to just sign off, and take the p*ss.

Pearly Gates

We Live in Hope

I notice the latest edition of Probation Quarterly from the Probation Institute includes an article making the case for removing probation from the grip of the civil service. One has to hope there's some serious behind-the-scenes lobbying going on of the Labour Party because I'm seeing precious little evidence of them being any more enlightened than the present Tory government at the moment.   

The diminishing voice of the probation service

Introduction 

In the past twenty years, the probation service in England and Wales has undergone four largescale reforms, placing the service in a near-constant state of flux as it adopts to a revolving door of top-down re-organisations (Mair and Burke, 2013). Indeed, probation has recently emerged from the near ‘death knell’ (Newburn, 2013) of the failed transforming rehabilitation (TR) reforms and has since been reunified into one National Probation Service (NPS). However, the NPS faces a renewed set of challenges as it adopts to its increasingly centralised role within the civil service structure and subordinated role within HMPPS (HM Prison and Probation Service). 

This article will briefly outline three current challenges probation is facing, including: the straight-jacket imposed by a monolithic civil service culture; the further domination of prisons arising from the ‘one HMPPS’ leadership restructuring, and; the diminishing voice of probation in court work and parole hearings. These three challenges demonstrate concerns that a vital service is losing its independence and critical voice on a local and national stage. These challenges will also be assessed in light of the negative media reporting regarding probation’s role in a number of recent serious further offences (SFOs) (Editorial, 2023). This article will conclude by suggesting a potential pathway to ensure the distinct voice of probation continues to be heard.

The diminishing voice of the probation service 

The first concern relates to the current management structure of the NPS. When the TR reforms were bought to an end, the newly reunified service was subsumed into the civil service structure. Concerns related to the unsuitability of civil service management for probation have been outlined by academic research, probation union representation and penal reform charities.

For example, preliminary findings outlined by Tidmarsh (Webster, 2022), concerning professional identity, culture and practice in probation since the collapse of TR, explains that despite staff welcoming the opportunity to be working once again as a single public sector organisation, there was widespread disquiet that the probation service is not a ‘good fit’ with the ‘grey, faceless bureaucracy’ of the civil service, which doesn’t allow for the flexibility and dynamism that is central to effective probation practice. Furthermore, Carr (2022) notes that as civil servants, probation staff are now bound by the civil service code and will face restrictions on their ability to speak publicly about their work – restricting their voice and ability to articulate concerns. Recent high profile SFOs and accusations that probation officers have been pressured to downgrade risk assessments (Editorial, 2013) help articulate the importance of staff being able to articulate concerns when they arise. 

The National Association of Probation Officers (NAPO) have also published their opposition to the suitability of a top-down command and control ethos of the Civil Service to probation practice, describing this move as “a disaster for the profession” (NAPO, 2022). Francis Crook (now retired) chief executive of the Howard League for Penal Reform argues that the nationalised structure of the NPS under the reunification of probation, has “nationalised not localised” (Crook, 2021) the service and the civil service structure will leave probation with no autonomy, independence or local voice. Indeed, Crook outlines concerns that the centralised structures of the civil service will damage local visibility and accountability. 

The second concern relates to a more recent re-structuring of HMPPS, titled the ‘one HMPPS’ programme (Ministry of Justice (MoJ), 2022a). The last thirty years of probation reforms have witnessed a number of attempts to amalgamate prison and probation services, despite longstanding concerns that they inhabit very different cultures (Cracknell, 2021). The one HMPPS programme is the latest attempt and involves the creation of two new leadership roles; a chief executive officer of HMPPS and a director general of operations. These roles replace the previous structure, which had separate director generals for the prison and probation functions. This means that the leadership structure for HMPPS oversees both prisons and probation, instead of separate oversight of each organisation. The MoJ claim this will help promote a more joined-up framework and enables a ‘whole sentence’ approach to sentences (MoJ, 2022a). Although any attempts to help ensure continuity in resettlement processes should be welcomed, substantial concerns have been highlighted by this change of leadership structure. This includes critiques by the Probation Institute who hold serious concerns that the integration of prisons and probation at senior management level “will quickly lead to the disappearance of a distinct Probation Service” (Probation Institute, 2022).

The Institute outlines six ways where prisons and probation have very distinct and incompatible working practices, and how these practices might be damaged by this leadership change. This includes: 

• Profession: The probation service requires a professional qualification at higher education level, whereas the prison service has no such requirement. 

• Purposes: The probation service prioritises risk management and rehabilitation work, and is closely aligned with a social work ethos. In comparison, prisons prioritise safety, security and fairly run prisons and thus have a different underlying ethos. 

• Culture: The two services have vastly different cultures, with probation embedded in the community and concerned with societal influences of offending, while prisons have different attitudes and behaviours towards the underlying causes of offending and are not community-based. 

• Size and funding: The size and funding of prisons vastly overwhelms probation, dominating budgets. • Leadership: Prisons have a clear command and control structure, while probation work demands more autonomy and in this respect it would be difficult for a prison practitioner to lead a probation service. 

• Training: Probation training consists of a two-year higher education course, while prison training is 6 weeks long and is focused on security. 

Napo (2022) outline similar concerns to the Probation Institute and regard the one HMPPS programme as a risk to the profession – particularly at a time as probation services are still undergoing the turbulence of reunification. Further concerns have been outlined by Justin Russell, the Chief Inspector of the probation  service. Echoing longstanding concerns of the ‘Cinderella service’ (Robinson, 2016) being dominated by its larger partner organisation, Russell forewarns that “the day to day operational and political demands of the prison service can all too easily distract focus from the Probation Service and its particular (and very different) needs” (HM Inspectorate of Probation, 2022) and asserts that the ‘voice of the Probation Service’ must continue to be heard amongst this leadership restructuring. At a time of negative press surrounding recent high-profile SFOs, it’s very important that HMPPS resources and focus are prioritised for the specific needs and issues that the probation service is facing. 

The third concern relates to the probation service losing its voice within the important work it undertakes in the wider criminal justice system. For example, pre-sentence reports (PSRs) have been in sharp decline in the past decade (Robinson, 2017). The probation service has been a longstanding key actor in court work, however, a culture in contemporary court work that values speed over quality, means a critical element of probation’s pre-sentencing work is in decline as less PSRs are ordered and probation work is becoming a less visible presence in the court setting. Fast delivery oral reports have seemingly replaced the longer, but more in-depth PSRs (Robinson, 2017), however, there are concerns related to the quality of information provided in these oral reports, and this is potentially damaging the integrity of the probation voice in courts and sentencers trust in the recommendations made by probation staff (HM Inspectorate of Probation, 2020). The decline in the use of PSRs has had serious detrimental impacts on public protection, with their decline cited in a factor in poor risk management practices involving recent high-profile SFOs (Probation Institute, 2023).

A further example of this diminishing voice within criminal justice work, concerns probation’s role in the parole process. A recent root and branch review of parole, now mean that probation staff are no longer able to provide recommendations or views on a prisoner’s suitability for release or transfer to open conditions in the reports they provide to the Parole Board (MoJ, 2022b) (this is currently undergoing a legal challenge). The review also gives further powers for the Secretary of State to provide a ‘single view’ on a prisoner’s suitability for release, leading to ministerial control taking precedence over the professional voice. Notwithstanding evidence that this has led to a significant reduction in prisoners transfer to open estates and an expected increase in the overall prison population (Prison Reform Trust, 2022), this means that another core function of probation work – assessing and managing risk – is becoming eroded. Media reporting on the recent SFOs already calls into question the effectiveness of probations ability to manage risk, and this decision further undermines probation’s expertise in this area. 

Conclusion: charting a way back 

Despite these above concerns, that probation practitioners continue to operate with such commitment in this difficult climate demonstrates the remarkable durability of probation values. However, three suggestions are outlined below which will hopefully help to sustain these values and amplify the crucial probation voice: 

• Remove the NPS from the civil service framework and return to a localised service, where probation is accountable and responsive to its local communities, and practitioners are given the autonomy to operate and articulate their voice.

• Ensure probation continues as a distinct service, and its voice clearly heard within the HMPPS structure, alongside recognition and continued support for its underlying values, culture and training, that are distinct from the prison service. The recent Target Operating Model for Probation Services in England and Wales (HMPPS, 2021) provides a helpful guideline for supporting this, with a focus on professionalism and staff development, and seeks to implement Professional Standards alongside a professional register framework of probation practice and renewed training initiatives. Continued commitment to this professionalism agenda will be crucial. 

• The targeting operating model (HMPPS, 2021) also emphasises a commitment to improving the quality of advice to courts and PSRs, this has subsequently been re-affirmed by a pilot scheme designed to improve the quality of information presented to court at each of the fifteen pilot sites (MoJ, 2021). However, staffing issues continue to hamper probation practitioner’s ability to provide their in-depth expertise in the court setting, and this issue needs to be addressed urgently. Recent decisions concerning parole board hearings should also be reviewed and reconsidered, allowing these expert professional opinions to play an important role in these hearings. 

Despite the above potentially presenting as another widescale re-organisation, this hopefully charts a way back for the probation service to return to its roots as a service embedded in the local community, with a distinct professional identity, that has practitioners with the skill and knowledgebase to undertake vital work throughout the criminal justice system.

Matt Cracknell, 

Senior Lecturer in Criminology 

Middlesex University

Latest From Napo 232

Here we have selected quotes from the Napo mailout sent to all members yesterday:-

TRADE UNIONS OPPOSE REFORM OF PROGRAMMES DELIVERY

Our members will be aware that the joint Probation Service trade unions (TUs) have now been involved in negotiations about the future of offending behaviour programme delivery for almost a year. Despite our best efforts, we are no closer to agreement with the employer’s proposals.

We are aware that the employer has stated that there have been over 30 hours of consultation on the subject, although the TUs would question how meaningful this was. We have continued to emphasise our concerns over how the proposals will negatively impact the management of the risk of harm to the public, in addition to looking after the interests of our members. Below is an update on the issues the TUs have raised with the employer.

WHY A SINGLE FACILITATOR JOB DESCRIPTION WILL BE BAD NEWS

The aim of the employer is to replace all current facilitator job descriptions (JD) at band 3 and band 4 with one JD which may end up being evaluated at pay band 3. The TUs believe that the JD should differ between general offending behaviour programmes (GOBP) staff, such as those who deliver TSP, and those who deliver work with men who commit sexual offences (MCSO) and domestic abuse (DA).

Consultancy, delivery of non-accredited one-to-one work, guidance to sentence management and provision of Learning and Development support to Sentence Management staff will differ with risk levels and complexity. Those subject to conditions to complete a general Offender Behaviour Programme (OBP) are not likely to require significant consultancy, guidance or Learning and Development support

The TUs feel that the creation of two facilitator roles at Band 3 and Band 4 better represents the work of our members. Work with more complex and high-risk groups (DA and MCSO) justifies differing salary bands to other types of Offending Behaviour Programme (OBP) facilitator staff.

DAMAGING TO CAREER PROGRESSION

Under the current proposals, the only career development pathway for facilitators will be to leave facilitation. Our proposals for Band 3 and Band 4 facilitator roles would offer greater flexibility in terms of career progression that would support remaining in facilitation.

The TUs have continued to emphasise the need for the Probation Service to develop a career progression model whereby people new into the service deliver structured interventions and TSP, allowing time to develop their knowledge, experience and skill before they progress to deliver Building Better Relationships (BBR) and programmes for those convicted of sexual offences, if they choose to do so.

MORE INFORMATION NEEDED

The TUs continue to press the employer for further information about:

• The justification for a single facilitator job description
• The pay band at which a single facilitator role will be paid? If the outcome of the job evaluation process puts the role at Band 3, our pay band 4 members face losing up to £11,000 per annum, if they want to continue to deliver programmes. This includes some former CRC facilitators.
• The arrangements for Band 4 members currently working in Interventions to return to sentence management. These members may have been out of sentence management for many years. As a minimum, these members, would require a full package of training and a gradual acquisition of a full case load.
• Whether non-qualified Band 4 facilitators who choose to leave Interventions would be offered pay protection if they were to return to a Band 3 PSO role.
• The consequences for new staff of failing Core Skills or programme specific training

DEDICATED SEX OFFENDER UNITS (DSOU) TO BE DISBANDED

Under the current proposals the employer intends for all facilitators to deliver all accredited programmes and structured interventions. This will result in existing DSOUs being disbanded, resulting in the loss of the accumulated expertise and knowledge held by our members in these teams and placing the public at greater risk of serious harm.

The TUs have been clear that keeping these teams would not only mean keeping current expertise in work with men who commit sexual offences but also allow for the development of expertise and knowledge in work with men who commit DA offences and engage in sexually abusive behaviour.

This would provide an opportunity to enhance our work with this group to improve risk management and public safety. The TUs continue to be clear that DSOUs should be expanded to incorporate those most experienced facilitators in the delivery of domestic abuse programmes to provide the same level of consultancy and support to sentence management and stakeholders that members in existing DSOUs provide.

The TUs continue to press the employer for further information about:

• What will be asked of members, who, for whatever reason, don’t wish to work with those who commit domestic abuse offences or are convicted of sexual offences?
• What will be asked of members who deliver structured interventions and don’t wish to deliver accredited programmes?

TREATMENT MANAGERS & PROGRAMME MANAGERS

Under the employer’s proposals, the TUs believe it is unlikely that Treatment Managers will have the capacity to provide current levels of professional support and guidance to probation practitioners and relevant stakeholders. This would be an increased risk at a time when the Probation Service has a large and increasing number of inexperienced probation practitioners and managers. It is clear that there are currently no substantive plans in place to ensure that competent clinical advice or support to probation practitioners or stake holders is in place.

The TUs are concerned that Treatment Managers may be expected to oversee programmes of which they have no experience rather than delivering twice before taking up the role. The TUs have pointed out that this would clearly result in negative consequences for the standard of programme delivery and lead to a reduction in the quality of risk management, putting the public at increased risk of harm.

The TUs continue to press the employer for further information about:

• The employer’s lack of response to issues raised around the potential consequences of staff inexperience and its implication for risk management, in the face of recent SFO reports and HMIP inspections.

COST!

The plans for Interventions will result in significant cost, in addition to the costs of developing a new programme. The TUs believe this money could be better invested in increasing facilitator numbers for existing programmes.

A SINGLE ACCREDITED OFFENDING BEHAVIOUR PROGRAMME?

The employer’s current plans are to replace all current accredited programmes with a single programme for all offenders. The information so far provided by the employer does not, in the TUs’ opinion, justify the plans put forward and indicates no significant work on a new programme has yet taken place.

An evaluation of a single programme approach used in Canada which has been seen by the TUs did not yield positive results. The TUs continue to have significant concerns in relation to:

• The future of the Domestic Abuse Safety Officer role should BBR be replaced with a single programme
• How Programme Managers will ensure the safety of our members and people on probation if DA perpetrators and MCSO are included in the same group
• How Programme Managers will be able to ensure there are no victims of DA or sexual offences in groups
• How it will be possible to facilitate and ensure the engagement of group members in large groups
• How sexual deviance will be tackled as part of a single OBP, as this is one of the biggest risk indicators

WHAT NEXT?

The unions are opposed to the HMPPS proposals for Programmes because we believe that they will reduce public protection at a time when tackling violence against women and girls is finally getting the attention and resources it deserves in other government departments. HMPPS is trying to force generic job descriptions onto complex work areas in order to save money in much the same way as the NPS did at the time of E3. It did not work then, and it will not work now.

So, we will continue to campaign against these dangerous changes both within and outside HMPPS.

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Excerpts from Napo's formal response to Parole changes

The following are excerpts from Napo’s formal initial response as a trade union, dated the 14th of July, to the information we were provided with at that time by HMPPS on the changes made by the Secretary of State for Justice to the parole process.

“It’s outrageous that this fundamental change was introduced without any meaningful consultation or notice in advance of the Statutory Instrument…

…It’s clear that no current practitioners or relevant stakeholders have been consulted in advance on what is in effect a dangerously inept political ‘power grab’. This demonstrates a complete failure to comprehend the severe consequences of the huge mistake being made by doing so…

…Our concern is that this is a decision which is wholly politically motivated, made in response to a tiny proportion of individual cases which have received significant national publicity. Unfortunately, experience tells us that this never makes for considered or effective decision making in the criminal justice system…

…In thousands of instances every year no recommendation of any sort will be made to the Parole Board, with experienced, trusted experts such as Probation staff being actively prohibited from doing so by the Secretary of State. This significantly increases the risk to the public, and will damage their confidence in the criminal justice system…

…So far there has been no consultation with the recognised experts in this area of practice – the staff currently writing these reports and attending Oral Hearings. In fact, the Secretary of State has – potentially deliberately – avoided any such process of engagement. How can the recognised trade unions and their members have any confidence that this guidance will be fit for purpose, especially given the mass of contradictions and flaws inherent in this plan and the extremely limited time available for its production?...”

We’ve taken the unusual step of including these excerpts in this communication following this week’s judgement of the High Court on cases related to the changes imposed by the Secretary of State for Justice in July 2022 – www.judiciary.uk/wp-content/uploads/2023/03/Bailey-and-Morris-judgment.pdf

To be in the position of having received such a damning indictment on their behaviour and judgement, has resulted in HMPPS carrying out the Minister’s stated aims in a manner that was described in the judgement as “unlawful” in multiple respects.

While we are aware of the possibility the Secretary of State may appeal this judgement – and given lack of any apparent judgement and sense of decency this remains entirely likely – it is difficult to see how they can recover from abject defeat in Court.

As detailed in previous communications over the months since these changes were announced Napo has consistently taken the fight to HMPPS on behalf of its members on this matter at every opportunity possible in the months since these changes were announced. We have made repeated representations about the dire effects that these changes would clearly cause, both for our members and the wider criminal justice system, then unceasingly brought these to the employer’s attention as often as we were able to after their implementation. In addition to this we have worked with others interested parties – such as in the Houses of Parliament, charitable organisations involved or the legal representatives of the individuals party to the Court case above – to attempt to overturn these changes at the earliest opportunity. In doing this we are grateful to the members who have shared their experiences and concerns with us to enable Napo to better represent all our members and to defend the importance of our professional judgement.

Napo believe this stands as the most recent example to be added to the increasingly long list of instances when HMPPS should have listened to its workers, and their trade union representatives, to avoid making disastrous decisions. Members can be assured we will cite this in the future in our contacts with HMPPS in relation to our reasoned, critical opposition to, for example, the proposed changes to programmes as well as ‘One HMPPS’.

Guest Blog 91

Another very recent contribution, worthy of highlighting for its powerful message, and I very much hope the anonymous author feels is curated appropriately.

    
The Probation Officer that the Probation Service has created 

The blog is curated by you, JB. It is a compendium of opinions, mostly anonymous. Those opinions come from a wide range of standpoints. The 'fine line' is that anonymised posts are welcomed BUT they need to be read & understood in the context of factual subject matter. I enjoy the blog very much. I find some posts painful to read. Not the spiteful digs of politically motivated interlopers & not the shit-shovelling of those with a personal agenda. The most painful are those that evidence an overwhelming sense of the loss of humanity, of the loss of humanitarian values, posts that inherently display lethargy, division & selfishness, a bit like most new-build houses come fully furnished with appliances & decor, i.e. they lack a sense of authenticity of an individual or any element of risk-taking.

But this is an example of what I enjoy here: 

I quite liked not having to make recommendations. 

I don’t care about all that professional responsibility malarkey. Nobody respects poorly paid and overworked probation officers as it is.

I hope Raab appeals and wins.

I'm torn as to whether that's mischief-making by a sad bastard or a real person saying what they really believe. The subsequent post, however, will have opened some eyes as it placed those comments in a context with facts:

Bear in mind CRC POs were effectively removed from parole processes for many years.

Maybe that's what Raab wants, i.e. the CRC-model of a PO that just does what's asked without feeling the desire to involve themselves in other peoples' lives, other peoples' business or hold any sense of professional values. He could demote any number of managers at any level of his organogram & get exactly that, of course.

Take it a bit further. Stop focusing on Raab and his recommendations or Grayling and his privatisation. We could pretend to believe the Probation Officer was once a professional elite. A silent pillar of the Criminal Justice System, neither social worker nor enforcement agent. An expert at resettling prisoners after long sentences, helping aggressive or prolific offenders to CALM or Think First, walking those with complex needs through drug, alcohol and mental health support, and being the link between the Court, prison, the community and their future. An advisor to the Court, Parole Board, Mental Health Tribunals and anyone else needing an expert witness, opinion, risk assessment or plan involving a supervised offender.

It’s a nice memory for some, a rose-tinted nightmare for others. If we are to believe it was true, but then came successive Justice Ministers who stripped away the Probation Officer’s professionalism and removed their values while our Chief Officers, managers and unions stayed silent, mostly. Even that Probation Institute still hasn’t amounted to much more than “the lipstick on the TR pig”.

First, the Probation Officers title was changed to Offender Manager, Responsible Officer and Practitioner.

Second, our beloved Probation Service was changed to Trust, NPS, CRC then back to a Service again that looked very different from it once was.

Third, we were made to work for private companies for profit who made us follow erroneous practices, or cower under the civil service and government ministers that removed our professional authority to make independent decisions and recommendations.

Fourth, we were forcibly vetted and scrutinised by the police, made to adopt police assessments and procedures, and made to partner with the police at MAPPA IOM and elsewhere.

Fifth, we were denied pay rises and compelled to work increasingly excessive hours, with unmanageable caseloads and in unsafe, unhealthy and toxic office environments which caused hundreds and thousands to leave in droves never to return.

I could go on and on, it ends with the Probation Service being exposed as inadequate, dragged through the mud, and with some Probation Officers thrown under the bus, becoming mentally ill and committing suicide. It is this that has led to the “model of a PO that just does what's asked” because that is what is now required of a Probation Officer. The expectation is that targets, instructions and JFDI are followed “without feeling the desire to involve themselves in other peoples' lives, other peoples' business or hold any sense of professional values”. Probation Officers are not required to show “humanity”, or humanitarian values”, and how could they possibly do so within a Probation Service that by the very nature of its application causes “lethargy, division & selfishness”.

I’ll put it in simple terms so you don’t overthink this too much. I became a Probation Officer because it’s what I chose to do and initially I loved it, but now I don’t. Tomorrow I’ll turn up for work with a 170% caseload of 60 mostly high risk offenders. I’ll be bombarded by emails demands and requests from dawn until dusk from managers, prisons and other colleagues and professionals alike. I’m under constant threat and hoop-jumping of SFO investigations, complaint procedures and HMIP audits. I’m expected to turn up at legal hearings, team meetings and training events I have no time to prepare for. I’m trying my best but I can’t keep up unless I work 35 hours extra every week, which means I won’t spend enough time with my family and for a job that barely enables me to pay the bills or plan my future. It’s not just me, there are PQIPs, PSOs and PO around me that feel exactly the same, some have no idea what they’re doing and there’s not an experienced colleague or a manager in sight to learn from. The rest are off sick so receptionist is the most experienced person in the office.

If not making recommendations means one less paragraph in a report, one less hour at a hearing or one less question from an offender, their POM and their legal representative harassing me about whether I’m recommending their release then I’m all for it. I’d rather not complete another OASys, AP referral, EPF assessment ever again either. This by no means makes me “lethargic, selfish or divisive”, nor lacking “humanitarian values”. I am being the Probation Officer that the Probation Service has created in every single office across England and Wales. Not the rose-tinted one of of a decade ago but the robot-dog one of 2023. It’s not a vocation or a job for life either. I want a better job, a better paid one and as far away from the Probation Service as possible.

A Threat to Judicial Process

Raab's attempted tinkering with the Parole Board is a very serious business and the legal world is quite rightly making much of it. This Twitter thread by Andrew Sperling succinctly explains the background:-   

This is a thread about an important High Court judgment which was handed down yesterday. It concerns the decision of Dominic Raab to try to control the conduct of parole proceedings and to prescribe how his officials provide evidence to the Parole Board.

Dominic Raab is Lord Chancellor and Secretary of State for Justice. He is under investigation for several bullying complaints during different ministerial posts. Coverage of this is more prevalent than coverage of his performance in his current role. This is about the latter.

Raab has decided to make 'reform' of the parole system one of his priorities. This might be regarded as an odd choice given that his remit includes the whole criminal justice and penal systems. There is very little evidence that the Parole Board is performing badly.

The Parole Board is tasked with a difficult role. It must make decisions about whether certain prisoners meet a test for release on licence. This test is set by Parliament and has been interpreted by the courts.

The Parole Board is a non-departmental public body. It is supposed to be independent of government. It performs a judicial role and is described by the courts as a court-like body. The separation of judiciary and government is a fundamental feature of a democracy.

A 'root and branch' review of the Parole Board was ordered by a former Lord Chancellor, Robert Buckland. This included strong recommendations for it to become a fully independent court or tribunal. Buckland had been replaced before decisions had been made about the Board's future

Dominic Raab did not agree that the Board should become a properly constituted tribunal. Instead, he has sought to make changes to the Parole Board which take it in a completely different direction.

Raab's ultimate plan - which will soon be considered by Parliament - is to take control of a significant proportion of the Parole Board's judicial decisions. This is very likely to be unlawful and he will probably have been given advice to that effect.

Yesterday's High Court judgment concerned his decision to stop professional witnesses (probation officers, psychologists and prison officers) from providing recommendations to the Parole Board. He did not want them to provide recommendations which might conflict with his own.

Professional witnesses employed by the prison and probation service have been providing recommendations to the Parole Board for many years. The Board does not have to follow them. They will investigate them and challenge them. They usually find them helpful.

Raab and his officials issued rules prohibiting witnesses from giving recommendations. They issued guidance telling them how they should respond if Parole Board members ask them to do so. This has made many parole hearings farcical ("I am not permitted to answer that question")

Yesterday's judgment decided Raab's rule change and guidance were unlawful. The judges concluded that it "may well have resulted in prisoners being released who would not otherwise have been released and in prisoners not being released who would otherwise have been released".

This fiasco has cast a shadow over thousands of hearings conducted over several months. It has thrown hearings conducted this week and beyond into confusion. It is a huge embarrassment. This story is not receiving the coverage it should.

This is not the first - nor will it be the last - example of unlawful action by the current Justice Secretary. Unlawful does not mean criminal. But in this case it indicates a basic misunderstanding of the law and a serious attempt to interfere with a judicial process.

A government committed to "integrity, professionalism and accountability at every level" might wonder if it is right to continue to keep Dominic Raab in this important post.

If you want to know more about how the parole system works you could do worse than watch the BBC's Parole series. It is not perfect but does at least give a flavour of what actually happens at a parole hearing. As far as I know, Dominic Raab has never actually observed a parole hearing. I know he has been invited to do so. 

Andrew Sperling

Legal and Policy Consultant. Public lawyer and parole specialist. Director of SL5 Legal. Legal Aid Lawyer of the Year (Social Welfare) 2021

--oo00oo--

The Prison Reform Trust have had a big hand in challenging Raab and published this yesterday:- 

Blog: Parole – the Bailey judgement – a key change ruled unlawful

The High Court has today published a judgement about the chaotic introduction of legislation and guidance that prevented the Secretary of State’s experts from giving the parole board their view on whether a prisoner could safely be released or sent to open conditions. It could not be much clearer about the fundamental mistakes Dominic Raab committed in pushing it through.

The brief history is that, following the embarrassment of cases where he had personally disagreed with a parole board decision in a high profile case, but was confronted with the fact that his own experts had agreed with the board, Dominic Raab decided to ban those experts from giving recommendations in all cases. This went much further than a proposal made as part of the “root and branch review” of parole published in March last year, which would have required a “single view” prepared by the Secretary of State in advance of hearings about the most high profile cases – expected to number about 150 a year. The change was given effect by an amendment to the secondary legislation that governs parole processes and in guidance to HMPPS staff issued in July 2022 and then amended in October 22.

Following a judicial review on behalf of two prisoners affected by this change, the High Court has concluded that both the secondary legislation and both sets of guidance are unlawful. This is what the court says:

“There was no legal basis for these instructions, which would induce report writers to breach their legal obligations.”

The court has even invited further submissions on the question of whether the Secretary of State has required his staff to act in a way which is in contempt of court.

At the time this was all happening last summer, it was obvious that officials were having to cobble a policy together at breakneck speed, with no consultation and with only a hazy idea of what the justification for such a dramatic change might be. As a result of a Freedom of Information request from PRT, the private exasperation of the unconsulted Parole Board became public, and is quoted in the judgement. Officials were reduced to producing a “script” for staff appearing at hearings which would not have looked out of place in an episode of “Yes, Minister”, as it tried to navigate through the challenge of sparing the Justice Secretary’s blushes while meeting the legal and professional obligations of a witness to a judicial proceeding.

The full text of the judgement includes a fascinating and rarely seen glimpse of what was happening in the corridors of the ministry during the chaotic run-up to the new rules being introduced in June 2022. Extracts of minutes of meetings between Dominic Raab and the senior officials responsible show what was actually driving the change in policy. It bore little relation to the submissions made to the court at this judicial review. As the lead official for the policy put it:

“This would fix(a) major presentational issue”

This was never about better decision making, or even public protection, but about political embarrassment.

But on another central issue those meetings also reveal the private opinion of the Justice Secretary on a very central issue. The judgement repeatedly confirms that the Parole Board has a judicial, and therefore scrupulously independent function:

“It is … well established that, when exercising powers in relation to the Board, the Secretary of State must not to do anything that undermines or would be perceived as undermining the independence of the Board or that encroaches upon or interferes with the exercise by the Board of its judicial responsibilities.”

And that is because:

“A review of …. domestic (legal) authority demonstrates that the applicable principles first articulated in Strasbourg march in step with the doctrine of the separation of powers, which in this context is reflected in the common law principle that decisions about the liberty of the subject should be taken by a body which is independent of the executive and impartial as between the parties, save where Parliament expressly provides to the contrary.”

That is both clear and, for most people, uncontroversial. But this phrase appears in a note of a meeting attended by Dominic Raab (the Deputy Prime Minister, or “DPM”), his Permanent Secretary and the lead policy official:

“Outlined that he (DPM) believes the Parole Board is not judicial in its function but is a fact finding process”

It really couldn’t be any clearer that the DPM – Dominic Raab – is choosing to ignore what the law clearly provides.

This judgement really matters. As the court states, the Secretary of State’s actions “may well have resulted in prisoners being released who would not otherwise have been released and in prisoners not being released who would otherwise have been released.” This is not just poor policy making and poor administration, it’s an undermining of a process designed to treat prisoners fairly and keep the public safe.

But it matters also for what it shows about the presentational motivation behind the government’s approach to the parole process, and for the Justice Secretary’s fundamental refusal to accept that, in the absence of explicit statutory authority to the contrary, the liberty of the individual should be determined by a court, not by him.

This is all potentially relevant to legal challenges to the current refusal to send almost all indeterminate sentence prisoners to open prisons. But it is also relevant to the promised legislation which may give the Secretary of State the final say in decisions to release someone on parole. The rule change which the court has declared unlawful in this case was not even debated in parliament before it came into effect. It’s crucial that both MPs and Peers – the legislature – now do their job of restraining this over-mighty executive.

Peter Dawson
Director