True Cost of TR

Serious Further Offences are something all Probation Officers live in fear of and particularly the subsequent investigation. From the beginning of TR it was always said that one likely outcome would be an increase in SFO's and I have reason to believe there's been a deliberate policy of trying to hide the true extent by various means. It should be of particular concern that the suggested oversight of the process by HM Probation Inspectorate is not now to take place.

Despite all the various efforts at obfuscation where SFO's are concerned, there are some instances where public scrutiny is impossible to avoid and one such case is that of Leroy Campbell resulting in the 41-page Independent Review by HM Inspectorate just published. As one would expect it is thoroughly forensic in highlighting the various failings of organisations, processes and individuals, but in addition gives valuable insight into the role of TR and how all the dire warnings have proved to be correct. 

It addition it also gives a rare glimpse into the vitally important and skilled work of a Probation Officer involved with dangerous and risky individuals, their attempts at effecting change in an offender's thinking and behaviour and making sound judgements, the result of which can have profound consequences. It's definitely not a role for the feint-hearted, belies all the sniping about there being little need for much training and serves to highlight why the Service is in a state of chaos when such professional public servants are basically treated like shit. 

As I prepare this blog post and when you think there cannot be any further insult and humiliation that can be heaped upon the profession, I read this from yesterday:-

"Oh you don't need to worry about staff shortages in NPS much longer - Interserve told CRC staff yesterday that they've 'realised' they have too many Probation Officers and are therefore planning to 'second' (ie. pimp) those surplus to requirement to the NPS! Good old private industry eh - why waste time providing an adequate Probation service yourself when there's more money to be made from selling your qualified staff's services to other providers?" 

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The following are my selected extracts that should give a flavour of the case, issues involved and in particular how TR played a significant part in the tragedy. In particular I must stress how unwise it is to expect Probation Officers to be able to handle a caseload made up of only high risk cases - it will inevitably lead to disaster for all involved.  
      
 1. Overview 

Leroy Campbell has a history of serious sexual offending, and a predilection for attacking lone women. Whilst under probation supervision in late 2016, he told his NPS probation officer that he felt vulnerable and isolated (feelings that he said were linked with his previous offending) and that he might reoffend, might rape again. A few weeks later he raped and killed Lisa Skidmore in her own home. He also attempted to murder her elderly mother in Lisa’s home, and then set fire to the property, leaving her for dead. Mrs Skidmore survived.

These were dreadful crimes. They have been devastating for the family. We offer them our sincere and heartfelt condolences. We understand that they need to know in sufficient detail, how Leroy Campbell came to reoffend in this way, and whether there is anything in the way he was supervised that increased the risk of such a thing happening. If there were failings, then family members will wish to know what is being done about it, and whether any individuals are called to account. 

When those under probation supervision commit serious further offences, the probation provider conducts a review of how well the individual was supervised by their staff while on probation. That happened in this case. The multi-agency supervision arrangements for Leroy Campbell meant that a second type of review could also be instigated, and that happened in this case as well. 

We have evaluated both of those reviews, and found them honest and reliable overall. There are one or two areas where we might have formed a different judgement, but they are not material. We agree with the reviewers: the supervision of Leroy Campbell was inadequate in several crucial respects. As a result, Lisa Skidmore, other women and the wider public were put at risk unduly, with grave consequences.

We set out in this report the detail of what happened in the supervision of Leroy Campbell, starting in 2000 when he was sentenced to life imprisonment. Many good decisions were made about his supervision within prison and upon release, but a series of unrelated yet questionable decisions and one final, very poor decision meant that his risk was not adequately managed. 

While in prison, Leroy Campbell was assessed as requiring management under what are known as Multi-Agency Public Protection arrangements (MAPPA), upon release. These are designed to ensure cooperation and integration of police, probation and other agencies’ work to protect the public once the offender is back in the community. Many high-risk offenders are managed under one of three levels of MAPPA arrangements. Level 3 arrangements (the highest level) are reserved for the small proportion of individuals where the greatest agency cooperation and management is thought necessary, to protect the public. Level 1 is by far the most common level in use. 

Leroy Campbell was expected to be managed under Level 2 or 3 upon release, but this was reduced to Level 1 during his time in prison. Although the MAPPA level was reconsidered pre-release the level was not revised and the supporting paperwork was not completed by the Probation Officer as it should have been. As a result he left prison assessed at the lowest level (Level 1) rather than the higher level expected and anticipated by senior probation staff: evaluation and record-keeping procedures were not followed properly. We find that unacceptable, and inexplicable.

While in prison, a series of 11 probation officers were responsible for his case. While changes over a long sentence are inevitable, this rate of change was exceptional. It does not support effective relationship-building or assessment. 

Leroy Campbell had a persistent offending history, and was serving a life sentence for the latest in a series of violent and serious sexual offences when the Parole Board decided to recommend his release. At that stage he was 11 years over his five-year tariff. The Parole Board had a difficult decision to make in this case, and having looked at the evidence available to us, we do not criticise the decision. 

Upon release, Leroy Campbell was managed in the community. In this case, police and probation responses at a critical time were not sufficiently co-ordinated, and a key piece of information was not recorded by Probation or shared with Police as it would have been, had Leroy Campbell been managed at a higher MAPPA level. Opportunities to review the MAPPA level during his release on temporary license were not taken. Curfew requirements imposed on Leroy Campbell by the Parole Board were relaxed, in a more casual manner than expected and sooner than expected as well. 

There were some indications given to probation officers by Leroy Campbell to suggest he remained a risk to women. He said things that could have been taken either way, but when put together they should have given probation staff cause for concern. While under release on temporary licence, he breached licence conditions designed to keep the public safe.

However, most striking in this case is a decision by probation services when Leroy Campbell was no longer living in Approved Premises. Probation staff decided NOT to respond actively enough to a clear indication that risk may be increasing notably. This individual came into the probation office and stated to his probation officer that he was thinking of raping again, and that he has been looking at - or had noticed - open windows (he had previously entered a victim’s house, to then rape her).

In our view that should have resulted in immediate, positive and firm action to protect the public – either an immediate move back to Approved Premises, or recall to prison. Instead, Leroy Campbell was left free to commit these terrible crimes. It was an aberrant decision, to leave Leroy Campbell at large. 

In the circumstances, we have looked at how the NPS has acted since, and the steps it has taken to hold its own staff to account for their standard of work. We find it odd that managers did not consider conducting an investigation immediately, or suspending any of the staff involved pending an investigation. In our view there was sufficient evidence to indicate that immediate action could and should have been taken. It was not. 

In the weeks following the offences, NPS managers scrutinised a broader sample of the work of the probation staff and managers involved in the case. The focus was to establish whether the poor judgement exercised was part of a pattern of poor practice. We have concluded that in the circumstances of this case, this approach was not sufficient.

In other areas of professional endeavour, professionals who fall far short of accepted professional standards on any occasion can be referred to their professional body for investigation and consideration of their fitness to practice. No such arrangements exist for probation professionals. While that remains the case, it is all the more important in our view that disciplinary procedures and their application pass muster, and provide the public and individuals with the assurance they need that appropriate actions are taken, and taken promptly when things go seriously wrong.

We question whether the organisation’s disciplinary procedures and its underlying disciplinary culture are sufficiently robust. The guidance available to managers on handling conduct and disciplinary investigations focused on situations where there were clear breaches of professional conduct, with little about dealing with failures in professional judgement. Some disciplinary proceedings have now been instigated here, but exceptionally late in the day and only after our interim report. Disciplinary actions should be timely in our view, to be as fair as possible to all concerned, and to maintain public trust. 

As well as dealing fairly and properly with significant professional failings, we and the wider public expect public services to learn from mistakes and put in place arrangements to reduce the risk of similar things happening again. Here the NPS has done that. It has put a lot of effort into developing a fulsome action plan and following it through. Regrettably however, the plan does not address two issues that are of national significance. 

Firstly, what is expected of senior probation officers whenever they supervise and oversee the work of less experienced staff is not sufficiently clear in our view. Professional supervision failed in this case both when Leroy Campbell was in prison and after his release – most especially when the probation officer concerned consulted a senior probation officer when Leroy Campbell disclosed he was thinking of rape. The right actions were not decided, or taken, even though Campbell’s history of offending suggested plainly the risk of a serious further offence. 

The NPS has recently reminded staff of how to deal with such disclosures, and we welcome that, albeit it is late and it simply confirms what we already expect of professional probation staff. We think there is a broader problem, however. With senior probation officers now responsible for a range of management duties, it is not clear what is expected by way of their professional supervision of less senior professional staff and their cases, or the priority to be given to that important work. The NPS should be more specific about the requirements, in our view, but progress here is slow.

Secondly, the plan does not address in any way the shortcomings of the organisation’s disciplinary procedure, or the disciplinary and accountability culture that prevails. In this case, managers responded to what we think are clear professional failings by looking at the quality of an individual’s work overall. While that is valuable in checking that an individual generally works to standard in protecting the public, it does not go far enough. 

Our view is that, whatever such an exercise shows, it is simply not acceptable that aberrant decision-making is left unaccounted for. It is unacceptable to the relatives and surviving victims of a further offence and to the wider public. In our view, the NPS should look afresh at its disciplinary policy and also consider how it deals with extremely poor decision-making, keeping public expectations about accountability in mind. 

The Skidmore family feel they have been poorly treated by the NPS following these dreadful crimes, and we agree. The NPS’s national procedures at the time for accounting to victims and their families were in our view difficult to defend: victims and families were presented with a review report to read on the spot, rather than take away. This does not build trust, and thankfully these procedures have now changed. 

In this case, reports were prepared to a good standard but it was a lot for the family to take in. What is more, in the meeting that followed immediately after their reading of the material, and subsequently, the family have found the NPS defensive, and unwilling to admit management shortcomings or to hold any individuals to account.

Indeed, although the NPS developed and implemented its action plan, it is only after the family’s determined pursuit of the facts and then the intervention of the minister, that certain actions have been taken by the NPS. That does not reflect well on the organisation, or restore the family’s trust. Some individuals are now subject to disciplinary proceedings, but it is very late in the day. 

Finally, this family’s distress at the loss of Lisa and the ghastly circumstances of her death was exacerbated by an application by the defendant for a second post mortem. The NPS were unaware of this application. Leroy Campbell made that application just one day before the time limit for application expired. It had regrettable consequences for the family, and their grief. The family suspect the applicant had self-serving reasons for the request, rather than the pursuit of justice. We do think government should consider whether the process of application for second post mortems is sufficiently robust.

5. Previous offending

LC has a history of similar offences. 

He has six previous convictions for 11 offences including rape, burglary, attempting to strangle, acquisitive offences and drug-related offences. In 1983 he entered a nurses’ home and attempted to choke or strangle a nurse with intent to rape or otherwise sexually assault her. He received a seven-year prison sentence for that. Then in January 1992 he was sentenced to 10 years imprisonment for an offence of rape, which he committed after breaking into the flat of a woman and her five-year old child, and threatening her with a knife. He was made subject to the requirements of the sex offenders’ register, for life. 

In May 2000 LC was sentenced to life imprisonment with a tariff of five years for offences of false imprisonment. He also received concurrent determinate sentences of eight years and three years respectively for linked offences of burglary (x2) with intent to rape and indecent assault. The tariff on this sentence expired in 2005, but as we detail below, the Parole Board did not direct his release on life licence until 2016.

6. The period in closed prison

6.1. The period 2000 – 2011

Following sentence in 2000, the probation officer who prepared the post sentence report assessed LC as posing a high risk of serious harm to others, in particular adult females.

In 2003 LC was detained at HMP Manchester, and it was there he had his first parole review. He had completed the Enhanced Thinking Skills course, a course designed to help individuals think more clearly and take responsibility for their actions. The Parole Board determined that he was not suitable for release or transfer to an open prison. 

The following year a senior probation office (SPO) reviewed LC’s progress in custody and concluded that if released he should be managed at Multi-Agency Public Protection Arrangement (MAPPA) Level 3, the highest level of multi-agency supervision. 

In 2005, while at HMP Wakefield, he had a second parole review. By then he had completed the Sex Offender Treatment Programme (SOTP) as well as alcohol and drugs awareness courses and drugs therapy. He had attended a workshop on alternatives to anger. He had also participated in one to one counselling in relation to the sexual abuse he had experienced as a child. The Parole Board again determined that he was not suitable for release or transfer to an open prison. The panel thought he needed to complete further offending behaviour work. 

He commenced the Extended SOTP in 2007. A third parole review happened that year. The Parole Board panel dealing with the case considered that despite having served seven years in prison and having completed two sex offender programmes (the first being on a previous sentence), the fact remained that LC was still obsessed with sex. He continued to be assessed as posing a high risk of harm to others. 

The Parole Board decided once again that he was not suitable for release or transfer to open conditions.

In January 2008 a senior probation officer responsible for MAPPA reviewed the file, and noted that LC was considered as a MAPPA Level 1 whilst in custody but likely to rise to Level 2 on release, due to the concerning pattern of offending and the need for active multi-agency management when he was in the community. The SPO noted that six months before release. LC should be reassessed and the required MAPPA screening completed so that he could be referred into Level 2 or 3 management. 

A fourth parole review took place in 2009. By then, LC had completed SOTP, Extended SOTP, Enhanced Thinking Skills, art and design courses and a tailoring course. This time, the panel did not recommend release, but that he should be moved to a prison that provided a therapeutic community (such as HMP Dovegate). This prison has a separate 200-bed therapeutic community for repeat serious offenders. The unit offers residents daily group therapy. The move did not happen straightaway. 

Subsequently, the Sentence Planning Board noted that LC was in a low and uncooperative mood during its discussion about the prospect of a move to HMP Dovegate. The Board agreed nevertheless that the transfer should take place. LC subsequently re-engaged with the HMP Wakefield’s psychology team, in preparation for the transfer, and he was moved to HMP Dovegate in 2011.

6.2. HMP Dovegate Therapeutic Community 2011 – 2014

After LC was transferred to HMP Dovegate, his next parole review was deferred until he completed specific offending behaviour work. When the review took place in 2011, the panel was still concerned about the risk of harm this individual posed to others, specifically women. The Parole Board decided against release: it was not thought to be a viable option. 

By May 2012, LC was six years over his tariff. At his therapy review that month, those working with him stated that he was not addressing the underlying issues of anger relating to the sexual abuse he himself had experienced. He had previously said that one reason he committed the offences and humiliated and degraded his victims was to make them feel the same way he had felt when abused. The assessor concluded that he was still posed a high risk of harm to others, and proposed that he should remain at HMP Dovegate in order to reduce future risk. 

The assessor recommended that LC’s past abuse and emotions could be explored by LC participating in the SOTP ‘Better Lives Booster’ programme. However, LC was later informed that he would not be able to complete the programme whilst in custody, as the programme was only available in a limited number of closed prisons. In June 2013, LC’s probation officer contacted the Probation Divisional Sex Offender Unit (DSOU) and was advised to refer LC to the unit three months before release. In that way, he could be allocated to the ‘Better Lives Booster’ in reasonable time and complete the programme whilst on licence in the community. 

An addendum to the parole report was prepared by the PO in June 2014, in readiness for the parole review anticipated for a few months hence. The probation officer noted that he had made some progress, and presented as having overcome the difficulties regarding emotional management which had previously led to isolation and negative thoughts. He still needed to demonstrate that he could maintain this over a period of time, however. At times he remained over-confident in his ability to remain offence free. 

The report summary stated that although LC had been in HMP Dovegate since 2011, at times he seemed more interested in moving to a lower category of prison than in the content of the programmes. The report concluded, however, that he could be moved to open conditions with a view to focussing on emotional management, substance misuse and education, training and employment. 

In June 2014, following the implementation of the government’s Transforming Rehabilitation programme, all cases held by the former probation trusts were transferred to either the National Probation Service (NPS) or to a Community Rehabilitation Company. LC was transferred to the Midlands division of the NPS. For LC this meant a change of PO and SPO. The new PO attended the parole oral hearing in August 2014. On this occasion, the Parole Board decided that LC could move to North Sea Camp, an open prison, and he transferred there the following month.

6.3. HMI Probation key findings from this period

We have not examined in detail all the records of the period in prison. From what we have read, however, it appears that probation staff retained contact with LC and the prison, attending lifer reviews, therapeutic reviews and sentence planning board meetings. 

During this time, 11 different POs were responsible for the case. Whilst it is inevitable that supervisory changes take place, this level of change was unusual at that time, and it is both undesirable and unsatisfactory. It cannot have assisted effective relationship-building or assessment, or the continuity of work. 

Continuity of management oversight can facilitate effective transfer of responsibility between probation officers, helping new staff to become familiar with the case. This is particularly important in a case like that of LC, whose files dated back many years and contained extensive information. However, over the period, five different SPOs held oversight responsibilities in this case. 

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The parole hearing in August 2014 took place shortly after the restructuring of probation services heralded by the government’s Transforming Rehabilitation programme. While this is no excuse, it is a relevant consideration. We understand that the PO to whom LC had been transferred had just been given a full caseload of offenders who presented a high risk of harm to others; this amounted to 36 cases, of which 35 had committed MAPPA eligible offences. The SPO at this point was also new to the transferred cases. 

The changes brought in by the restructuring of probation services meant that the NPS became entirely focused on MAPPA cases and those presenting a high risk of harm to others. This is a significant change for those staff and managers who had previously held a more varied caseload. Prioritisation now meant identifying the highest risk cases within a caseload where few present a low risk. One could speculate that the benchmark for cases that receive the most attention moved upwards.