Whatever the Question: £700m

"Pull a string and they mention the £700m.".

 ****

"Actually, "The Irony Of It" is that the £700m that is being banded about in every other sentence from the Government, is roughly only about the amount that was stripped out of the service through austerity and TR. £700m could really be seen only as a refund?

The real investment that probation needs is in all the things that went as a consequence of that financial stripping. Identity, experience, independence, autonomy, training etc etc. Good investment is not always about looking for a financial fix."

******

I am absolutely sick to death of hearing about the £700 million. Every single time practitioners raise a legitimate concern about workload, staffing, experience, public protection or what is coming down the line, somebody at the MoJ presses the same bloody button:

£700 million. 1,400 recruits. More tagging.

We know. We’ve heard it. Repeatedly. What we are telling you is that IT ISN’T FIXING THE PROBLEM.

I don’t manage £700 million. I manage people. Real people, with complicated lives, changing circumstances and risks that don’t conveniently fit into a tier, an actuarial score or a bloody dashboard.

A trainee isn’t an experienced PO because you’ve counted them in a recruitment figure. A GPS tag isn’t supervision. AI isn’t professional judgement. An exclusion-zone alert isn’t risk management. And reducing contact with people doesn’t magically create a safer probation service simply because somebody in HMPPS has labelled the missing hours “released capacity”.

Meanwhile those of us actually carrying the cases are expected to absorb OFPS, new tiering, sentencing reform, early releases, more electronic monitoring, more information, more potential breaches and recalls, and whatever else arrives next — while being told the answer is to spend less professional time with some of the people we’re responsible for. And:

When we tell you we’re worried? Thank you for your resilience.

When we tell you we’re exhausted? Here’s a wellbeing webinar.

When we tell you workloads are unsafe? We’re taking away your ability to see the WMT.

When we tell you we’re frightened something will be missed? £700 million.

And now practitioners apparently have to speak anonymously to Channel 4 because shouting inside the organisation isn’t working. That should shame HMPPS.

These aren’t disgruntled staff moaning because they’re busy. These are professionals warning before the event that they do not believe they have sufficient capacity to safely deliver what Government is promising the public. So record it. Date it. Remember it. We told you.

If this goes wrong and somebody is seriously harmed, don’t you dare come back afterwards with an SFO review, work backwards through an individual practitioner’s records and ask what they should have done differently. Ask what you did when the workforce warned you. Ask why you kept piling work into probation while reducing meaningful supervision. Ask why recruitment headlines mattered more than retaining experience. Ask why you removed workload visibility.

Ask why every warning was answered with investment figures and corporate platitudes rather than evidence that the service could safely cope. And please, spare us the inevitable “lessons will be learned.” The lesson is being handed to you right now.

You’re just not bloody listening.

*****

And there, buried underneath all the recruitment headlines, are the figures that actually matter.

Qualified Band 4 POs: DOWN 2%.
Band 3 PSOs: UP 13.6%.

Yet apparently we’re supposed to hear “1,400 new probation officers recruited” and conclude that the staffing crisis is being fixed. It isn’t.

You can recruit thousands of trainees, increase PSO numbers and issue endless press releases about recruitment targets, but none of that changes the number of qualified, experienced practitioners actually available today to carry the work and the risk.

And this little gem deserves translating:

“The shortfall in probation officers has increased relative to the March release mainly due to an increase in probation officer target staffing.”

In plain English: we’ve finally admitted we need more POs than we previously said we did, so the hole is even bigger than we were admitting. Meanwhile the Government is shifting thousands more people into community supervision, massively expanding electronic monitoring and telling probation to absorb the consequences of sentencing reform. And their answer?

“We’ve recruited 1,400.”

No. You’ve recruited people towards becoming probation officers while the number of actual Band 4 POs has fallen. There is a difference. Stop pretending there isn’t.

Getafix is also absolutely right about the £700m. Investment isn’t just money. What probation has lost over successive “reforms” is experience, professional identity, autonomy, confidence, continuity and institutional knowledge. You cannot buy 25 years of practitioner experience with a recruitment campaign. You certainly can’t replace it with a tag, an algorithm or AI.

Perhaps instead of endlessly telling us how much money you’re putting into probation, somebody could finally explain what sort of Probation Service we’re actually getting for it. 
Because from where I’m sitting, we’re getting fewer qualified POs just as Government expects probation to do more. That’s not investment. That’s deprofessionalisation with a press release attached.

*****

Then factor in the leaving rates:

Band 4 @ 5% That's 275 POs gone.

Band 3 @ 10% So, recruit 1,400 at band 3 (which is where trainees start), but lose 592.

Staff loss: (592+275) = 867

Claims about recruitment:

1. "In the past year, 1,622 probation services officers were appointed, some of whom will be training to become qualified probation officers."

2. "The Probation Service onboarded 1,389 new Trainee Probation Officers (PQiP) across the 2025/26 financial year"

Yeah, but more than half that number have left..

net staffing (depending on which figure is used):
= (1622 - 867) = +755... or...
= (1389-867) = +522

Neither of those figures gives 1,300 net increase. Whilst the lies fall from their mouths, it would be preferable that the scales fell from their eyes.

The Irony Of It

"The irony is almost insulting. On the very day HM Inspectorate publishes a paper saying the service needs to create “psychological safety” and take staff wellbeing seriously, Probation Day apparently involves a national call where staff can’t even use the chat or Q&A.

We’re thanked for our commitment. We’re praised for our resilience. We’re told our wellbeing matters. We’re told the frontline is being listened to. Then somebody switches off the microphone. Perhaps that is the most accurate metaphor for modern probation anyone could have devised."

****

But hey it's probation day today so let's pretend everything is rosy

National call BS = ✔️
Kim late to join the call ✔️
Turn off chat and Q&A for staff ✔️

****

Is it apt that Probation day falls on the same day as National Survivors day?

--oo00oo--

The cost of caring: compassion fatigue in probation practice

1. Introduction 

Despite the explosion of trauma-informed approaches within frontline services that work with society’s most excluded and vulnerable individuals, researchers have been slower to recognise the related harms that may befall staff or practitioners (in this case probation workers). There is a growing understanding of a list of secondary or ‘vicarious’ traumas but often with little to no recognition from wider organisations and a limited evidence base regarding the full effects of these occupational risks and the true extent of their prevalence in our working lives (Powell, Walton and Scott, 2024). Many professionals within these roles, e.g. nurses, police officers or even researchers in challenging spaces, experience cumulative and multiple distressing events over time. Although not included in any job description, they are routinely implied within the roles and sense of professional identity, where exposure to secondary trauma is simply ‘part and parcel’ of the job, a form of occupational duty. Furthermore, staff in such frontline fields often report a series of barriers to help-seeking, for example a high degree of stigma when coming forward, with roles routinely being tied to notions and expectations of endurance and stoic toughness (Cogan, 2026).

--//--

2.3 The state of play in probation

As is widely known, the Probation Service has, and continues to be, under considerable strain. There has been the destabilising Transforming Rehabilitation era (2014-2021) followed by the difficult unification of probation services during the Covid-19 pandemic, sitting alongside a history of underinvestment. At the staffing level, the challenge is just as acute. The service has experienced consistent shortfalls in staffing numbers (Orakci, 2025) and significantly higher levels of absence than the national average, with ‘mental health’ being the most commonly reported reason (ONS, 2026). Not enough is known about the exact state of the mental health of probation practitioners, other than using the simplistic labels of ‘stress’ and ‘depression’, which tell us little about the complex mental lives or the struggles that they face. Practitioners often feel disillusionment and frustration at not being able to make the kind of difference to their clients’ lives that they intended when joining the service, recorded in experiences of practitioner burnout, and the psychological costs of emotionally ‘taking the work home’ (HM Inspectorate of Probation, 2025). 

It would be difficult to overstate the considerable challenges faced by probation practitioners in their everyday working lives. They must manage high-pressured, emotionally and intellectually demanding cases, and balance the goals of rehabilitation and public safety. Not only does probation have one of the highest rates of staff attrition in the public sector, but often cited reasons for staff leaving the profession are highly relevant to any discussion on CF. Although probation does not assess for the presence or prevalence of CF, there is strong evidence to suggest that the features and duties of probation staff place them at higher risk of developing CF than in many other professions. The Probation Service also experiences far higher levels of public criticism and scrutiny than in many other professions (see Martin, 2025). Whilst this is perhaps unsurprising, given the risks to public safety, this can lead to negative and stigmatised appraisals of probation practitioners’ work, adding an additional risk factor in developing CF.

--//--

3. Conclusion 

This paper has introduced the concept and risk of CF for probation practitioners. While it is only one of many potential vicarious harms experienced by probation staff, an increased focus on the complex reasons for practitioners leaving the profession would no doubt reveal dimensions of the phenomenon, while providing an opportunity to reduce the burden on those undertaking this most essential role in our society. Otherwise, CF is likely to continue contributing to practitioners moving away from the service. 

Any future discussion must start with the recognition that human needs are inherently infinite, whereas practitioners’ time, resources and their level of emotional resiliency are not. The fundamental and relational challenge of probation work is regular exposure to human suffering and traumas from people on probation, alongside a combination of complex decision-making, routine system instabilities, and high degrees of responsibility. Taking CF seriously validates these challenging lived experiences of probation staff. It acknowledges the everyday struggles, including the emotional labour involved in the work, and the inherent moral and social justice element to compassion itself. 

The quality of care provided by frontline staff in any helping profession should be a primary concern of any employer or organisation. Investing in a model of psychological safety for probation staff, prioritising staff wellbeing, would be beneficial both to the practitioners themselves and in terms of wider public safety by increasing staff effectiveness and the likelihood of their long-term retention in the service. In the same way that a firefighter would wear protective equipment before entering a property engulfed in flames, we too must provide probation practitioners with appropriate psychologically-informed safeguards and supports, working towards a system and culture that promotes psychological resilience and safety.

Burnham Doesn't Get It

Just as we thought, Andy knows nothing about the Criminal Justice System and the proof comes in his new government's announcement last night:-

Fixing the prison and probation crisis

The Government is taking action to keep the most dangerous offenders locked up, expand prison capacity and strengthen protections for victims and the public.

This Government inherited a prison system in crisis, putting the public at grave risk. Prisons were on the brink of collapse, with capacity dangerously close to being exceeded. That’s why the Government is taking decisive action.

1. The Government is building new prison places. By 2031, there will be more prison places than ever before

• This Government has already built around 3,200 new prison places and aims to create 14,000 by 2031, giving communities confidence that those who pose the greatest risk will be locked up.

• We are also speeding up the deportation of foreign criminals, saving money for taxpayers and protecting the public from dangerous offenders. Over 11,700 foreign criminals including murderers and rapists have been removed since July 2024.

2. The Government is making changes to sentencing so that prison places are used for the most dangerous criminals

• The most dangerous offenders must be locked up for a long time. That will not change.

• We are introducing reforms to prison release arrangements through the Sentencing Act 2026 which change the amount of time offenders will spend in prison. However, over 18,000 offenders serving life and extended sentences, murderers and those serving sentences for rape and serious sexual child and grooming offences, are completely excluded from these changes.

• For offences with sentences of 12 months or less, there will be a presumption against custodial sentences in favour of community sentences – including unpaid work, electronic monitoring tags, curfews and exclusion zones. Courts will still be able to send offenders to prison when there is significant risk of harm to the victim or public.

3. The Government is improving the monitoring of offenders when they are released from prison

• Prisoners who are released will not be free and can be recalled to prison at any time if they step out of line. Victims will have a say over tough new restrictions on offenders leaving prison.

• A record £700m investment going into probation by 2028/29, which has already helped us hire 1,000 new trainee probation officers, will enable 1,300 more to be added by March 2027.

• It also means we can ramp up the electronic tagging of offenders on release from prison, with nearly all offenders tagged and subject to curfews and exclusion zones to keep victims safe.

• Rape and certain child sex offenders will now face tighter controls than ever before after leaving prison, with more intensive probation supervision and a mandatory condition that will give constant access to their location via a GPS tag.

• We are also expanding other protections including chemical suppression for sex offenders, random drug testing, and bans from driving, pubs and events such as football matches.

4. The Government is improving support for victims

• The Government is introducing a stronger package of support for victims, including increased and improved contact to all affected victims.

• This will be supported by a £10m boost for victim support to fund extra local frontline services for victims to get trauma-focussed support.

• This is on top of the largest ever investment into specialist services that offer practical and emotional support to victims and witnesses. Over half a billion pounds of funding over the next three years will help charities and others deliver support like counselling and advice on attending court.

• A dedicated victim helpline will be available by October for all those affected by the reforms to provide emotional support and practical guidance.

--oo00oo--

The future appears to be already written. Published a few hours ago, here's the answer, here's the fix! I personally struggle with the logic of creating more routes to recall people back to prison whilst at the same time trying to free up space. Available capacity stands at around 1800 places. Early release scheme hopes to free up a further 1500 places. Recall figures however exceed 50,000 in the last year. My maths are not great, but I just can't see how they hope to achieve anything.

'Getafix

*****
The order of priority & language is essential to understand that nothing has changed in downing street or whitehall for decades & decades:

"As Home Secretary in Margaret Thatcher’s government from 1979 to 1983, Willie Whitelaw pursued a hard-line law and order agenda. He is best known for introducing the "short, sharp shock" policy for young offenders and embarking on major prison-building programs to tackle rising street crime."

Michael Howard: "Prison Works": Argued that keeping serious and persistent criminals behind bars reduces crime rates through incapacitation and deterrence.

Deterrence and Detection: Advocated for an across-the-board approach focusing heavily on measures to catch and punish lawbreakers rather than relying solely on social or economic explanations for crime.

Rejection of Fatalism: Maintained that rising crime is not an inevitable fact of modern life and can be reversed with political will.

The bliarweasel project: "Tony Blair famously defined his approach to law and order with the 1993 political slogan: "Tough on crime, tough on the causes of crime." This dual strategy balanced strict enforcement and punishment for offenders alongside social interventions addressing poverty, lack of opportunity, and family breakdown" - sadly he unleashed tough on criminals but failed to deliver when it came to "the causes of crime", viz- "The government policy under Tony Blair has been one of relentless attack on our civil liberties; the expansion of new police powers, the introduction of new offences, and harsher penalties with longer custodial sentences – all of which has been matched by an increased weakening of the safeguards in the criminal justice process."

Now we have burn'em & co:

1. The Government is building new prison places. By 2031, there will be more prison places than ever before "HUZZAHH!"
2. The Government is making changes to sentencing so that prison places are used for the most dangerous criminals "LOCK 'EM'UP"
3. The Government is improving the monitoring of offenders when they are released from prison "MAKE THE PUNISHMENT LAST AS LONG AS POSSIBLE"
4. The Government is improving support for victims

A serious point can be made here whereby prioritising & elevating the victim's status whilst confabulating it with the means or severity of the punishment is not healthy. It runs the risk of making the victim a 'legitimate' target (in the eyes of the perpetrator) & potentially places the victim in greater peril, e.g. if the victim can be silenced then the punishment might be less harsh. The victim's voice is undoubtedly important, but the justice system should be the arbiter of punishment, not the volume, articulation or skill of the victim's opinion. Similarly I would argue that the imposition of victim work upon the probation service was, again, a big mistake. It has led to some terrible conflicts of interest.

*****
And there it is again.

The Government’s shiny new “Fixing the prison and probation crisis” page tells the public that prisoners released under these reforms “can be recalled to prison at any time if they step out of line”, that nearly all offenders will be electronically tagged, and that short sentences will increasingly be replaced by community sentences.

Who exactly does Government think is going to manage all of this? Because every one of those policies creates work for probation. More people managed in the community. More licence supervision. More electronic monitoring information. More curfews and exclusion zones. More potential breaches. More decisions about whether behaviour represents escalating risk. And, inevitably, more recall decision-making.

Then comes the reassurance: £700m and recruitment. Except read the Government’s own words carefully. The investment has apparently helped recruit 1,000 new TRAINEE probation officers, with another 1,300 to be added by March 2027.

We have literally just been discussing Millsike, where the Government accepts that having physical capacity isn’t enough because inexperienced staff require time to develop the skills and confidence to operate safely. Apparently probation works differently. And Getafix raises another rather obvious problem. Government is desperately trying to create prison capacity while simultaneously creating more routes through which people in the community can be recalled back into those same prisons.

Meanwhile OFPS is supposed to release 25% of probation capacity by reducing the amount of professional supervision some people receive. Which part of this is the coherent strategy?

More people in the community. More tagging. More surveillance. More potential breaches. More recalls. Less practitioner contact. An inexperienced workforce being recruited at pace. And a WMT that’s about to disappear. Yet the Government page presents all of this under the wonderfully reassuring heading:

“Fixing the prison and probation crisis.”

From the frontline it looks rather more like moving the crisis out of the prison gate and expecting probation to carry it. And when that doesn’t work, I suspect we’ll hear the same thing we always hear: “Lessons will be learned.” Perhaps somebody could try learning them before this time.

Listen to the Front Line!

What did HMPPS and the MoJ formally learn from TR about large-scale transformation, modelling risk, implementation at pace and listening to practitioners? And where can we see those lessons reflected in the design and implementation of OFPS today? And perhaps that question now needs putting directly to ministers, including the Probation Minister who we've heard nothing from since her appointment.

What lessons from TR have you personally satisfied yourself have been learned before another fundamental redesign of probation is implemented? Because this isn’t some interesting historical comparison. TR had an enormous financial cost, but it also had a human one. Experienced staff left. Professional identity was damaged. Services were fragmented. Practitioners spent years working through successive restructures before reunification attempted to put the service back together again.

And now, barely having recovered from one transformation, probation is being transformed again. Once again staff are being told about efficiency, technology, new models and releasing capacity. Once again the centre appears remarkably confident about what can be achieved. And once again the people expected to make it work will undoubtedly be thanked for their “hard work”, their “commitment” and their “resilience” when the reality on the ground becomes difficult.

Frankly, those words are wearing very thin. Resilience should not mean repeatedly asking a workforce to absorb the consequences of organisational decisions and then congratulating them for surviving them. Nor should “listening to the frontline” mean thanking staff for raising concerns before proceeding regardless.

This is why ministerial silence on probation is becoming increasingly difficult to understand. Probation is apparently important enough to carry a substantial part of the government’s answer to prison overcrowding and sentencing reform, but where is the political voice explaining what is happening to the service expected to deliver it?

Where is the Probation Minister explaining OFPS to the workforce and the public? Where is the acknowledgement of what happened under TR? Where is the assurance - backed by evidence rather than another set of comforting phrases - that the same mistakes are not being repeated? Because if an organisation can experience a failure on the scale of TR and, little more than a decade later, find itself using eerily similar language while embarking upon another fundamental redesign of probation, asking “what did you learn?” is hardly unreasonable.

Romeo was absolutely right about one thing in 2014: there are no prizes for believing your own hype. The financial and human cost of getting probation reform wrong doesn’t disappear simply because Whitehall has moved on to the next transformation programme.

So perhaps the question for HMPPS, the MoJ and the minister responsible for probation is no longer where is the institutional memory? It’s: what evidence is there that you learned anything at all?

*****
"Nor should “listening to the frontline” mean thanking staff for raising concerns before proceeding regardless."

That perfectly describes the attitude & approach in 1999 when, as the sun was eclipsed by the moon, a group met in London to discuss the findings of the first OASys paper-based pilot. Staff from prisons & probation sat around a large table while civil servants asked for their feedback. A number of legitimate &/or worrying concerns were raised by the staff. Those comments were acknowledged &, for the most part, immediately dismissed. There was an agenda.

The 'centre' had a plan & they were merely going through the motions so they could say they had consulted & piloted the project before imposing it across the board. It was cumbersome, it was repetitive, it was judgemental. It was a crude stick used to beat the person being 'assessed' into shape such that they would fit into the round or square hole. And so began a series of carefully choreographed impostions - NPSv.1, NOMS, Trusts, TR, HMPPS, reunification, reset, OFPS.

*****
I couldn't agree more that, looking back, OASYS signalled the beginning of the end for probation. We spend our lives servicing a badly designed system. The unrelenting lists of standards, feedback, audits, QDOs, shows me it isn't staff who are "doing it wrong" but the system itself is fundamentally flawed. And yet management have spent years of wasted time on this ridiculous endeavour, ultimately blaming the staff for incompetence rather than admitting it was their own for enabling such poor use of our time and resources filling it out with an ever increasing list of requirements and quality audit tools.

What I don't know is whether ARNS will sort this out...has anyone used it or seen it that can give us some reassurance that there is light at the end of the assessment tunnel?

*****

I don't think OFPS was based on staff consultation. Are we really saying that staff have genuinely supported and asked for reduced contact with people on probation as the key to unlocking the 25% workload reduction? Certainly if someone had asked me, I would have pointed to the duplication and unnecessary time spent completing OASYS...how easily could 25% of my time be saved if that system was completely redesigned and the unrelenting impossible standards underpinning it wripped up.

Think about the targets, the data, the measurement, the monitoring, the duplication and unnecessary tasks we are forced to complete on a daily basis. All this has been left completely intact while probation supervision has been diluted, reducing contact and cancelling any contact at all through a push for early termination motivated not by success but convenience, with one to one work replaced with a preset list of "conversations". Is this really what staff have said when asked for ideas about reducing unnecessary workload?

And are we now going to be passively brow beaten once again to bring in yet another "model" we don't support, or am i wrong and staff are really supportive of a probation service that spends the vast majority of its time "assessing" in the most unimaginably laborious and ineffective way possible while implementing absolutely nothing at the end of it? Are staff not as angry as I am that out of all the things that could have been cut, contact was seen as the most unnecessary and dispensible element of our role?

******
And once again probation/government have increased punitive control measures by applying them to all, whether they are needed, worthwhile or necessary. In my mind this (inadvertently) changes the culture of probation officers by both seeing all as more dangerous than they really are, and diluting any remaining critical analysis or professionalism that used to be needed to determine who needs these monitoring tools at all or for whom they are necessary and proportionate.

Romeo Special

From Daily Mail:-
Andy Burnham's top mandarin is facing questions over her own role in the prison overcrowding crisis that is leading to thousands of criminals being released early.

Dame Antonia Romeo, now Cabinet Secretary, was in charge of the Ministry of Justice for four years as problems mounted with the plan to build more cells. She was accused by MPs of presiding over a 'ticking timebomb' as her department knew that existing jails were rapidly running out of space yet the construction of new sites was delayed.

On her watch the MoJ built just 6,518 new places were built out of a promised 20,000, and the target will only be reached five years late according to the National Audit Office. When grilled by the Public Accounts Committee last year, Dame Antonia admitted there had been a 'degree of slippage in the delivery' but blamed unexpected developments including planning hold-ups.

She was also challenged over the MoJ's decision to sign a 10-year lease on HMP Dartmoor despite knowing the site had high levels of radon gas, meaning that hundreds of much-needed cells cannot be used.

Former prison governor John Podmore told the Daily Mail: 'She dug a big hole and Andy Burnham jumped right into it. 'While she was at the Ministry of Justice she watched it all go wrong. I didn't see any intervention that she did. 'The overcrowding crisis has been around for a long time but they haven't taken any responsibility.'

He said the department could have created more room by stopping so many suspects being held in jail on remand ahead of long-delayed trials, or by reducing the large number of released prisoners being recalled to jail for minor licence breaches.

Instead, the Prime Minister is now having to consider more radical proposals to free up space - in order to prevent the killers of PC Andrew Harper being included in the looming early release scheme - such as putting men in women's jails.

Another ex governor, Prof Ian Acheson, pointed out that Dame Antonia was previously responsible for the disastrous £4billion part-privatisation of the probation service, which later had to be reversed. He said: 'The connected upper class of the Senior Civil Service giving the PM advice on this political crisis bear some of the blame for the mess the criminal justice system is in.

'Romeo now sits at the side of the Prime Minister and represents continuity of the administrative class who have presided over chaos with no answers apart from 'No, Prime Minister'.

'The Ministry of Justice in a tight field is one of the worst departments in Whitehall. When the dust settles on this latest debacle, Andy Burnham would do well to consider a wholesale clear out of officials who have served him so poorly.'

But a Government source insisted: 'It is totally ridiculous to claim that anyone is responsible for the prisons crisis Labour inherited other than the Tory ministers who ignored repeated warnings from officials and refused to take action.'

Insiders said that key decisions that led to the overcrowding crisis, including increasing prison sentences as well as failing to provide enough funding, were taken by Tory-era ministers rather than officials.

A Government spokesman added: 'As Permanent Secretary at the MoJ, Antonia led the programme for new prison places, which included opening three new prisons with over 4,500 new prison places and plans to deliver 14,000 by 2031.

'She and her team consistently worked to prevent the prison system reaching maximum capacity, including during the summer riots in 2024 where she led the response of the Criminal Justice System to bring offenders swiftly to justice.'

*******
A significant Twitter thread:-

I've absolutely avoided the tittle tattle around Romeo's previous conduct mainly because of my own experience of being a pushy outsider in CS. I've focused on aspects of her performance which have been effectively memory holed. 'Transforming Rehabilitation' is exhibit A.

Romeo while DG at the MoJ was Senior Responsible Officer for this part privatisation of the probation service which was a total disaster from start to finish. Government ideological vandalism certainly but implemented by her.

She assured parliament the doomed transformation programme “is going to work and isn’t taking on any unnecessary risk” It was a total fuck up from start to finish when Probation was returned to public sector after wastage of £467 million underestimated costs and bail outs.

The probation union said the process was a “shambles” with “zero communication”, increased paperwork, fragmented risk management, deskilling and demoralisation of staff, and poorer outcomes for offenders being supervised. In other words it put the community at greater risk.

£9 million alone was spent on consultancy trying to gild this turd while probation officers had their pay frozen. The National Audit Office demolished the programme finding 'systemic failings' in design and implementation, aspects she was fully responsible for as SRO.

So it's for this reason and this alone I have serious reservations about the spin that says she's equal to the task of 'rewiring government.' It doesn't matter that she's a women and ambitious (oh no!) or all the fluff around her media profile. What matters is *delivery*.

But airbrushing serious failures won't cut it either. The systemic rot in the senior lanyard class in public service is a 'mediocracy' - people promoted up to and well beyond their level of competence. Not sure she's the best exemplar of how to tackle that. We shall see.

Ian Acheson

*******
"The systemic rot in the senior lanyard class in public service is a 'mediocracy'"

After all of the failures & waste of public money la romeo has been responsible for, someone with media clout has finally said it out loud.

John Podmore also alluded to it last week on R4 (referred to on this blog previously), but without going as far as Ian (possible bbc editing? possibly being cautious?). But la romeo has been at the heart of the destruction of justice for a long time, at least 8 years' at the helm in varying roles:

2011-13, Director General, Transformation.
2013 -15, Director General, Criminal Justice
2021-25, Ministry of Justice as permanent secretary

Dame Antonia Romeo (Jan 2021 – Mar 2025)
Sir Richard Heaton KCB (Aug 2015 – Aug 2020)
Ursula Brennan (July 2012 – July 2015) – Retired
Sir Suma Chakrabarti (May 2007 – 2012)

There's also this motley crew from noms/hmpps who aided & abetted the catastrophe:

Martin Narey (2004 to 2005)
Helen Edwards (2005 to 2008)
Phil Wheatley as Director-General (2008 to 2010)
Michael Spurr (2010 to 2019)
Jo Farrar (2019 to 2022)
Amy Rees (2022 to 2025)
Phil Copple as interim (2025)
James McEwen (2025 to present)

And any assortment of shadowy senior civil servants who shun the limelight but happily impose stupid, uninformed policies upon the minions.

******
There is an interesting contrast between the discussion about Antonia Romeo and the SFO discussion above. When accountability reaches senior organisational level, suddenly context matters enormously: political decisions, funding constraints, planning delays, competing pressures and decisions made elsewhere in the system.

And actually, context should matter. Complex systems fail for complex reasons. But surely the same principle has to apply when examining the actions of an individual PP.

If a practitioner was carrying an excessive workload, covering sickness, working within an organisational supervision model, unable to access accommodation or treatment, dealing with poor information sharing and making decisions within the time and resources available, those aren’t excuses to be stripped away before examining their practice. They are part of the evidence.

Perhaps genuine organisational learning starts when we become as interested in the context surrounding frontline decisions as we apparently are in the context surrounding decisions made at the top.

******
When there's glory to be grasped, Alpha Romeo is more than happy to be in the spotlight.

“To get large transformation programmes working, you’ve got to have really good assurance in place so that you know you’re not believing your own hype”

“My job as senior responsible officer is to make sure we deliver the benefits of the programme. We need to really understand what’s going on – and there are no prizes for not listening.”

Most offenders, she points out, have “a very complex and intractable set of problems that need to be looked at holistically.”

As the new system is established, these will be identified using what Romeo calls an “actuarial tool”: a piece of software that “looks at all the indicators and does something rather complicated and determines what level of risk someone is.” ... Romeo emphasises that the final decision will be made by NPS professionals – as will decisions over whether to recategorise offenders once the system is up and running.

There is clearly a political timetable behind the pace at which the MoJ is moving... Romeo acknowledges that the ministry hasn’t trialled its final proposals anywhere. “You have to turn on the statute once nationally,” she says.

“The Cabinet Office has a very clear process for awarding contracts.”

"I personally listen very carefully to what people tell me; and I go out all the time and talk to trusts, and to local authorities, and to police and crime commissioners.”

******
Powerful friends are useful, especially when you share a longstanding agenda.

"The Cabinet Office’s propriety and ethics team broke into a safe and destroyed the department’s copy of a historic bullying investigation into the new head of the civil service. In 2022 Darren Tierney, the then director-general of the government standards watchdog, asked maintenance staff to force open the vault. Reports surfaced that the department's copy of the Romeo file was disposed of following the vault breach... He later said he had wanted access to a confidential report about Dame Antonia Romeo. The Cabinet Office stated that the manual opening of the broken safe was routine due to a mechanical failure" - The Times/Telegraph & others

* Darren Tierney previously worked under Antonia Romeo when she headed the Department for International Trade (DIT) before later becoming the Director-General for Propriety and Ethics in the Cabinet Office

It seems there's a strong link between Romeo & the Cabinet Office...

"In July 2022, Francis Maude launched an independent review of UK civil service governance and accountability... Antonia Romeo—acting then as the Permanent Secretary for the Ministry of Justice—officially sponsored and supported the review alongside Maude.. Romeo later advanced to become Cabinet Secretary and Head of the Civil Service, putting her at the head of the department where Maude previously drove major structural reforms as Minister for the Cabinet Office" civil service world & others.

"News of the government’s intention to reform the civil service began to emerge in 2020. At the time, the agenda was being pushed by then-Cabinet Office minister Michael Gove and Dominic Cummings, the former chief adviser of PM Boris Johnson. Maude will chair the latest review, with the support of Ministry of Justice permanent secretary Antonia Romeo"

2010: Romeo transferred to the Cabinet Office as the Executive Director in the new Efficiency and Reform Group under Francis Maude.

But not everyone's in thrall to alpha romeo:

"Antonia did not arrive in the senior civil service by the usual route of decades in a single department. She arrived through the coordination layer, the place where the various arms of the British state meet and agree their stories.

[romeo's] is not the career of a specialist. It is the career of a fixer. Intelligence liaison, efficiency reform, transformation, implementation, delivery. Every job title is a verb dressed up as a noun, and none of them leaves a paper trail you can scrutinise in a newspaper.

There was a reason for the trajectory, and his name was Jeremy Heywood, later Lord Heywood of Whitehall, who was Cabinet Secretary from 2012 until his death in 2018... Heywood was Romeo's mentor. He personally asked her to stay in the civil service when she was considering leaving, and sent her to New York. He smoothed her path to DIT, reportedly striking a "trade-off" with Theresa May, according to the Mail on Sunday's 2020 reporting, to secure her appointment despite the New York investigation.

Past performance is the best predictor of future performance. On past performance, Antonia Romeo is precisely what a failing administrative state produces, elevates, and protects. Not despite the record. Because of it.

She will also, we are told, rewrite the Civil Service Code, which is a bit like asking the fox to redraft the henhouse security policy."

*****
Reading that old interview alongside this discussion is quite sobering. Forget personalities for a moment because the more important issue is institutional memory. We have been here before.

A major transformation programme. Pressure to release capacity. Increasing reliance on actuarial tools. Assurances that professional judgement will remain with practitioners. A nationally implemented model accompanied by confidence from the centre that the risks are understood and appropriately managed.

TR subsequently failed, at enormous financial and human cost. So surely one of the most important questions for OFPS is: what has HMPPS actually learned from that experience? Because the line from that 2014 interview that really stands out now is: “You’ve got to have really good assurance in place so that you know you’re not believing your own hype.”

Quite.

If OFPS is deliberately attempting to release 25% of practitioner capacity through new tiering and supervision arrangements, where is the independent assurance that the model can safely do that? What happens if the assumptions underpinning the actuarial tools prove wrong? How will unintended consequences be identified once implemented? And crucially, who owns that risk?

That’s why this connects directly with SFO accountability. It cannot be acceptable for the organisation to design the model, determine the available resource and set the parameters of supervision, but for the individual practitioner to inherit the consequences if those assumptions subsequently prove wrong.

TR should have taught HMPPS that organisational optimism is not evidence. The question is whether anyone retained the lesson.

Guest Blog 110

When the System Sets the Risk, Who Carries the Blame?

Excellent piece, particularly the acknowledgement that sometimes the difference between becoming the subject of an SFO review and never experiencing one is not necessarily professional competence, but luck.

Risk assessment is not clairvoyance. Practitioners make judgements using the information, resources and time available to them at that moment. Yet after an SFO almost every action of the individual PP [Probation Practitioner] can be reconstructed: what was recorded, what wasn’t, whether an assessment was updated, whether information was acted upon and whether recall should have been considered.

The question is whether the organisation is examined with anything approaching the same forensic intensity.

And that question becomes even more important with everything now being introduced through OFPS, [Our Future Probation Service].

HMPPS is attempting to release around 25% of practitioner capacity. A new tiering model will determine how supervision is targeted, with seven tiers and maximum rather than minimum contacts. Practitioners will have to review all of their cases as the new arrangements are implemented, including ensuring the relevant risk indicators are captured. At the same time there are changes to supervision packages, increasing reliance on actuarial tools, the removal of practitioner access to the WMT and the additional pressures coming from sentencing reform and electronic monitoring.

These aren’t simply administrative changes. They are organisational decisions about risk.

If HMPPS determines through OFPS that a particular category of case should receive less practitioner resource, and a PP manages that person within the supervision framework HMPPS has designed, what happens if that person subsequently commits an SFO?

Will the review ask whether the model itself allocated sufficient professional time to that case? Will it examine whether the tier was appropriate, whether the supervision package was sufficient, what workload the PP was carrying and what other work they had been instructed to deprioritise?

Or will we once again work backwards through the individual practitioner’s records looking for something they might have done differently?

There is a particularly uncomfortable contradiction here. HMPPS is redesigning probation specifically because it accepts there isn’t sufficient capacity to continue doing everything currently expected of practitioners. Yet practitioner access to the WMT is disappearing just as these changes arrive.

Potentially, therefore, the individual PP becomes more retrospectively measurable while the organisational constraints around their practice become less objectively measurable.

That is exactly how defensive practice is created.

And perhaps this is the real test of whether SFO reviews are genuinely about learning. If HMPPS wants practitioners to embrace a new model that deliberately targets finite professional resource according to assessed need and risk, then HMPPS must be prepared to own the consequences of that model too.

Accountability cannot stop at the practitioner when the parameters within which that practitioner was working were designed much further up the organisation.

Anon

Guest Blog 109

When Fear Leads, Probation Fails

SFOs and the culture of blame in Probation

HM Inspector of Probation, last month published a Research & Analysis Bulletin looking at how the Probation Service can learn and improve practice following Serious Further Offences (SFOs).

I read this with interest: in my time I spent as a Probation Officer I had my fair share of sleepless nights worrying someone I supervised would do something terrible. I would hear news reports about a crime and run through, in my head, whether anyone on my caseload could have been in the location it happened in, and when I would get news, someone had been arrested my heart would beat faster and I would feel panicked as I waited to hear what for.

As my career developed so did my greatest fear– fairly or unfairly – that, should the worse happen, I would be ‘hung out to dry’, and left unsupported to take the sole blame. I feared I would be shamed for negligence and incompetence that led to the harm of another person – making me as bad, if not worse, than the person who actually committed the SFO. I became frightened that one day I would wake to my name and personal details appearing in the national press – and my professional reputation forever tainted, with no right to reply or opportunity to give an explanation.

Of course, SFO reviews are intended to promote learning. But as the HMIP Report shows, staff experience the reviews as failing to reflect the complex realities of frontline probation work, and actually being about allocating blame to individual practitioners, to divert attention from the organisational and systemic factors that contribute to SFOs.

I was fortunate, no one I supervised ever caused me to be the subject of an SFO Review. Not because I was especially skilled – but because I was lucky. I saw some truly amazing Officers subject to brutal SFO Reviews and, frankly some poor Officers never subject to one. Because that’s the nature of working with people – sometimes things happen that you cannot predict. Other times you might have strong suspicions – but nothing you can evidence, or you try to get resources to help someone – and they simply are not there – or not there in time.

Of course, there are times when Probation Officers practice is poor. But – for a long time now Probation staff have worked in a very poorly performing service. Consistently, the Inspectorate reports detail a service in failure. Staff are constantly holding more cases than they should be, they are covering cases for absent colleagues, they are having to act as proxy housing officers, chasing referrals in an increasingly disjointed system.

Despite being exposed to seeing and hearing some of the worst parts of human behaviour – both in terms of the crimes the people they supervise have committed and the, often, trauma filled background those same people come from, probation staff rarely receive any clinical supervision or genuine assistance to process this.

Probation staff are encouraged to ‘build their resilience’ but little is done, to help them do that. The systemic problems in the Service, are something staff are expected to deal with and rise above – and if you can’t – well you must be to blame.

Of course, the result of a staff body living with this kind of pressure and fear is a culture of defensive practice. Every decision is seen through the lens of ‘what if the worst happens?’ Even when nothing in the person’s history suggests the worse will happen. The recall rate – now at record levels, is, in my opinion, testament to this.

The irony is, people enter the Probation Service wanting to deliver relational, rehabilitative practice. Inspectorate reports demonstrate staff worried to admit any deficits in their practice, and staff worried to commit fully to relational practice, for fear of the consequences and, as such, a learning culture is simply not possible, and Probation fails to be the service of rehabilitation it could be. It’s hardly a surprise retention is such an issue in the service.

But blame doesn’t keep people safe. Learning, ultimately does. And until probation chooses learning as the central part of its culture, rather than fear, it will never be the rehabilitative service our communities deserve.

Kelly Grehan - In Justice Blog
@kellygrehaninjusticeblog

After 20 years working for the Probation Service in London, and 3 years working for MPs with justice briefs in Parliament, I now work for a justice charity. So fed up of the false discourse about justice I have decided to start blogging about it.

After HMIP published their (excellent) bulletin on serious further offences by people on probation, I felt compelled to write about the experience of staff being on the end of these reviews.

Without Probation None of This Can Happen

“Promises of extra investment are starting to sound like snake oil... Napo is urging government to listen to probation professionals... HMPPS has previously been issued with seven key demands, with deadlines for implementation"

Probation's been spoon-fed snake oil for decades. Local, regional & national management have been collectively holding the noses of probation staff & pouring it down their throats. No matter how its been disguised & delivered - Choreographed, Trusted, Transformed or Reset - it still tastes like shit.

Difficulty is that the unions (plural) have no authority, no gracvitas, no meaningful presence... just wobbly words of if's, but's, maybe's, wild claims & empty promises. They do a lot of "urging", so much so its a wonder they haven't had a prolapse. They do a lot of "demanding", but from a position of subservience & learned helplessness.

The "indicative" ballot is, as [has been pointed out] above, not exactly overwhelming when 9% of however many of the 6,135 members (no AR21 for 2025 yet, so this remains the 2024 membership figure) do not vote for it.

IF *all* members voted (I doubt they did) that's over 550 union members who, in this current climate of ever-worsening shitstorm, did NOT vote for "potential industrial action over workloads". If the current & impending situation isn't enough to make you fear the worst, what will it take?

Severally & individually you're in a position of extreme jeopardy, with the current dangerous levels of workload about to be ramped up beyond what is imaginable. The govt & hmpps haven't a fucking clue what they're doing & as an ex-prison governonr said on R4 yesterday, the PM is getting shit advice from a pack of inexperienced blowhards & his cabinet sec - ***who used to be the DG of HMPPS***. What he didn't go on to say was she was responsible for so much of the catastrophe that's been brewing for the last decade at least.

The whole Sentencing Act is about to be re-written - again - and it aint going to be pretty. Its already been rebranded as The New Progression Model ... one where the loudest cries of "foul" result in failure to release because hmpps will find some means of keeping the chosen ones in gaol for a few more weeks or months.

Meanwhile those moderate rightwingers wanting to 'reform' the country are having a ball, with ex-prison governor flakey frake signalling the return of the death penalty wouldn't go amiss. And 9% of however many voted (will we ever know?) think there's nothing to fret about?

Anon

*****

Whatever anyone thinks of Napo, 90.76% of those voting in an indicative ballot supporting potential industrial action should be impossible for HMPPS to dismiss as a few disgruntled staff.

I agree that Napo should publish the turnout and actual voting figures because transparency matters. But perhaps the bigger question is what happens next.

Probation has an unusual amount of public attention at the moment. Channel 4 is actively asking frontline staff to describe what is happening. Early release is dominating the news. Government is relying on “tougher community supervision” to reassure the public, while simultaneously expecting an already overstretched service to deliver it.

If ever there were a moment for probation staff to stop being the invisible part of the criminal justice system, surely this is it.

And this cannot be allowed to become simply an argument about wanting more pay or doing less work. Workloads, retention, experience, training, professional autonomy and yes, pay, all ultimately lead back to the same thing: public protection.

The government cannot tell the public that probation will provide the safety net for its sentencing and early-release policies while ignoring warnings from the people expected to provide that safety net.

The really interesting question now is whether Napo is prepared to use the leverage its members currently have, or whether we get another round of strongly worded statements, meetings, “urging” HMPPS to act and then watch the moment pass.

Because “without probation none of this can happen” is only a powerful statement if probation is finally prepared to act like it believes it.

Anon

Media Interest

Three questions for probation staff from C4 News:

• How concerned are you about the early release plans starting in October?
• What are you worried about and why?
• What do people need to know about what's happening inside the Probation Service and its ability to manage risks to the public? 

Responses please to: 

wyjaw@protonmail.com 

Sally.Chesworth@itn.co.uk 

All replies will only be used by C4 anonymously and the content will be voiced up by actors. We welcome replies from anyone working in Probation, across England & Wales

Guest Blog 108

I can't help but wonder if our current Criminal Justice System has reached a point where it's now beyond repair, and a whole new system needs to be created across the board? Apart from the chaos of the early release scheme, I read this week that prison wings are being closed under the guise of renovation to hide staff shortages and high levels of sick days being taken.

I read too that the MoJ may have to close down more prison space because of dangerous levels of radon that is affecting several of our victorian prisons as the building materials used are starting to decay through age.

I also read that whilst the MoJ are struggling to release prisoners early, they have at the same time decided to increase prison punishments, increasing the number of added days a prisoner can be awarded from 42 days to 84 days.

https://insidetime.org/information/mean-spirited-and-unjust-why-the-mojs-new-rules-risk-undermining-rehabilitation/

It seems that every policy that is introduced has an alternative policy that works against it. Within my social group there is a retired probation officer (CQSW) who is very left wing in their views. There is also a retired prison officer (10 years a block screw) and extremely right wing in their views. There is also a couple of ex-cons (old lags now and also long retired) who's views stretch in betwwen. 

However, regardless of political opinion, everyone is on the same page with the CJS. It was never perfect, but it worked well. More importantly, it was respected. The police caught the offenders and brought them before the courts. The courts heard the case, weighed up all the circumstances and decided on the most appropriate punishment. If that happend to be imprisonment, then the convicted person would serve two thirds of the total sentence and be released without any post sentence supervision. For those sentenced to two years or longer the possibility of being granted parole after one third existed, and if granted release, came with the provision to engage with probation services. No consent, no parole.

The public respected this process. There was never any outcry that someone hadn't been given long enough, or someone was being released early on parole. There was never any media or victims making headlines demanding that someone serve the amount of time that they wanted to see them serve. The system was respected. The sword and the scales, and what ever decision the courts arrived at, or who ever the Parole Board released was just acceped as part of the overall process.

Probation was respected too. It worked to resettle and rehabitate those being released on parole, not by enforcement and control, but by support and encouragement.

The CJS needs to go back to somewhere near to what it was. Each agency needs the freedom to do it's own job and achieve its own specific purpose, what it was designed to do. The CJS needs to assert itself and not be driven by the court of public opinion because pandering to one group will always upset another group. It may not of been perfect, but there was a time when it all worked so well, and its really not all that long ago.

'Getafix