Monday, 12 October 2026

Back for More?

Academic articles are invariably extremely long and not at all conducive to the blog format, especially if accessed via a mobile, however they are often important and the following published last year, particularly so in my view. I've taken the liberty of removing the copious references and the chapter on methodology in order to make it more manageable and hope the author forgives me in furtherance of trying to bring it to a wider audience. 

So, in an attempt to maintain the current discourse regarding probation's plight, although a long read, I think it pretty much puts things into context and is particularly relevant for its testimonies from front line staff as the Napo AGM in Newcastle approaches this week. And on that note, I am going to be in that great city on Thursday 15th at The Mile Castle Wetherspoons on Grainger Road near the railway station from 6pm in order to meet any colleague old or new, up for a chat. 

“We’ll always go back for more”? Probation, precariousness, and professional identity

Abstract

Over the last few decades, the environment in which the Probation Service in England and Wales operates has become both more punitive and managerial, dominated by the logic of risk. A challenge to the tenets on which probation’s professional project was founded, such as its (social work) knowledge base and autonomy to work with individuals under supervision, has accompanied this changed landscape. Indeed, probation’s relative powerlessness to mobilise against governmental impositions has resulted in four top-down organisational restructurings since the turn of the millennium. This paper, therefore, considers the impact of such change on professional identity in probation. Against the backdrop of the most recent organisational reform – the “unification” of services, in June 2021 which brought to an end a failed seven-year experiment in part-privatisation – it explores how punitive, managerial, and marketising reforms have contributed to a crisis of identity that has been decades in the making. The paper argues that, while an appeal to an ideology of service centred on helping clients remains significant among staff, the nature and extent of the challenges probation faces has rendered professional identity more precarious.

Introduction

Change, it seems, has been the only constant for the Probation Service in England and Wales in recent decades. Probation is a legal profession rather than the legal profession, but the two have historically had strong links – notably, through co-location in the courts. Like criminal justice defence lawyering, probation professionals have typically acted as an “ally” for those processed through the criminal justice system. In recent years, however, probation – again, like criminal justice lawyering – has experienced considerable challenges. As an “invisible” profession – one that exists in the shadow of the prison, working with involuntary, (mostly) low status clients – probation has proved especially vulnerable to interference from successive governments. Part of a broader neoliberal effort to align public service delivery with private sector techniques, the foundations on which the service’s “professional project” was built have been disturbed by the forces of managerialism and marketisation. From the 1980s onwards, practitioner autonomy has been partially surrendered to performance targets and audit; social work training requirements for practice have been abolished; and the service’s foundational mission, summarised in the words “advise, assist, befriend”, has been abandoned within official documents.

This challenge to probation’s knowledge, methods, and values extends to the service’s governance structure. There have been four top-down restructurings of probation since the turn of the millennium. In 2001, the New Labour Government concentrated 55 “constitutionally separate” Probation Areas within 42 Probation Boards, overseen by a new National Probation Service (NPS). These were further reduced to 35 Probation Trusts in 2007, as the search for greater efficiency and effectiveness saw the “ogre of contestability” rear its head in the form of attempts to outsource core practices to private (and voluntary) providers. This (part-)privatising ambition was not realised until 2014, when the Conservative-Liberal Democrat Coalition Government’s Transforming Rehabilitation (TR) reforms split services between the publicly-owned NPS and 21 privately-managed Community Rehabilitation Companies (CRCs). However, TR was a “policy disaster” and probation was subsequently “unified” (in essence, re-nationalised): on 26 June 2021, seven NPS Divisions and 21 CRCs were realigned into 12 Probation Regions and housed within the Civil Service.

These changes to probation governance and practice can be seen in expectations for professional identity (re)formation. There is no accepted definition of “professional identity”, but Obling’s review of the literature identifies three ways in which it is understood. The first sees identity as constructed through a process of professional socialisation. This refers to the acquisition of knowledge, skills, qualifications, and values as crucial to shaping how to differentiate between professionals and non-professionals. Second, professional identity is not fixed or immutable. Hence, work role transitions concern internal transformations of professional identity, which can be prompted by new training programmes, workplace structures, or career development. Third, identities in context relates to how “environmental change” brought about by socio-economic and political changes can exert significant influence over professional identity formation. Taken together, Obling argues, a recognition of how macro- and meso-level forces interact and are enmeshed can produce more comprehensive understandings of how professional identity is (re)constructed.

Thus, with a particular emphasis on the unification of services, this paper analyses professional identity in probation. It maps the strands of the literature identified by Obling onto the service, tracing how the “extra-organizational forces” which influence probation governance and practice have contributed to a succession of organisational restructurings, with detrimental implications for professional identity. The paper contends that the nature and extent of the challenges probation faces have reshaped the service into which professionals are socialised. While an ideology of service predicated on helping clients remains a significant source of meaning for staff, recent reforms have contributed to a crisis of identity that has been decades in the making. The result is an increasingly “precarious” professionalism. As such, the paper’s contributions are twofold. First, it provides an ongoing commentary on the impact of the unification of probation services, from the perspectives of staff. Second, following adopting an approach which bridges macro-, meso-, and micro-level changes can enhance understandings of professional identity in probation and comparable (low status) professions.

The paper begins with an overview of the power (and precarity) of professions. Thereafter, following a brief outline of the study’s methodology, understandings of professional identity give structure to the data analysis. Identities in context explores how the service’s relative powerlessness renders it an easy target for political intervention. Work role transitions reports on staff experiences of recent organisational reform – namely, TR and the unification of services. Finally, professional socialisation scrutinises the service into which new staff enter, arguing that professional identity in probation is increasingly precarious.

Professions, power, and precariousness

The legitimacy of professions depends, in part, upon the extent to which they can demonstrate “commitment to the public good”. Professions able to successfully present themselves as in service to broader societal benefit can acquire social, economic, and political power, and thereby guard against external interventions from the state or market competition. This claim as to public interest underpinned functionalist views of the reasons that professions should be considered different from other occupations. Would-be professions sought to acquire ideal-typical “professional” traits that marked them as distinct, such as a mastery of abstract knowledge, learned through prolonged education and training; capture of a particular activity, or activities, within the division of labour; and the ability to exercise considerable autonomy over how everyday tasks are undertaken. Ultimately, though, the most important trait was a client-centred ideology of service which not only communicated a profession’s altruistic social function, but also kept the potentially self-serving interests of members in check.

While later, neo-Weberian views of the professions took issue with the altruism that pervades functionalist understandings, there was nonetheless consensus on how occupations that are able to successfully lay claim to professional status cultivate a space between the state and the market. Scholars writing from this perspective asserted that professions utilise the jurisdiction granted by the state to manipulate the market to realise higher social and economic gains relative to laypeople. Hence, the claim central to neo-Weberian interpretations is that professional power is leveraged for self-interest: professions compete with others adjacent to their jurisdiction to preserve, maintain, and ultimately capitalise on their legitimacy, often at the expense of their clients. The more social, economic, and political resources a profession can command, the better it can resist extraneous interference.

And yet, not all professions benefit from such power and privilege. The extent to which a group can profit from claims to professional status depends upon its relationships with its “audiences”, such as the state, clients, and the public. Here, Johnson’s distinction between “collegiate” and “mediative” control over work can be used to show how professions can flourish under different modes of organisation. A collegiate model refers to how members of some professions are able to organise themselves. The medical profession in the US has typically provided an archetype of “collegiate” organisation: the state grants licence to practise; members are then able to restrict entry into the profession, while providing a service to fee-paying clients. By contrast, mediative professions thrived under Keynesian political economy. This model emphasises state intervention in the professional-client relationship: services are funded by the state; and clients, who are often involuntary, cannot typically withdraw their purchasing power. These professions, like social work and nursing, are often located in the public sector, staffed predominantly by women, and underpinned by an ethic of care; they are generally “multichance”, for a certain degree of “failure” must be tolerated. This means that trust, both public and political, in a profession’s knowledge and methods is more difficult to establish than, say, in the case of surgeons, whose credibility is directly linked to their ability to prevent (somatic) failure. This dependency upon the state renders mediative professions’ legitimacy more precarious, and thus less able to resist external interventions.

The Probation Service in England and Wales, Tidmarsh argues, is one such mediative, “multichance” profession. From its origins in the Church of England Temperance Society, it established exclusive jurisdiction over the supervision of offenders in the community in the first half of the twentieth century. As such, probation underwent a process of professionalisation: practitioners were trained in social work knowledge and entrusted by the state to work autonomously in diagnosing individuals’ problems and proposing solutions. Staff, in other words, were socialised into a service defined by a “medical” casework model and underpinned by the words “advise, assist, befriend”, which constituted probation’s (rehabilitative) ideology of service. While probation has always been plagued by accusations that it is “soft on crime” relative to institutions like the prison, its knowledge, methods, and values were largely shielded from public scrutiny for most of the twentieth century. What was viewed as being in the best interests of people on probation – namely, rehabilitation – was also considered to be in the best interests of taxpayers. This state-sanctioned confidence in the service enabled it to grow in the postwar period: between 1951 and 1981, the number of full-time, qualified officers increased from 1,000 to 5,500 while its caseload tripled from 55,000 to 157,000.

However, against the backdrop of sustained increases in the crime rate, which quadrupled between 1955 and 1974, probation’s social and economic utility began to be questioned. This challenge can be seen as part of a wider shift in the 1970s, in which neo-Weberian criticisms of professional power became overlaid with critiques of the paternalistic role of the Keynesian state. Mediative professions were criticised on the grounds that their methods were ineffective. for example, alleged that for professions like probation, a failure to reduce the size of the criminal justice system in the postwar period served as a justification for their continued expansion. Thus, the legitimacy of the postwar penal welfare compromise, of which probation was a fundamental part, was challenged by the New Left and a politically ascendant New Right. For the former, penal welfarism was coercive and hierarchical, unreceptive to the needs of particular individuals and communities. For the latter, the costs of administering criminal justice services premised on rehabilitation and perceived to be ineffective during a decade defined by fiscal crises was detrimental to the taxpayer. Despite their ideological differences, at the heart of both perspectives was a distrust of the state and professionals, and the contention that “their power must be checked”. This highlights probation’s precariousness as a profession – a point that is developed below with regard to the decades-long challenge to the service’s knowledge, methods, values, and governance structure.

Identities in context: probation and extra-organisational change

With regard to the legitimacy of professions, Moorhead asks, “[d]oes there come a point at which professions can no longer satisfy their audiences that they meet their needs?” This question is relevant to the Probation Service following the collapse of the Keynesian postwar state. The election to government of Margeret Thatcher’s Conservative Party, in 1979, marked the key turning point. Her political project was predicated on neoliberal ideology, or the belief that individual freedoms are directly linked to free and unregulated markets. Amidst a wave of privatisations in the 1980s, public services which were not transferred to the market were instead subjected to the principles of New Public Management – specifically, a prioritisation of economy, efficiency, and effectiveness in service delivery. Thus, where a profession’s worth historically rested upon its ability to demonstrate superior competence and ethicality, for professionals working in the public sector, the neoliberal reorganisation of the state accentuated economic criteria of legitimacy.

Political economic shifts have also prompted questions of the audience(s) to whom probation must demonstrate its legitimacy, with significant implications for its professional project. Here, “the public” are typically expressed as taxpayers and as potential victims. Both are captured in Robinson et al.’s analysis of the penal “adaptations” which have informed probation policy and practice since the 1980s. For example, a managerial adaptation witnessed the pursuit of greater accountability via new rules and regulatory frameworks. Part of a wider neoliberal agenda which sought to curb professional autonomy, targets were introduced in probation in 1988, with performance monitored via an expanded culture of audit. This was followed, in 1995, by the severance of probation from social work training requirements for practice, a “repudiation [that] was much more about connotation and political tone than substance”.

Managerial practices have been accompanied by a punitive “adaptation” which promised “tough on crime” approaches, particularly after the 1990s. This can be seen in the language used around probation policy. For example, the words “advise, assist, befriend” were removed from official probation documents from 1992 onwards. Espousing greater punitiveness was key to the election of the (New) Labour Party to Government in 199, and Canton notes how a 1998 House of Commons Home Affairs Select Committee “deplored” the use of terms like “client” and “probationer”. Indeed, in 2008, Jack Straw, then Secretary of State in the newly established Ministry of Justice, bragged that “Probation officers now routinely talk of the criminals they are dealing with as “offenders”, which is what they are, and not the euphemistic nonsense of “clients”, when the client is the victim and the tax-paying public”. His comments highlight the confluence of punitive and managerial adaptations in how, and to whom, the state expects probation to demonstrate its legitimacy. They also illustrate the contempt with which the service is sometimes discussed in political discourses, rendering it an easy target for intervention. Probation is largely “invisible” it enters the public eye not for its successes, but for its failures – namely, serious further offences. The presentation of these tragic, often fatal incidents, and thus of the service, is accentuated by the so-called “undeserving” and nature of its clientele:
In the health service, you get doctors who do the wrong thing, but you don’t get the health minister playing the blame game. In health, in the police, they feel less blamed. I think that’s because we do the work nobody else does. We work with the so-called undeserving, somebody who has done wrong, and therefore we’re under a higher level of scrutiny. (RPD4)
The increased “scrutiny” under which probation operates has coincided with two significant demographic changes in probation. First, the abolition of social work training requirements prompted a significant increase in lesser qualified PSOs, who constituted the majority of frontline practitioners by 2012. Second, having historically been dominated by men, probation has experienced “feminisation”. A “gender switchover” – the moment at which women outnumbered men – occurred in 2006, and women now comprise 76.4% of probation staff has recently linked these demographic changes to “cultural dynamics of feminisation” in which an influx of women into a profession is typically accompanied by worsening pay and working conditions. This is not to present a causal link between women and a diminished professional project, but rather, to emphasise their overrepresentation in professions like social work and nursing. That these professions, like probation are predicated on care for non-fee-paying clients means their virtues are disconsonant with market-like mechanisms through which the success of neoliberal public services is demonstrated.

The consequences of macro-level, “extra-organizational forces” can be further seen in changing professional identity in probation. Mawby and Worrall’s typology of occupational narratives identified three ideal-typical profiles of probation staff. Lifers, they argue, were social work trained and most likely to view their job as a vocation. Second careerists entered into the service after a considerable period of employment in another, often unrelated occupation; some were social work trained, but others joined after its abolition as a requirement for practice. Finally, offender managers joined after the election of the New Labour Government in 1997. There was little resonance amongst this group with social work culture; they were, instead, “security-conscious” and generally comfortable with the technologies and practices of risk assessment compared to lifers and second careerists. Indeed, the logic of risk now dominates practice; it is both “a language through which probation could frame its work with offenders and a knowledge base on which staff could draw to evidence decision-making”. And yet, despite these differences, Mawby and Worrall conclude that these groups are united by a shared value set based on commitment to the client and a desire to engender change amongst the less fortunate. This claim is supported by research on the “durability” of a client-centred ideology of service. Studies of probation training, for example, have emphasised that while staff express frustrations with the managerial nature of probation work, there is consensus of why people enter the service – namely, because of a desire to work in a people-oriented profession. This highlights the importance of an ideology of service to professional identity in probation, particularly as a buffer against efforts to reshape its organisational culture.

As such, it is possible to identify several major environmental changes that have impacted probation’s professional project since the 1980s. Public ignorance about probation, largely unfavourable media representation, and the political capital made from its “undeserving” client base has rendered, and continues to render, the service vulnerable to state interference. This powerlessness has manifested in the turbulence that has marked the recent history of probation:
I think a big challenge is the complexity of our working environment – which I think, genuinely, we overcomplicate sometimes. Trying to navigate those pressures – the financial, the political, the operational – is difficult. (RPD1) 
Where, previously, ideal-typical professional tenets like social work training, practitioner autonomy, and an ideology of service were crucial to legitimacy and identity in probation, the service is now predicated on a regimen of risk management and managerial regulation. Indeed, countering this shift towards managerialism was at the heart of the Coalition Government’s implementation of TR. Part of the wider adoption of austerity measures which followed a reconfiguration of the 2007/08 financial crisis as one of government overspending, these reforms accelerated the decades-long challenge to professional subjectivities in probation. The impact of TR and the subsequent unification of services on staff is explored in more depth below.

Identities in transition? Probation and organisational reform

The financial, political, and operational challenges described by RPD1, above, have driven and been exacerbated by work role transitions. The most destabilising of these restructurings was Transforming Rehabilitation (TR), which split services between a publicly-owned NPS and 21 privately-owned CRCs, in 2014. The reforms were initiated, in part, to “unlock … professionalism” (MoJ) in probation. Part of a wider critique of public sector efficiency, the Coalition Government argued that state-run services were excessively bureaucratic, dominated by a regime of targets and audit that stifled effective performance. The innovations only market provision could generate, by contrast, would empower probation professionals with the discretion to reduce reoffending and the costs of criminal justice.

A comprehensive autopsy of the failures of TR is beyond the scope of this paper, but suffice to say that interlinked cultural and structural issues became insurmountable. On culture, studies of the transition to the private sector provide found overwhelming opposition to TR as staff identified resolutely with a public sector ethos. This suggests that attempts to promote entrepreneurial “narratives of self” through organisational reform were successfully resisted, a point further evidenced in this current study. Such cultural resistance to TR was exacerbated by structural failings in how the contracts were set up (NAO). Contrary to how the Coalition Government presented the market as a means to activate professionalism, the reforms merely entrenched the importance of meeting performance targets. As PO2 put it:
The main thing is, the CRCs had to hit targets to get paid. […] There was a massive difference, a separation, between quality assessments and performance; the two didn’t meet.
This focus on metrics was further heightened by lower than anticipated caseloads. Fewer individuals allocated to the CRCs by the courts resulted in a combined £1.4bn shortfall against the initial £3.7bn promised to private providers (HMI Probation). Many CRCs responded with redundancy programmes, which not only increased individual caseloads for those who remained but also intensified target-driven, “box-ticking” practice (HMI Probation). Accordingly, HMI Probation’s conclusion that TR contributed to “deplorable diminution of the probation profession” was echoed by PSO11, whose summary of the impact of the reforms can be taken as evidence of an increasingly precarious professional identity:
Prior to the privatisation, we were very proud of the fact that we were a public sector organisation that delivered a very specific and significant, very specialist service. I think the roots of where the Probation Service came from were still visible and were still quite obvious to any member of staff and especially new staff coming in. […] I’m afraid that my opinion is that it’s all been eroded because of what happened through the privatisation.
One of the most consistent findings within probation research in recent decades is the persistence of a client-centred ideology of service. Staff, as argued above, have successfully mobilised such values as a way to “grasp the nettle”, to make sense of practice with reference to the profession rather the organisation. The period of TR was no exception: despite considerable opposition to the reforms, most staff could be described as guardians of probation identity. This view was summarised by PO3:
If we didn’t have the passion for the job, it would be easy for us to walk out and double our salaries in the private sector. We’ll always go back for more; it’s the way we’re built. The one thing we have in common is that we believe in the work. (my emphasis)
What could be interpreted in positive terms, as an ideology of service that willingly places the care of individuals above all else could equally represent the normalisation of overworking in probation. This raises questions about the impact of yet another work role transition on professional identity (re)construction.

Since the “unification” of services in June 2021, PO3’s contention that staff will “always go back for more” has been undermined by the confluence of challenges which continue to besiege the service. Staff feel “overworked, understaffed, [and] underpaid” (PSO2) – claims that are borne out in the national data. For example, while caseloads vary by Probation Region, a survey of 1,534 probation staff conducted by HMI Probation found that 51% thought their workloads were “not so manageable”. The challenge presented by high caseloads is compounded by staffing levels. The extent of frontline practitioner vacancies did not become known until unification – in large part because commercial confidentiality laws meant CRCs were not required to disclose data on staffing – but the evidence points to a “retention crisis.” As of June 2024, 2,357 people left the service in the previous 12 months, an increase of 10.6% on the previous year. M2 reflected upon the impact of staffing shortages, which she attributed to the continuance of managerial adaptions:
We’ve struggled with staffing levels that I’ve never experienced in any job. Everything was cut to the bone and trying to manage the cases appropriately and still maintain the community links and find the work … it’s been really tough. People have got to have the time and the headspace to supervise the teams, do the community liaison, and actually motivate people to attend. It’s all been about meeting deadlines, meeting time limits, and just chasing targets that are completely unrealistic.
This contention that staffing “was cut to the bone” could apply to numerous public services during a period defined by the politics of austerity; however, there is evidence that budgetary pressures have been felt more acutely in probation than in comparable professions. For example, many of the professionals to whom informants compared themselves – such as police officers and NHS staff – have seen pay increases of approximately 15% since 2010  – but pay in probation has largely been stagnant, with just a 1% increase in real terms over the same period:
People realise that they can get more stacking shelves for less stress. I think, even now, you know, people haven’t had a pay rise again; the unions are trying to argue again, but they never seem to be able to argue what we’re worth. If they manage to argue a 3% pay rise, everyone will be like, “great, what does that mean in real terms?” The cost of living is soaring – food, electricity, petrol – so, actually, we’re taking a pay cut: it’s horrendous. (PSO7)
The comparison to “stacking shelves” resonates with similar research. It should not be read as an attempt to belittle retail work, but rather, as a way to emphasise that the pay is “not commensurate with the weight of responsibilities upon the shoulders of probation staff”. This points, then, to a sense of demise among probation staff in this study, of identity in crisis. As M6 summarised:
It’s sad because I don’t see the profession that we had before, I think it’s been decimated. I don’t want to be depressing, but I really do. I think it’s been decimated. It needs to be redone, rebuilt.
Accordingly, recent work role transitions in the form of top-down, organisational restructurings have surfaced longstanding concerns, around caseloads and the pervasiveness of managerialism. The findings presented in this section point to a heightened sense of precarity regarding how staff understand their work. This raises questions about the culture of the service into which new staff enter, which are explored in the next section through the lens of professional socialisation.

Identity and socialisation: the “enculturation” of probation staff

Professional socialisation entails the acquisition of the knowledge, qualifications, values, and practices which differentiate professionals from non-professionals. It typically occurs through training and exposure to the established working cultures and practices of other professionals, thereby contributing to a collective sense of identity. In a probation context, Robinson refers to this process as “enculturation” – that is, how “new members acquire the norms, values, behaviours and other tools of [a] particular culture”. However, these facets of identity formation have been challenged by successive governments and codified within numerous organisational restructurings. Despite claims to the contrary, recent reforms have served only to bring longstanding problems to the surface, particularly with regard to caseloads and poor retention rates. This raises questions about the nature of the service into which staff are socialised and, by extension, how they construct their professional identity. Hence, this final section explores the enculturation of probation staff, including the roles played by Practice Tutor Assessors (PTAs) and Senior Probation Officers (SPOs) – two groups that are important to the socialisation of frontline practitioners.

As acknowledged above, one of the most consistently observed findings within probation research is the persistence of a value base which foregrounds the importance of non-judgemental approach to those who have offended and a belief in the capacity of individuals to change. Staff, in M2’s terms, share an “underlying moral compass”
If you talk to people in probation, they all have – no matter how they present as characters and personalities – this underlying moral compass of not only wanting to see that justice is done and people are dealt with appropriately but also to make a difference and get those difference and get those people off the paths they’re currently on. […] I do think that people who work in probation have this desire to care, to change the way the wheel is turning for some people.
Her allusion to care-based practice means probation can be located alongside comparable (low status) professions, such as nursing and social work. Accordingly, this current study supports a substantial body of research on why people work in probation. It suggests that an ideology of service underpinned by a desire to work with people to motivate change is the most significant factor in professional identity formation, one that cuts across experience and job role:
… to work with offenders to help them improve their lives in effect, in some shape or form. I think that for me is the main common denominator. So, thinking of my colleagues, those who have left, those new ones who have joined, a big one is they want to improve people’s lives. (PSO4)
… it’s about social justice, the path we walk, where we find ourselves – just being able to have a temperament to work with people. They’ve been judged, so there’s no point in judging them; I just want to help them. (RPD4)
PSO4’s reference to new entrants into the service is particularly important given the challenges of retention identified in the previous section, and the subsequent need to recruit staff. According to the latest HMPPS Workforce Statistics Bulletin, of the 1,047 frontline practitioners that joined the service in the year-end June 2024, the overwhelming majority (95%) entered at PSO grade. Just over half (n = 543) of these new staff are enrolled on the Professional Qualification in Probation (PQiP), completion of which is prerequisite for qualifying as a PO. The PQiP is comprised of an academic component located in a university and on-the-job learning, which includes managing a (reduced) caseload. Newer staff who had recently completed (PO5) or were enrolled on (PSO2) or the PQiP at the time of interview were generally positive about their experience, but also commented on its intensity:
At some points, it became overwhelming, especially at the end when you have deadlines and you’re expected to deal with higher risk cases. But it did give me a theoretical underpinning to the work that I needed to do. For me, it was a good experience overall – I just recognise that there were some really intense periods. (PO5)
It’s intense, is one word to describe it. It’s just a lot. It is manageable and my SPOs are happy to be flexible with deadlines; but with deadlines for work and deadlines for uni, it’s, urgh, a lot. (PSO2)
PSO2’s emphasis on “deadlines” highlights the dual pressures under which trainee POs operate, as individuals who manage a caseload alongside undertaking education and training. It suggests how both an ability to demonstrate the acquisition of knowledge via university assessment and to meet performance targets, part the neoliberal demand for accountability which has reconfigured practice in recent decades, are crucial to professional socialisation into probation. The latter, in particular, reflects a “narrative of efficiency” by which identity among public sector professionals has been reshaped. This further underscores the shift towards working with “things” over “people”, manifest in greater administrative responsibilities. As PTA2 put it:
The biggest difficulty about the job – and they’re all graduates, right? None of these kids are stupid and they’ve gone through a ton of hoops to get into the service – is they arrive into the service and go, “what, I’m not seeing anyone?” […] I think that individuality of care has been lost to the administration side of things. That’s why I think people have completely left the service, because of the amount of time people spend staring at their screens. (my emphasis)
PTA2’s role entails inducting new staff, observing them as they begin to undertake interviews with clients, and assessing their practice skills. He is, in other words, responsible for socialising new recruits into the culture and practices of the service. Tensions between with the time spent with people relative to time spent behind computers have long defined new starters’ experiences, but PTA2’s above comment suggests that unification has exacerbated the conflict between probation’s ideology of service and managerial administration, contributing to problems of retention. This culture, he argued, is dominated by the logic of risk, which prioritises proficient “typists” over “people-people”:
I really want more time to be spent between probation officer and client, face-to-face, in the room, and not feeling under any pressure to have to get out of the room to go and write about them. I think, when we get to that point, we’ll have people coming into this job who are not administrators, they’re not great typists – they’re people-people.
As such, PTA2 sees his role as training practitioners in the hope that they will have the time to realise a client-centred ideology of service:
We’re training people for the future possible, in the hope that they will go back to seeing clients properly, for an hour at a time, weekly.
The present reality, though, is of a service that is overwhelmed, not just at practitioner level but also at the level of management. Like PTAs, SPOs are crucial to the process of enculturation. The role was integral to the professionalisation of probation in the postwar period: established via the Probation Rules of 1949, SPOs provided a measure of oversight over practitioners whilst ensuring that complex cases were managed by an individual with the appropriate skills and experience. For PTA3 (a former SPO), however, the role has changed markedly in recent decades:
… the SPO role has changed dramatically from when I first qualified, when it was about case supervision. Now, it’s about performance management. I think that’s what senior probation officers should be doing: they should be working with people on their cases. The HR function, the performance function, should be done by a different role or grade.
This response speaks to both quantitative and qualitative shifts. SPOs should be both the “manager and developer of frontline probation practitioners”. Present workloads, however, mean they are unable to give sufficient support to their staff. Qualitatively, the tasks that fall within SPOs’ remit have expanded, as understaffing has meant that “their focus is too often on non-operational tasks” (HMI Probation). Quantitatively, then, this increase in the volume of work has reduced the time SPOs are able to spend with their staff. Both shifts were emphasised by SM1:
If we had more staff, [SPOs] could do more. We also have quality development officers; but the problem is, because we’re so understaffed, they’re used elsewhere to plug operational staff. So, it comes down to the SPOs, many of whom have got large teams. They haven’t got the capacity to do what they’d like to do.
One of the consequences of these staffing pressures is that practitioners are able to move into management roles more quickly than has previously been possible in probation. Here, there are parallels between the post-unification Probation Service and Healy’s research on children’s social workers in Australia. She argued that “low status and poor working conditions” which stemmed in large part from a societal ambivalence towards caring profession, contribute to high staff turnover and an inexperienced workforce. This inexperience was felt higher up the managerial hierarchy, for newly qualified social workers were quickly promoted into decision-making roles and, once there, discovered that workload pressures impinge upon their ability to develop the structures “to support a largely novice casework workforce”. Such concerns were articulated by PSO12, who reflected on what she saw as a “new breed” of SPOs who had risen through the ranks too quickly:
I think people are moving up really, really quickly. A woman who was a PSO five years ago in [this region], she’s now an SPO. That’s quite a new thing. […] Here, there are two SPOs. One of them was highly thought of by colleagues because she got on with people. She’d come up through the ranks and had been a senior for a long time. Whereas the other one was more like the newer breed; she didn’t have a lot of time for staff, closed door all of the time, works from home. If you did have supervision, it’d be via Teams. The management isn’t as visible now as what it used to be. They don’t seem to be as hands on and have enough knowledge of all the processes and policies that are being churned out. (my emphasis)
PSO12 works in a rural office with just two SPOs. Her comparison cannot be extrapolated to the service at large nor, even, to practitioners in this study – most of whom were supportive towards SPOs and acknowledged the pressures they face – but others reported similar experiences. As PO4, who joined the service in 2020, summarised:
It’s difficult to allocate the time to spend to maybe reflect on practice, even in supervision. The time is limited. You can always tell when the SPO is clock-watching or thinking about those 50 emails that are in their inbox. […] You’re left to your own devices quite a lot, to be honest. Often, you can feel like you’re on your own on a little boat sailing. It can be unsettling, at times, when there’s lots going on – people going into crisis, all sorts of risks to manage. […] A lot of the time, I think a lot of people try to bottle it up and deal with it themselves.This response highlights how pressures upon SPOs in some regions can manifest in an absence of support. It suggests that, since unification, new staff in some regions are being socialised into an increasing atomised, “unsettling” probation culture – one that points to an increasingly precarious sense of professionalism and professional identity.
Conclusion

This paper has argued that probation staff in England and Wales are being socialised into a culture beset by multiple and interlinked challenges. It adds to a significant body of research on the persistence of a client-centred ideology of service which guides why individuals enter into probation, one that has proved relatively resistant to numerous (and damaging) restructurings. However, the ability to realise these values is being impaired by the confluence of staffing shortages, high workloads, and a regime of performance management, manifest in an increasingly “precarious” professional identity. The value of the paper, therefore, lies in its focus on professional identity (re)construction – specifically, how macro-level environmental shifts filter into meso-level work role transitions which, in turn, impact micro-level processes of how probation staff understand their work.

No profession has been exempted from the forces of neoliberalism; but the changes to the Probation Service described in this paper demonstrate how it has proved especially vulnerable to extraneous intervention, not least because of the low-status, involuntary nature of its clientele. The politicisation of these concerns from the late-1970s onwards accelerated demands for probation to display its punitive credentials. This extra-organisational change prompted the rise of managerialism: as caseloads increased, so did pressures on the service and its staff to manage the risks posed by clients – reconstituted as “offenders” – in more efficient and effective ways. Accordingly, while an ideology of service has not disappeared altogether, it has been tempered by the work role transitions extant within several organisational restructurings and changes to probation’s knowledge and methods.

The most damaging of the recent organisational reforms to probation was the TR, which brought many of the service’s underlying problems to the surface. Here, the emphasis placed by staff on care-based practice provides the clearest articulation of the best of probation work, and thus the findings typically associated with AI research. For the most part, though, staff were pessimistic about the service’s contemporary iteration. Ongoing staffing shortages are felt by practitioners, not only in terms of workloads but also in their socialisation. For new staff, two groups are key to this “enculturation”: PTAs and SPOs. The former prioritise educating staff in the knowledge and practices of risk management; the latter, many of whom were relatively inexperienced practitioners before progressing into the SPO role, are preoccupied with a culture of performance management.

The findings presented in this article have several implications for the future of probation. First, organisational reform has not alleviated the challenges experienced throughout the period of TR; indeed, since unification, problems of high caseloads and low morale have worsened. This suggests that further attempts at restructuring should be approached with caution. Second, the client-centred ideology of service espoused by staff in this study is testament to its durability, but it is not a sustainable base from which to rebuild the service. The pressures under which practitioners operate, manifest in a “retention crisis” hint at an atomised probation culture and an increasingly precarious professional identity. More, then, is needed from Government, both in terms of financial resources and political backing, if the trends towards precarity described in this paper are to be reversed. Third, investment in the service since unification has understandably been put to the recruitment of trainee POs, but other groups should also be prioritised. This article has highlighted the dual roles of SPOs, who are responsible for both performance management and case working elements of staff supervision; however, the former dominates over the latter. Rebalancing this asymmetry, or perhaps even splitting the quantitative and qualitative tasks between distinct SPO roles, could not only provide better role clarity but also help new practitioners to feel more confident in their practice.

Matt Tidmarsh
University of Leeds
Associate Professor in Criminal Justice

Areas of expertise: Probation; community sanctions and measures; sociology of the professions; organisational culture; offender rehabilitation; alternatives to custody

Sunday, 11 October 2026

What Voters Think

Thanks go once again to ace contibutor 'Getafix for truffling out an outfit I've never heard of before - Common Ground Justice Project - who claim to not only know what voters think is wrong with our criminal justice system, but what they think would fix it! This is one of my biggest takeaways:-
"Of key institutions, only the police narrowly retain majority confidence (51%) – with prisons (41%), probation (38%) and youth justice (33%) lowest."
Held to Account 
Understanding the crisis of public confidence in British criminal justice – and what voters want to change. 

Finding common ground on crime and justice 
With prisons full and reoffending high, the UK's criminal justice system isn’t working. Victims feel ignored and voters feel powerless. But a noisy, polarised debate on crime is getting in the way of change. The Common Ground Justice Project listens to the public across divides, finding common ground for a new way forward on criminal justice in the UK. We are an independent non-profit initiative, hosted by the Centre for Justice Innovation (UK charity no. 1151939)

What We Do
01 LISTEN ACROSS DIVIDES We conduct creative research and deep listening exercises across the UK, listening to voters, victims and communities who don’t feel heard.

02 FIND COMMON GROUND We uncover shared values and ideas on crime that cut across divides – uncovering a new way forward with broad public support.

03 SPARK BOLD ACTION We create a more constructive conversation on crime, shifting policy towards common ground solutions that cut crime and rebuild trust.

Foreword
I know what it means to be held to account. When I was 19, I threw a single punch that killed James Hodgkinson. I went to prison for manslaughter. It wasn't till years later, through restorative justice, that I sat down with James’s parents, Joan and David, and faced the harm I had caused in a much deeper way.

During that meeting there was no escaping that harm. Nor should there have been. Joan and David were able to tell me directly what my actions had done to them and their family. I had to listen, acknowledge it and take responsibility.

That process taught me something about justice that punishment alone never could. It gave me the motivation to completely change my life.

Joan and David still believe my sentence was too short. But over time, the question of accountability became about more than the length of my prison sentence: they wanted me to take responsibility for what I did and show that I had changed. Today, after helping me make that journey, they are senior advisers to the Common Ground Justice Project.

Our experience has taught me that justice is not necessarily a choice between consequences and rehabilitation, or between the needs of victims and perpetrators of crime. Acknowledging harm, giving victims a voice, taking responsibility, facing consequences and demonstrating change over time can all be part of holding someone properly to account.

It is one of the reasons I co-founded the Common Ground Justice Project along with Sam Boyd and Alice Dawnay. We shared a frustration that the debate on crime too often reduces complex questions to being “tough” or “soft”, pitting punishment against rehabilitation, and prioritising short-term point-scoring over long-term change. Our response was to start somewhere different: listening to people across the country who don’t feel heard.

The findings in this report suggest that Joan, David and I are far from unique in what we needed from the justice system. The British public want meaningful consequences – but also for people to own the harm they have caused, and change so they do not create more victims. And they want the system to be more accountable for delivering on its promises.

That core finding gives me hope: that when we really listen, the public are less divided about justice than our politics suggests. We hope this report encourages those in power to respond in kind: to put party politics aside and build the modern justice system that Britain deserves.

Jacob Dunne
Co-founder Common Ground Justice Project

Executive Summary
C H A PT E R 0 1 CRIME WITHOUT CONSEQUENCE
Understanding the crisis of confidence in British criminal justice 

Most Britons think crime usually has no consequence 
Fewer than one in five voters (18%) believe people who commit crimes usually face real consequences; half say consequences follow only occasionally or almost never. “Nothing happens” was a recurring refrain across our focus groups and interviews. Perceived lawlessness and unfairness in criminal justice appears to be contributing to a wider sense of national decline and erosion of trust in politics. 

Fear of victimhood is high, especially among young women 
Nearly two in three Britons (63%) expect to be a victim of crime within the next year, and one in three expects a violent or sexual crime. Fear of violence is concentrated among the young: over half of women under 35 (53%) expect to suffer a violent or sexual crime this year, as well as 39% of men under 35. These figures are roughly four times the actual rates of victimhood reported by the most recent Crime Survey for England and Wales, albeit this survey may underestimate actual victimhood on some crimes.

No core function of the justice system is rated well by a majority 
There is no function of the justice system a majority rates as doing a good job – just 22% say it does a good job of reducing crime, and only 38% of protecting the public. Of key institutions, only the police narrowly retain majority confidence (51%) – with prisons (41%), probation (38%) and youth justice (33%) lowest. The crisis of confidence in criminal justice appears to be feeding a wider sense of national decline and mistrust of politics. 

Underfunded, ineffective and unfair: the roots of mistrust 
Perceived leniency is only part of the reason for low confidence – voters point equally to underfunding, ineffective delivery and unfairness of treatment. Low confidence in prisons, probation and youth justice is mainly attributed to a failure to cut reoffending and lack of resources. Perceived unfairness is another key driver of mistrust, arising around questions of police treatment (66% believe policing is unequal by ethnicity, split evenly on who benefits), and inconsistency in sentencing. 

Voters want accountability to cut both ways 
Just as the public expects offenders to be better held accountable for their actions, they also want the system itself to be more accountable – for being fair, effective and honest. Broken promises and the cycle of crisis-response are seen as a system failing on its own terms and letting down victims, with every failure deepening the crisis of trust. 

The public want bold and balanced change 
Almost two in three Britons (62%) say the criminal justice system needs major changes – a demand spanning every party – with broad support for balancing punishment with rehabilitation and prevention. Keeping the public safe is clearly the top priority (87%), with youth services first in line for new spending. The public back bold but balanced change: a system that punishes but also treats and prevents crime.

C H A PT E R 0 2 ACCOUNTABILITY AS ‘OWNING, PAYING AND CHANGING’
Understanding what the public mean by accountability for crime

Punishment is seen as necessary but not sufficient for accountability 
Punishment is where many voters start, but only around one in ten lean towards the view that a served sentence delivers accountability on its own. Across five forms of accountability we tested – the '5 Rs' of repercussions, responsibility, repair, reform and reintegration – every one is rated important by at least 88%. The demand is 'punishment plus', not punishment alone.

Accountability as 'owning, paying and changing' 
The public see accountability as containing three key steps: owning the harm, paying for the harm, and changing behaviour. This is common ground that spans divides, and points the way towards justice reforms that will command widespread confidence. 

Responsibility is key – and the clearest common ground 
Accepting responsibility is the most widely endorsed form of accountability (96%) and the most unifying. On our 0–10 scale of importance, a tenth of a point separates Labour, Conservative, Reform and Lib Dem voters on this principle. But responsibility must be seen as genuine – demonstrated over time, not performed for a process. The public agree that taking responsibility includes engaging in treatment for addiction, where this is driving offending.

C H A PT E R 0 3 TACKLING PROLIFIC OFFENDING 
A case study of delivering accountability in practice 

Frequency of offending increases demand for punishment – but not at the cost of rehabilitation In response to repeat offending, the public raise their demands for punishment, but not at the cost of rehabilitation. Prison rises from the least popular response to a first offence (17%) to the top response once offending is repeat and organised (61%). Yet rehabilitative responses remain popular: compensation or unpaid work stays near 60% support, while treatment and help into work also stay high. Voters mostly want both. 

The role of addiction increases support for treatment – but not at the cost of punishment 
Told that repeat offending is driven by homelessness and addiction, support for treatment jumps 19 points to 73% and becomes the clear winner among every party’s voters – but support for prison never falls below 43%. Empathy is evident and reduces the demand for punishment, but it does not remove support for clear repercussions.

‘Punishment plus’ policy packages win broadest support 
In our conjoint experiment, eight of the ten most popular policy combinations to address prolific offending paired a clear consequence with treatment or visible repair. 'Punishment plus' consistently performed better than 'punishment only', while rehabilitation-only packages performed the worst. When it comes to community sentences and diversion, the public is mostly supportive; their biggest concern is not leniency but underfunding and ineffective delivery by overstretched public services.

C H A PT E R 0 4 CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
Summary of recommendations for politicians, policymakers and campaigners 

This report concludes that rebuilding trust demands accountability that cuts both ways: for people who commit crime to be held to account for their actions, and a justice system that's held to account for honest and effective delivery. Our research suggests the public is less divided than political debate often implies – and political pointscoring on crime risks obscuring the common ground that does exist. Seven recommendations follow, for policymakers and campaigners in criminal justice: 

1. Ensure consequences and public safety are the foundation – reassurance here is what creates permission for bold action on rehabilitation and prevention. 

2. Focus on accountability and responsibility to reach across divides - responsibility is the clearest common ground, while punishment is a popular but more divisive frame. Policies which recognise this will win broad support. 

3. Restore visible consequences for prolific and low-level crime – everyday crime that visibly goes unaddressed is driving the confidence crisis and needs urgent action. 

4. Improve communication and honesty with victims and the public – say what sentences mean, follow through, and tell victims what happened in their case. 

5. Strengthen and amplify community justice – make non-custodial sentences more robust, more visible and clearly evidenced; scepticism is mostly about the system’s capacity to deliver, not leniency.

6. Make recovery from addiction central to tackling prolific offending – getting the balance of consequence and high-quality treatment right for this group is where the public's demand for 'punishment plus' can work in practice. 

7. Develop a cross-party 10-year plan for justice – politicians should respond to public frustration by working together across parties on a long-term approach to fixing the criminal justice system: a plan built on pragmatic 'common ground' solutions.

Saturday, 10 October 2026

The Job Used to Have Integrity

As news comes in of the latest derisory pay offer - with strings of course - anger is spreading within the ranks ahead of the Napo AGM next week and there's serious talk of strike action. We've been here before of course over recent years, but things are a bit different now because many of the traditional 'vocational' cohort have left and been replaced with newer recruits with very different views on the job and their approach and loyalty to it. I saw this yesterday:-

"I don't get this argument, 20 years ago it worked. The world has changed in 20 years, adapt. Sure, the current OFPS is a shambles, but we live in a different world and let's be honest, we treat most criminals like victims and completely ignore actual victims of crime.

Clearly a 2 stage Probation is needed, help those who want help and give longer sentences to the problematic cases who bung up the justice system. Accountability is long gone and we seek to blame anyone but the individual."

I'm increasingly coming to the view that if government will not listen to evidence and argument about the probation service because of the political risks that even Andy Burnham has been persuaded precludes investigation and the previously promised independent Review (The Labour government committed in its 2024 general election manifesto to carry out a strategic review of probation governance and evaluate the benefits of devolved models), then maybe it might only take a catastrophic collapse instead to prompt any action. Even the public are getting tired of the "£700 million" and "1,300 new officers" bullshit responses to all questions because there's a huge hole in the bucket with more staff exiting than arriving. 

With all this in mind, lets take a look at what officers were saying 10 years ago in the Guardian. Of course many things have changed, but does anyone seriously think things have improved?   

'The job used to have integrity': readers on Britain's probation services

We asked those working in probation services across the UK to tell us how they have been affected since the 2014 privatisation

An official review into the failing performance of the government’s privatisation of the probation service, has been called for by justice secretary Liz Truss.

The probation service was split in 2014 into 21 private community rehabilitation companies (CRCs) and a public National Probation Service (NPS), replacing the former 35 probation trusts. Truss told MPs on Tuesday that the review into the performance of the privatised probation companies would be finished by April and would include measures to improve the service. The announcement came after highly critical reports by the chief inspector of probation, Dame Glenys Stacey, found companies struggled to deliver the supervision of 250,000 offenders a year.

We asked people working in probation services in the UK for their views and experiences. From low morale among staff to excessive case loads, and unsuitable risk assessments, here’s what some of them said.

Working for the publicly owned NPS: ‘Staff have no faith in leadership’

The probation trusts we used to have were rooted in localism and worked closely with partner organisations such as the police, social care and the health service. But all those relationships have been put under strain by the arrogant attitude emanating from Whitehall. Staff still believe in the job they do but have no faith in leadership.

The recent staff survey information indicated that just 3% thought that the NPS had made improvements - I think that says it all. As we’re such a small organisation we won’t get the headlines that problems in the prison service get but if things go wrong with us, the consequences for the public could be even greater.

Neil

‘I suffered burnout and am now on unpaid leave’

Nobody is receiving the service they should and it has become too difficult to do a good job. People are leaving and sickness levels due to stress and depression are high - it is not uncommon for people to cry at their desks.

I have been qualified as an officer for 11 years and have a range of experience, from prison work to managing a team of probation officers. However, I had a period of sick leave due to depression and am now on unpaid leave. Direct line managers and colleagues were generally supportive but despite that I have suffered burnout. I am now travelling around Europe in a motorhome with my children!

Alison

Public protection within the NPS: ‘Staff are inexperienced, inadequately trained and very poorly paid’

We’re supposed to offer a service where high risk offenders (while on licence) are directed to reside in places where they can be monitored before being released into the community, but it’s staffed with people who are inexperienced, inadequately trained and very poorly paid. How does that facilitate public protection?

It’s been awful from the word go but I wanted to stick it out and learn something new. I’d never worked in probation before. However after almost ten years I handed in my resignation on Monday. I’ve learnt a great deal. I’ve really enjoyed the work and helping people change their lives is great. Human behaviour is very interesting and although the public might not understand probation and what it does (which is probation’s fault) all of these offenders have been victims at one time too. Society is very ill. A philosopher once said: ‘Society gets the criminals it deserves,’ and that it does.

Simone

‘Excessive case loads are putting public protection at risk’

I have been a probation officer for 11 years and supervise male offenders predominately for domestic violence offences. Before privatisation I worked in a team of 11 and had a case load of between 40-50 offenders. Now I am in a team of 7 and have a caseload of 70.

I am supposed to assess their risk and compile a community sentence plan (this is where we look at the needs of the offender and work to improve their situation whilst reducing their risk. For example someone who becomes violent when drunk will need alcohol intervention as well as help addressing the reasoning behind violence such as power and control, or anger management). In the current political climate many offenders have mental health issues and there is no longer any provision for this issue as the CRC has disbanded the mental health cohort. We also find many of our clients have housing issues and benefit sanctions.

Before privatisation we used to see offenders weekly for a minimum of 16 weeks and each session would last at least a minimum of an hour. In doing so we would build a positive rapport and a thorough analysis of the offender, their needs and their risk. Now we have too many offenders and not enough time. I see my offenders on average for 20 minutes once a month. There is no minimum requirement and our managers encourage us constantly to see them less and sign post them more which is a false fallacy as community services are scarce and stretched.

Public protection is at risk here with excessive case loads but no one is monitoring this and managers do not care. We are robustly managed to hit targets but are totally missing the point. I want to resign. My job has become a tick box exercise. The people I see are damaged and often dangerous, with violent backgrounds or mental health issues and need support.

David

Custody within a CRC: ‘There have been a number of totally inaccurate and inappropriate risk assessments’

I’m a custody probation officer and my job is effectively the ‘motto’ of probation: protect the public, rehabilitate the offender, and enforce the law. Public protection means assessing the risks (of harm and re-offender) of any particular prisoner. Rehabilitate the offender (ideally) means ensuring they receive the most appropriate work to address their offending. Enforce the law means ensuring an offender (whether on a community order or on a prison licence) abided to his or her conditions.

Prison officers are few and far between, so we have to find one who has time and energy to unlock a prisoner so we can do some work. In the past, a prisoner making a request would have it dealt with appropriately. These days, I could receive umpteen emails, phone calls or being collared while out and about the prison, to tell me a prisoner needed to speak to me.

With regards to CRCs - half the time we don’t have up-to-date contact information, so cannot phone or email an outside officer for whatever reason. There have been a number of totally inaccurate and inappropriate risk assessments.

Lots of people who do front-line work are having long periods of sick leave. If these stressed people stay in their jobs, they’re not going to be as effective as they should be, or once were. The whole system is collapsing and we’re just letting it happen.

Nemo

Enforcement within a CRC: ‘I have given up trying to defend the indefensible’

We have lost experienced officers who would rather take redundancy than work in a job they are now ashamed of. I prosecute breaches - when anyone bothers to take any action - and am constantly having to try and explain to the courts why offenders have not been seen for months. I have given up trying to defend the indefensible. If victims of crime knew that even the paltry sentences handed down are not even carried out, how do you think they would feel? The government tells us crime is going down (which is nonsense), people just do not even bother to report it.

Taylor

Working in a senior attendance centre for a CRC: ‘I was transferred in 2014 and am yet to have any job specific training’

I have been in my current role for 12 years but directly under government bodies, and was transferred to a CRC in August 2014. My role is predominantly working face to face with low to medium risk service users and ensuring they report regularly to the centre. Myself and other colleagues have yet to have any job specific training other then a few hours being shown a few key things on their database. I have received no training in relation to health and safety. I have very little contact with supervising officers to find out how their service users are complying with their orders, and there are so many probation officers with unsafe case levels to manage.

As for the companies interest or obligation for my welfare, it is practically nonexistent. I have had one appraisal six months after I transferred, and three different line managers! I have now been told that redundancy for me is very likely, as they are attempting to make what was once a thriving sentencing option into a skeleton service.

Sophie

Victim services within a CRC: ‘Victims are lost in the system and the reason why offenders are on probation is forgotten’

If you are a victim of crime you would like to believe that the offender will be held to account and required to complete the sentence set out at court. This is not the case - because we work in a target driven culture. The emphasis is to get the offender through the order so it can be viewed as a successful completion - and to achieve this probation officers are expected to do whatever they can. So in reality there are no national standards, you cannot breach anyone and you can’t recall anyone - offenders rule the service.

Previously an offender could have two missed appointments before they would be in breach and taken back to court now offenders get through their orders hardly setting foot in an office. Telephone calls are now classed as appointments, and any requirements such as programmes are overlooked, if they don’t want to do it then on the whole they don’t have to. We are expected to do anything and overlook everything in order to get a successful completion. The word public protection used to be the core of probation but now it’s not even considered.

The job used to have integrity, but now we are at the mercy of people who don’t actually care about victims or potential victims. Instead they are lost in the system and the very reason why offenders are on probation is forgotten.

Emmy

Working in resettlement in a CRC: ‘Before privatisation I would have been supervised by managers’

I am a probation practitioner which involves risk assessment, and going out to prison wings to interview prisoners for accommodation, benefits, finances, relationships, health and wellbeing, and behaviour. We then action the issues they have, always bearing in mind the risk posed to the public. As you can imagine some prisoners have a multitude of issues. We then have to try and find the allocated officer in the community, which is difficult now as splitting the service has made this a very tiring and arduous task.

Before the split I would have had the support of managers including supervision. Now it is nonexistent and we are expected to run innumerable caseloads. We have to offer the above support services knowing they are not working. We have been de-skilled as officers due to not having support with what we are supposed to be delivering in custody, such as interventions. We are not coping with the changes that the government have imposed and hand-in-hand with the current state of the prison, police and our service, I am fearful of the future. I am afraid for the public given that prisoners are leaving without appropriate services in place, with one of the worst hit areas being mental health. I am very aware of people leaving custody with no support because there is none.

DP

Support from the courts: ‘Clients are released with nothing and appear back in court for food theft’

I work in a criminal court team. I write sentencing reports, cover criminal sentencing courts and provide information to the courts about any current cases. I interview individuals and then provide a proposal for sentence. I am supposed to look at risk levels and ways to reduce reoffending, ways to rehabilitate and ways to keep known persons and the public safe. This is nigh on impossible when we don’t even know what privately run companies are actually providing. Our team has had seven different managers over the last two years. Staff moral is at an all time low.

We basically lie when proposing sentences in our reports. We tell judges and magistrates that particular lines of work will be done when in reality, clients are never seen and go weeks without appointments. Drug and alcohol services are nigh on useless and it takes weeks to set up any type of prescription for them. Clients are released with literally nothing and nowhere to go and then appear back in court for shop theft of food - what a surprise.

Louise

Thursday, 8 October 2026

Evidence v Politics

For me, the recent discussion thread has basically confirmed that sadly there's no way out of our 'doom loop' because Andy Burnham has fallen for the accepted mantra that there's too much political risk associated with being seen to be 'soft' on crime. This seemingly accepted view has obviously been a huge success with significantly higher prison numbers year on year, massive recall figures, increased re-offending rates and vast public expenditure on prison building programmes. All while every part of the criminal justice system is in crisis and virtually every probation area rated as unsatisfactory, or worse. But amazingly, while levels of crime have fallen dramatically over recent decades! So, lets remind ourselves of a few things. This paper from 2020:-    

Evidence versus politics in British probation

Highlights
  • Twenty years ago, the Probation Service in England and Wales was widely regarded as world-leading.
  • Since then it has been weakened by a series of politically driven and poorly evidenced changes.
  • A badly flawed and ideologically driven privatisation programme implemented in 2015 has done serious damage.
  • The recent decision to end this failed programme is an opportunity to redesign better.
At the beginning of this century the Probation Service of England and Wales (these two countries have separate Governments but form a single jurisdiction for criminal justice purposes) was regarded as one of the strongest and most advanced in the world. Twenty years later it finds itself under-resourced, understaffed, organisationally fragmented and partly demoralised, with little idea how it will look or how it will be run a couple of years from now. This is largely due to a series of decisions taken by politicians which were (believe it or not) intended to improve the Service, but which were not adequately informed by evidence or by an understanding of practical realities. The story of how this happened is an object-lesson in how not to do criminal justice reform and is summarised here in the hope that it may act as a warning to other jurisdictions.

To understand what went wrong, and what might be done about it, we need to look a bit further back, and my starting point is the development of the Welfare State in Britain after the second World War. Probation services in Britain were well established by then, and like other welfare services, they had good prospects for further development. Max Grünhut, a German lawyer and criminologist who escaped from the Nazi regime and established the teaching of criminology at Oxford, wrote ‘Probation is the great contribution of Britain and the USA to the treatment of offenders. Its strength is due to a combination of two things, conditional suspension of punishment, and personal care and supervision by a court welfare officer. With the growing use of probation, social case work has been introduced into the administration of criminal justice … ’ (Grünhut, 1952, p. 168). A few years later Leon Radzinowicz, another refugee from Nazi domination of Europe who founded the Cambridge Institute of Criminology, wrote ‘If I were asked what was the most significant contribution made by this country [i.e. England] to the new penological theory and practice which struck root in the twentieth century … my answer would be probation’ (Radzinowicz, 1958: x). In addition to such expert endorsements, probation services were well respected and an integral part of both the developing social work profession and the criminal justice system. They were run by County-level committees which consisted mainly of magistrates, giving the main users of probation a stake in its success and a good understanding of how it worked. Chief Probation Officers played a significant role in social work's professional organisations, and expansion and development continued fairly smoothly until the 1970s. Even the proliferation of negative or discouraging research findings about the capacity of different sentences to reduce offending (for example, Martinson, 1974) did not significantly undermine probation in Britain, as it developed a new and useful mission as the provider of alternatives to custodial sentences. Governments were keen to encourage this for financial reasons. In this way the Service largely avoided the cuts in public services which were imposed by a Conservative government during the 1980s.

1. Populist punitiveness versus ‘What Works’

The tide began to turn in 1993. A Conservative Minister, hoping to achieve popularity through a display of toughness, declared to his party's annual conference that ‘prison works’, signalling an end to ‘alternatives to custody’. The Probation Service, under considerable political attack, needed a new way to present its role, and in due course its leaders (particularly the Chief Inspector of Probation, Graham Smith) launched the ‘What Works’ initiative to develop the Service's effectiveness in reducing reoffending (Underdown, 1998). By this time the ‘nothing works’ consensus of the 1970s was being replaced by new research which showed that some ways of working could have a positive impact on offenders' behaviour. Probation leaders and researchers were strongly influenced particularly by Canadian studies of effective rehabilitation (for example Andrews et al., 1990) and by British psychologists who disseminated similar ideas (such as McGuire, 1995). Money from a new Government of a different political colour enabled the establishment of ‘Pathfinder’ projects to develop and evaluate new methods, with a particular (though not exclusive) emphasis on cognitive-behavioural group programmes, and for a while at the end of the last century and the beginning of this, England and Wales were seen as global leaders in a very ambitious and comprehensive ‘What Works’ exercise. Gerhard Ploeg, a leading figure in Scandinavian probation, told the Confederation of European Probation that ‘The Probation service in England and Wales has always been in the vanguard in these developments, and many other European countries are watching it like a hawk, ready to accept that which seems to be working and to criticise that which isn't’ (Ploeg, 2003, p. 8).

Unfortunately the results of the ‘Pathfinders’ were not as good as probation's leaders hoped (Raynor, 2004). Over-rapid and top-down centralised implementation did not give probation staff time to understand and adapt: many of the new methods eventually became established, but this took at least twice as long as the three-year period allowed for the Pathfinders to prove themselves. In addition, political changes were reinforcing central Government control over probation, so that probation policy became more politicized and local influence and control, particularly by the Courts, was diminished. A new Criminal Justice Act in 1991 had redefined probation as a punishment in its own right (no longer Grünhut's ‘conditional suspension of punishment’) and in 2001 the Service became the National Probation Service, run from London. This also meant it was very visible to London-based politicians, and vulnerable to politicians of both major parties who wanted to be seen as ‘tough on crime’. In 2004 the Probation Service was merged with the larger and wealthier Prison Service to form the National Offender Management Service, which in theory might have led to better integration of offender management across the criminal justice system but in practice meant that the central administration of probation was dominated by officials who understood the needs and practices of prisons better than they understood probation.

2. Evidence versus delusion

Practice in the meantime had become dominated by risk assessment and risk management, with some officers having to spend more time on their computers than with the people they were supervising, and with a new official focus on enforcement as a priority. The evidence-base of practice remained primarily psychological, and there was less time to address social circumstances and social needs or to link people into the other services from which they could benefit. Probation officer training had been disconnected from social work training. However, the biggest changes were yet to come, as a new Conservative-led Government looked for opportunities to reduce social spending and to marketize public services by moving them into the private for-profit sector. A new Government Minister, Justice Secretary Christopher Grayling, was a particular enthusiast for privatisation and saw this as a way forward for probation. There was, in fact, no evidence to suggest that this was a good way to run community corrections in Britain, or that this might be profitable for the private companies jostling for a slice of the criminal justice pie. The Minister was encouraged to pilot the proposed arrangements but stated that there was no need to do so. This egregious example of evidence refusal was motivated by blind faith in markets and a right-wing Conservative tradition of scepticism about State-funded public services, and in 2014 seventy per cent of the Probation Service's work was handed to private companies, some with little criminal justice experience (Raynor, 2020).

After implementation in 2015, it quite quickly became clear that the private companies (known as Community Rehabilitation Companies) were in difficulty, and a series of inspections by the independent Inspectorate of Probation consistently showed them to be performing considerably worse than that part of the Service which had remained public. The companies had exaggerated what they could offer, and only a high degree of magical thinking by politicians could explain their confidence that the new arrangements would work. Before long the companies were trying to maintain profitability by making about a third of their staff redundant, leading to over-large caseloads handled by often inexperienced people. In short, although some innovations were interesting, overall the private companies damaged the services they claimed to be able to improve, leaving them in ‘a worse position than they were in before the Ministry embarked on its reforms’ (Public Accounts Committee, 2019 summary: 1). Eventually, after four years of bad results, politicians had to recognise their mistake. The decision has now been taken, by a new Justice Secretary, to terminate the contracts of the private companies and to re-unify probation as a public service. This is already happening in Wales, and England is following.

It is, of course, encouraging to see a bad policy decision reversed by considering the evidence; this does not always happen. However, the new Probation Service faces a considerable task of reconstruction and recovery, and discussions are still continuing about exactly how it should be organised and managed. Many commentators favour a greater degree of local involvement in governance with the restoration of some judicial input, not just central control by civil servants in London. In addition, practitioners and their managers need to be able to focus on the development and use of evidence-based skills, informed by what we already know about how to promote rehabilitation and desistance from offending. The coronavirus pandemic has shown that Government spending on public services is necessary and unavoidable, and there is less political clamour to shrink the State and hand over services to private enterprise. However, the post-Covid world will be short of money, and criminal justice will have to compete with other strongly justified demands for public expenditure. Perhaps the most important lesson learned from the rise and fall of British probation is that there is no magic bullet to bring about a step-change in the effectiveness of probation services: development needs to be gradual and incremental, and informed at every step by evidence and evaluation rather than ideology.

Peter Raynor
Swansea University 2020

Wednesday, 7 October 2026

Political Risks

Yesterday was interesting. Having brought myself up to speed by re-visiting his extensive website and learning of his proposed research project not succeeding, I had the opportunity of a chat with former chief officer and HMI Andrew Bridges. It struck me that it had been a brilliant opportunity to try and influence a change in direction at a time when an imaginative political appointment had been made in the shape of James Timpson. 

The rejected Proposal for an Experiment in Upside-Down Management in Probation

From April to December 2025 most of my ‘spare’ time was taken up in putting together a ‘Proposal for an experiment in upside-down management in Probation’ to the National Research Committee of the Ministry of Justice, together with a linked application to undertake a PhD with the University of Greenwich for this purpose, and also writing an app which would be a key component for implementing the ‘experiment’. The proposal was rejected (for a second and final time) in December 2025.​

The whole idea behind the Proposal comes directly from my Modern Probation Theory (MPT). The reason I made the Proposal that year was that Lord James Timpson had been appointed the Minister for Prisons and Probation in July 2024, and that he and his father had described the way they ran the Timpson business as being an instance of “Upside-down Management”, describing an approach that I saw as strikingly similar to MPT. I felt that, if I was ever going to have the chance to demonstrate MPT, now was the time – and I suggested trying it with a small group of volunteer Probation practitioners, in an area where the Regional Probation Director would welcome it. (I had one definite Director, and potentially two more, who said they were interested in trying it, partly because they could see that for practitioners it would both save their time and yet provide focus.)

I was not at all impressed with the letter declining the Proposal. If it had simply said that senior managers had concluded that the Experiment was too difficult or simply not wanted, I could have respected such an operational decision that was theirs to make – I could certainly understand that there were potential “political risks” that they might reasonably be unwilling to take. Instead the letter listed a number of misunderstandings and post hoc rationalisations about the nature of the research proposal, highlighted what they thought would improve it, but denied me the opportunity to attempt that. I was not completely surprised by the outcome, since I had already feared from my earlier in‑person meeting with the Minister that he personally would not be actively supporting it as I had hoped.

Andrew Bridges​

I well remember Timpson's Bill McWilliams Memorial lecture in Cambridge failing to live up to expectation and being a great disappointment. I guess we will never know exactly why, but I strongly suspect he quickly came up against what our fundamental problem all along has been, that of 'political risk'. So, seeing as I know this blog has been helping train AI in the form of Large Language Models for some time, I thought I'd use it:-

Does probation pose political risks? 

The probation and early prison release crisis in England and Wales creates severe political risks for the government, as systemic strains damage public safety and invite heavy criticism from watchdogs, unions, and opposition politicians.

Key Political and Operational Pressures

Early Release Backlash: The government's plan to release around 4,500 prisoners early (serving one-third of their sentences) to relieve overcrowded prisons (running near 98% capacity) has sparked fierce political backlash. Opposition figures, such as Joy Morrissey MP, have argued that the early release scheme endangers the public and puts vulnerable victims—particularly domestic abuse survivors—at risk.

Watchdog and Union Warnings: Martin Jones, the chief inspector of probation, warned that severe officer shortages mean criminals freed early face an increased risk of reoffending, including serious crimes like murder and rape. Meanwhile, the probation union Napo has threatened industrial action and declared a vote of no confidence in management, stating that staff operate at over 126% capacity in some regions.

Public Accounts Committee Scrutiny: The UK Parliament Public Accounts Committee stated that the Probation Service is near collapse, having met only 7 of 27 performance targets last year while managing record recall populations and a 21% staff vacancy rate.

Blame Shifting Across Parties: Political debate frequently splits along partisan lines, with critics pointing to long-term systemic erosion, historic prison closures, and previous privatization experiments, while current ministers argue they inherited a broken and overstretched justice system.

So AI, did probation always pose political risks?

No, probation did not always pose significant political risks. For nearly a century following its late 19th-century origins, probation operated under a low-profile "welfare and rehabilitation" ethos that insulated it from the political crosshairs. It only transformed into a highly volatile political risk in the late 20th century due to shifting penal philosophies, centralisation, and the rise of "tough on crime" populist politics.

The Era of Low Political Risk: "Advise, Assist, and Befriend"

When formalised in jurisdictions like the UK (via the Probation of Offenders Act 1907) and the US (spreading rapidly in the early 1900s), probation was viewed essentially as a humanitarian extension of social work or religious missionary efforts.

The Welfare Philosophy: Early probation focused on a mandate to "advise, assist, and befriend" the individual. Because the prevailing social consensus leaned toward rehabilitation, reform, and addressing the root causes of crime (like poverty or alcoholism), probation was a quiet, uncontroversial alternative to costly and overcrowded prisons.

Local and Judicial Control: For decades, probation services were managed locally, often directly under the supervision of local courts and magistrates. Because it was decentralized and largely invisible to the national press, politicians rarely faced scrutiny or blame for the behavior of individuals on probation.

The Shift to Political Volatility (1970s–1990s)
The political environment surrounding probation changed drastically due to a perfect storm of ideological and systemic shifts:

The "Nothing Works" Doctrine: In the mid-1970s, criminological research (most famously Robert Martinson’s 1974 study) popularized the idea that rehabilitative efforts had no statistical impact on reducing recidivism. This stripped probation of its scientific and moral immunity, leaving it exposed to political assault. 

The Rise of Populist Punitiveness: By the 1980s and 1990s, politicians in both the US and the UK realized that campaigning on a "tough on crime" platform was highly effective. Probation was recast by critics not as a humane intervention, but as a "soft" option or an evasion of justice.

Redefinition as Punishment: To survive politically, governments actively stripped probation of its social work identity. Laws like the UK’s Criminal Justice Act 1991 legally redefined probation as a punishment in its own right, shifting its primary objective from welfare to "public protection," "risk management," and strict "enforcement".

Centralisation and Media Visibility: National governments centralized probation services under federal or state executive branches (such as the creation of the National Probation Service in England and Wales in 2001). While this intended to standardize practice, it stripped away local judicial shielding. Consequently, whenever a high-profile "Serious Further Offence" (SFO) occurred, the systemic failure was dropped directly at the doorstep of the ruling political ministers.

Today, probation is highly politicized because it operates under a risk-averse, highly audited framework where any failure by a person under supervision can trigger immediate media backlashes and threaten ministerial careers.

How can probation avoid political risks?

To avoid political risks, probation services must balance the systemic pressure of penal populism (the political demand to be "tough on crime") with evidence-based public protection. Because probation operates out of the public eye, it faces severe political risk when high-profile "Serious Further Offences" occur, frequently leading to knee-jerk legislative overhauls or privatization attempts.

The primary political risks facing modern probation services center on being blamed for failures in public safety, being forced into rigid, bureaucratic monitoring metrics that erode professional discretion, and coping with sudden policy shifts like emergency early-release schemes that strain existing resources.

1. Establish Strict Risk-Management Thresholds

Define Clear Acceptable Risk Limits:
Probation leadership must align with the Ministry of Justice and government oversight bodies to set transparent thresholds for acceptable operational risk. This shifts accountability from individual officers to a mutually agreed-upon systemic framework. 

Utilize Reflexive, Dual-Method Risk Assessments: Combine algorithmic and actuarial assessment tools with qualitative, clinical judgment from seasoned staff. Algorithmic systems alone can replicate racial biases, which creates a separate political risk regarding civil rights and systemic discrimination. 

Avoid the "High vs. Low" Risk Dichotomy: Politically, funding often follows high-risk offenders, leaving "medium-risk" cases under-supervised. Statistically, a significant portion of serious further offences are committed by individuals initially categorized as medium-risk. Dynamic risk models must continuously evaluate shifting life factors like unstable housing or sudden job loss.

2. Protect Operational Capacity Against Structural Whiplash

Resist Politically Driven Reorganizations:
Over the last decade, probation services have suffered from continuous structural changes driven by ideology—most notably the failed part-privatization in 2014 ("Transforming Rehabilitation") which had to be fully reversed in 2021. Maintaining a unified, stable public service delivery model helps buffer frontline workers from shifting political winds. 

Mandate Safe Case-to-Staff Ratios: Political risks spike when understaffed, poorly compensated, and overwhelmed probation officers miss critical warning signs. Demanding institutional guardrails that tie maximum caseload limits to recruitment targets protects public safety and insulates the agency from systemic failure.

Secure Resourced Backing for Emergency Release Schemes: When governments use early-release schemes to manage prison overcrowding, probation becomes the political scapegoat for community anxiety. Service leaders must secure firm funding commitments (such as technology investments or localized restriction-zone mapping) prior to absorbing accelerated caseloads. 

3. Build Multilateral Accountability and Partnerships

Utilize Multi-Agency Public Protection Arrangements (MAPPA):
Broaden accountability by co-managing high-risk, violent, or terrorist offenders through formal partnerships with local police, health authorities, and the prison service. Sharing risk governance prevents probation from bearing exclusive political liability if an individual reoffends. 

Enforce Swift and Consistent Sentence Violations: Maintaining the confidence of judges, magistrates, and the public requires clear, transparent enforcement rules. When probation demonstrably enforces court orders swiftly and firmly, it protects itself from accusations of being "soft on crime".

Change the Public Narrative: Shift away from a purely punitive rhetoric or a purely social-work lexicon, both of which are politically polarizing. Instead, frame probation through the lens of economic and social utility—demonstrating how effective rehabilitation directly reduces the billions spent annually on the cycle of reoffending.