HMPPS Not Fit For Purpose

Here we are again with yet another SFO, exactly as predicted as a direct result of imposing part-privatisation of the Probation Service with TR. Reunification under HMPPS command and control is not the answer because that department is simply not fit for purpose. How long is it going to take before either the present government understands this, or more significantly, the Labour Party understands the Probation Service must be reconfigured as a distinct and separate agency. Todays HMI press release:-

Independent Serious Further Offence review of Jordan McSweeney

Background:

On 14 December 2022, Jordan McSweeney was sentenced to life imprisonment, with a minimum term of 38 years, having pleaded guilty to the murder and sexual assault of Ms Zara Aleena. These offences occurred as Ms Aleena walked home, alone, with McSweeney following her, before he subjected her to a sustained physical and sexual assault. Jordan McSweeney was subject to probation supervision when these offences occurred.

In July 2022, the Lord Chancellor and Secretary of State for Justice asked HM Chief Inspector of Probation Justin Russell to conduct an independent review into this case, as Jordan McSweeney was on probation when he is alleged to have committed these offences. The review was completed in January 2023.

Statement:

Chief Inspector of Probation Justin Russell said: “Jordan McSweeney should have been considered a high risk of serious harm offender. If he had, more urgent action would have been taken to recall him to prison, after he missed his supervision appointments on release from custody. The Probation Service failed to do so, and he was free to commit this most heinous crime on an innocent, young women. Our independent review brings into sharp focus the consequences of these missed opportunities and reveals a Probation Service, in London, under the mounting pressure of heavy workloads and high vacancy rates.

“McSweeney murdered Zara just days after being released from prison. During his sentence, he was considered a violent and threatening man – to other prisoners and to prison staff – and had carried weapons. Known to the criminal justice system, since 2005, McSweeney had been imprisoned many times before, and had displayed violent and racially aggravated behaviour. He also received a restraining order for an offence, against a woman, in 2021.

“All the evidence shows that McSweeney should have been assessed, on release from prison, as high risk of serious harm. Instead, he was incorrectly assessed as being of medium risk because each of the offences, his behaviours in prison, and his criminal history, had been reviewed in isolation. Probation staff involved were also experiencing unmanageable workloads made worse by high staff vacancy rates – something we have increasingly seen in our local inspections of services. Prison and probation services didn’t communicate effectively about McSweeney’s risks, leaving the Probation Service with an incomplete picture of someone who was likely to reoffend.

“Following his release from prison and successive appointments being missed, the Probation Service failed to take prompt action to recall him to custody. Once that decision had been made, there were also delays in signing the necessary paperwork to initiate the recall. Had this been done sooner, opportunities for the police to locate and arrest McSweeney would have been maximised.”

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Highlights from the full report:-

1. Foreword 

On 14 December 2022, Jordan McSweeney was sentenced to life imprisonment, with a minimum term of 38 years, having pleaded guilty to the murder and sexual assault of Ms Zara Aleena. These offences occurred as Ms Aleena walked home, alone, with Mr McSweeney following her, before he subjected her to a sustained physical and sexual assault. This crime has devastated her family and shocked the local community and beyond. 

Jordan McSweeney was subject to probation supervision when these offences occurred. The Probation Service typically conducts a Serious Further Offence (SFO) review when an individual on probation commits a serious violent or sexual offence. However, in this case, the Secretary of State for Justice asked me, as Chief Inspector of Probation, to conduct an independent SFO review into the Probation Service’s management of Jordan McSweeney.

This report sets out the findings of that independent review. My inspectors found that the assessment of the level of risk posed by Jordan McSweeney was inaccurate given information that was known regarding past offending, behaviour in custody and patterns of behaviour. Subsequently this impacted on the way his case was managed and the level of oversight he was subject to. 

Had the correct assessment of risk of harm been undertaken to identify that Jordan McSweeney posed a high risk of serious harm, actions taken in terms of pre-release planning, plans for accommodation on release and speed of response to non-attendance after release could have been significantly different and potentially more urgent. 

Following his most recent sentence, in April 2022, there were significant delays in McSweeney’s case being correctly allocated to a probation officer in the community. This impacted on the time available to update his risk assessment and plan effectively for his release on 17 June 2022. 

Following his release, and successive probation appointments being missed, the Probation Service failed to take prompt action in respect of recalling him to custody. Once that decision was made there were also delays in signing the paperwork to initiate the recall. Had this been undertaken sooner, opportunities for the police to locate and arrest Jordan McSweeney would have been maximised. 

The practice deficits in this case are set against a backdrop of excessive workloads and challenges in respect of staffing vacancies in the London region. I have commented on this in recent local probation inspections and the recommendations made in this report correspond to many of our findings in these. This is far from the first time we have made recommendations relating to the need to improve the assessment and management of the risks of serious harm to the public posed by some people on probation. The need for us to repeat them yet again raises questions as to whether HMPPS is learning the lessons of past mistakes. It is vital that they do so in the future.

Justin Russell 

HM Chief Inspector of Probation 

2. Background to the review 

On 26 June 2022, Ms Zara Aleena had been out socialising with a friend and was walking home in the early hours of Sunday morning in Ilford, Essex, when she was physically attacked and sexually assaulted. CCTV footage showed a white male, identified to be Jordan McSweeney (JM) following Ms Aleena and attacking her from behind. The victim suffered multiple injuries, including serious injuries to her head. She sadly passed away later in hospital. On 14 December 2022, JM was sentenced to life imprisonment with a minimum term of 38 years. 

At the time the offence was committed, JM was supervised by the Probation Service – London region, having been released from custody on 17 June 2022. He had previously received a 16-month custodial sentence on 13 April 2022 for five counts of possession of an offensive weapon, three offences of criminal damage and one racially aggravated public order offence. All the index offences were committed whilst in custody serving a previous 32-month sentence for burglary. 

JM’s arrest for murder constituted a Serious Further Offence (SFO). SFOs are specific violent and sexual offences committed by people who are, or were very recently, under probation supervision at the time of the offence. They are committed by a small proportion of the probation caseload (fewer than 0.5 per cent) 1 however, while this percentage is small, for the victims and families involved, the impact and consequences are devastating and cannot be underestimated. 

An SFO review is triggered when a person is charged and appears in court for a qualifying offence alleged to have been committed while they were under probation supervision or within 28 working days of the supervision period terminating. These reviews are normally internal management reports conducted by the Probation Service itself but, occasionally, the Secretary of State for Justice asks HM Inspectorate of Probation to review a particular case, or aspects of a case, as he did in this instance on 01 July 2022. 

To inform this independent review, HM Inspectorate of Probation has reviewed the quality of the work undertaken by the Barking, Dagenham, and Havering (BDH) probation delivery unit (PDU), within the London Probation region (see annexe 1 for terms of reference). Current probation practice guidance, policy documents and relevant strategies have also been considered at a local, regional, and national level. Given JM had been released from custody 10 days prior to the SFO, practice and policy was also explored in HMP Belmarsh, by colleagues from His Majesty’s Inspectorate of Prisons.

4. Summary of key findings: 

Our Inspectors have found that, overall, there were significant omissions and practice deficits which impacted on the management of this case, outlined in the summary below. 

Risk of serious harm – inaccurate assessments and underestimation of risk 

JM was managed as a “medium risk of serious harm Integrated Offender Management (IOM) acquisitive individual” however his level of risk should have been escalated to “high” in February 2021, based on the range of information available on his past history of violence as well as acquisitive offending. There was information known about risks present in custody, such as possession of weapons, violent and threatening behaviour. In addition, he had carried weapons in the community, as well as the risks posed to known adults. The risk to the public, staff and other prisoners, should have been assessed as high risk of serious harm. The risk of serious harm to known adults should also have been high based on information related to offences against a known female received in 2021, which later resulted in a restraining order being imposed. 

The risk should have been reviewed by the Community Rehabilitation Company (CRC) who were responsible for the case at that time. JM’s persistent poor behaviour in custody was seen in isolation and risk management in the community was not given sufficient consideration. The risk of harm posed was not viewed holistically in this case, with the focus being on acquisitive offending, and a thorough assessment of other presenting risk factors was missing. 

The lack of effective information sharing between prisons and probation contributed to an incomplete picture of JM’s risks and potential for violence and disruptive behaviour. The fact he spent a significant proportion of his adult years in custody made it difficult to gather significant information about his circumstances and potential behaviour in the community. This strengthens the need for effective information sharing to ensure all known risk factors, behaviours and intelligence is gathered to produce effective risk management plans to use both whilst in custody and when in the community. 

Had he been correctly assessed as high risk of serious harm – specifically in respect of other prisoners, staff, known adults and the public – the planning for release, licence conditions, reporting instructions, and action taken when he failed to attend on release could have been significantly different and potentially more urgent (for example following his failure to attend initial probation appointments on 17 and 20 June). He may also have been eligible for joint Multi Agency Public Protection (MAPPA) management, and for consideration for an Approved Premises (AP) placement, which would have afforded more monitoring of his risk in the community as well as opportunities for rehabilitation. 

With the correct risk assessment, it is likely that the level of monitoring through the IOM arrangements would have been enhanced, allowing timely responses to non-compliance but more importantly, contributing towards a release plan appropriate to the risk posed. 

A critical omission in the case was the failure to apply sufficient professional curiosity and management oversight to ensure all available information was analysed to assess the risk posed by Jordan McSweeney. This review identifies that a significant amount of information became known regarding his circumstances confirming that he was in a relationship, had a stepchild and deteriorating family dynamics, particularly regarding his mother. While information was recorded, there was little evidence of this being explored in any detail or informing assessments undertaken by agencies. This led to risk factors being assessed in isolation and not building a picture of the overall risk posed.

The inaccurate classification of risk was a key theme in our recent PDU inspections in London. Of the 137 medium risk of serious harm cases that were inspected across six local probation areas, seven per cent were deemed to have had their risk underestimated and should have been rated as high risk of serious harm rather than medium. Whilst this is only a sample, it does demonstrate the urgent need to ensure risk categorisations are accurate.

Case Allocation 

There were issues highlighted with the allocation of JM’s case. Although JM received 16-months in custody, taking into account his time spent on remand, he only had two months left to serve in prison at the point of his sentence and so his case should have been allocated directly to a community practitioner. The processes for allocating cases when a custodial sentence is imposed is confusing and cumbersome, impacting significantly on pre-release planning. Had allocation taken place correctly and earlier, probation staff would have had more opportunity to consider the risks posed by this individual and to amend the risk of serious harm assessment. As outlined above, this would have allowed for the exploration of other release arrangements and restrictive conditions. 

Enforcement decisions and recall process 

JM had a history of non-compliance. However, during his periods on licence, delayed decision-making by probation staff and ineffective management oversight resulted in non-compliance continuing without relevant action being taken. Following his release on 17 June, there were missed opportunities to recall JM following failed appointments and risk factors emerging. Recall should have been initiated following non-attendance on 20 June 2022, but management consultation did not consider recall and efforts made to locate JM were insufficient. 

When the recall was initiated on 22 June, this occurred following an informal discussion and PO1’s manager SPO1 was not fully included in the process. A delay to signing off the recall until 24 June, outside the 24-hour target specified in the related guidance , meant the recall was not timely and ultimately delayed the opportunity for JM to be arrested by police. 

Data indicates that the public protection casework section (PPCS), who process licence revocations in HMPPS, take an average of seven7 hours to issue a licence revocation. National data on recalls also shows that the median time8 between licence revocation and a return to prison custody is three days. Had a recall been initiated following the missed appointment on 20 June, or completed within the specified timescale on 23 June, the time for police to locate and arrest JM would have been maximised. 

Diverse needs 

Throughout the records relating to JM, differing needs are highlighted. At different junctures records stated JM had Attention Deficit Hyperactivity Disorder (ADHD), Personality Disorder (PD) and had suffered from depression. He was stated to be medicated at various times for ADHD, but little analysis was undertaken of how this affected his day-to-day cognitive functioning and learning styles, and if there were links with offending behaviour.

5. Recommendations 

Between July and October 2022 HM Inspectorate of Probation inspected six PDUs in the London Region. Barking, Dagenham and Havering PDU was one of those inspected, many of the findings from this independent review mirror those from the London PDU inspections9 . They focus on critical concerns such as the quality of work to assess and manage risk of serious harm, the delivery of interventions, information sharing between agencies, quality assurance processes and management oversight, staff training and development, and resourcing and retention of staff. These recommendations are relevant to the practice observed in the case of JM. It is crucial that the service deals with these broader issues to address the practice deficits, and wider systemic issues identified in this independent review.

Notably, some recommendations in this report mirror what has previously been recommended by His Majesty’s Inspectorate of probation, particularly in the independent review of Joseph McCann . It is therefore imperative that these are actioned urgently given they have been highlighted previously as recommendations. 

This independent review makes a further nine recommendations specific to the case of JM.

HMPPS should: 

1. conduct a thorough, senior led review of the processes its staff use to assess the risks of harm that people on probation may pose to others, to ensure that all staff understand and apply the correct criteria for identifying high risk of serious harm cases and that this then informs robust and appropriate risk management plans and regular reviews. This action should be conducted urgently 

2. implement effective arrangements to ensure all risk of harm assessments, including at pre-sentence stage, are quality assured for accuracy until regular and appropriate management oversight arrangements are established, given the national staffing resource shortage and middle management oversight limitations 

3. develop processes to ensure all known information on past behaviour or current risks in prison or the community is available to probation practitioners and is properly analysed when formulating risk assessments pre and post sentence 

4. create robust processes to record and analyse on probation case files when a person on probation is acquitted of offence(s) and where information remains relevant to inform risk of harm assessment and management 

5. while cases are in custody ensure timely and accurate allocation of each case to probation practitioners in the community for supervision before and after release and a mechanism for checking this process 

6. undertake an urgent review of processes for information and intelligence sharing between prisons and the probation service to be completed by June 2023. (A recommendation from the independent review of McCann, this should be given urgent attention given issues are still apparent). 

7. develop processes to ensure that all recall decisions are signed off and submitted by Senior Probation Officers within the 24-hour target period – with compliance against this target monitored in every Probation Delivery Unit on at least a monthly basis 

8. ensure that data on the time from licence revocation by HMPPS Public Protection Casework Section to an individual being received into prison custody is monitored on a regular basis by HMPPS jointly with the National Police Chiefs Council (NPCC) and that joint probation and police plans are agreed for maximising performance against this metric 

9. ensure the EPF2 tool is used when determining licence conditions and develop a mechanism for effective management oversight of this process to ensure that all appropriate licence conditions, including GPS tagging, are applied after release 

10. develop a London wide initiative on neurodiversity and invest in trauma informed training for staff.

14. ‘Early Look’ and onward actions 

Following JM’s arrest for murder, an ‘early look’ SFO review was completed by the Probation Service – London region in June 2022 in line with HMPPS expected practice. The purpose of an ‘early look’ is to quickly review the practice in the case and promptly identify, to senior leaders within HMPPS, any practice and training deficits that require immediate attention and to begin appropriate actions, and human resource (HR) processes if assessed as being necessary. Inspectors found the quality of the ‘early look’ to be mostly of a sufficient standard. However, on further exploration, some information contained within it, and therefore subsequent actions, were inaccurate. This related specifically to the following: 

The assessment undertaken at Court as part of the allocation process was inaccurate as it pulled through information from historic assessments that required updating. Whilst PO2 was limited by the fact that he did not have the opportunity to meet with JM, the offence analysis did not relate to the index offences and I would have expected this to have been updated.

Having spoken with PO2 and the line manager, and considered the guidance in place, PO2 was required to undertake an “RSR only” OASys which does not require a full review. The process requires an OASys assessment to be generated solely for this calculation, to determine allocation. There is no expectation of court officers to undertake a review of risk. We found that although the correct process was followed here, the process led to inaccurate information being contained within assessments but in line with guidance, should have been updated by the receiving COM or POM. 

The ‘early look’ also indicated that the inclusion of a licence condition to engage with Catch 22 was not appropriate as their remit was to support people to build emotional resilience. We disagreed with this, as it was clear this would be of benefit to JM. However, we did agree other conditions were omitted which would have been beneficial to risk management, such as the imposition of a curfew/GPS tagging. 

When considering the recall prior to the SFO, the ‘early look’ states SPO1 was included in the discussion on 22 June, however on further investigation we know this did not occur, with them only being informed by PO1 a recall was being completed. Actions relating to management oversight and recall processes which were highlighted in the ‘early look’ have already been progressed. 

Following this, HR investigations procedures were initiated in respect of two staff members. These have now concluded, with no further action taken in either case. 

In respect of other areas which have been highlighted as significant in this review, we discussed work that is underway to address some of the deficits. We were told there are significant changes being made to IOM case management in London, in particular work is underway to improve liaison between prisons and IOM colleagues. With regards to neurodiversity, the Head of Operations for north east London boroughs (HOOP) told us there are aims to embed a trauma-informed approach to practice, and projects are already set up in some areas of London focussing on specific needs particularly in respect of young adults.

Although not eligible for OMiC management, the effectiveness of this process is under review by HM Inspectorate of probation with a number of recommendations to review the process which aim for improvements across the OMiC spectrum .

15. Conclusion 

Inspectors found that overall, there were significant omissions and practice deficits which impacted on the management of this case. 

JM was managed as a “medium risk of serious harm IOM acquisitive individual,” however, his level of risk should have been escalated to high risk of serious harm in February 2021, based on the range of information available had it have been sufficiently analysed and considered.

The risks present when he was recalled, in February 2021, were not sufficiently considered for a potential escalation to high risk of serious harm and management by the then National Probation Service. When a restraining order (RO) was imposed in 2021, the PDU were not sufficiently aware which was another missed opportunity to reassess the risk posed. Furthermore, JM’s persistent poor behaviour in custody was seen in isolation and not given sufficient consideration in terms of his risk management in the community. 

Issues were found with sharing of information between prison and probation and assessments were completed in isolation. This led to agencies managing the individual without thorough consideration of the impact on the risks posed, and how they should be managed, both in a custodial and community setting. 

A lack of professional curiosity coupled with a failure to consider information known about JM holistically, led to inaccurate and insufficient risk assessments. There was a significant amount of information known about JM which should have been analysed and explored more fully.

The delay in JM’s case being allocated to a probation officer meant his case was not formally allocated for two months following sentencing. Positively, PO1 continued to work with JM and did undertake some pre-release planning. However, given the delay in allocation, a pre-release assessment was not completed prior to release. This was a missed opportunity to review all the available information and inform pre-release planning and the risk of serious harm assessment. Tools such as the EPF tool which was developed by the probation service to determine relevant licence conditions was not utilised and therefore not all relevant conditions were included. 

On release, the PDU missed opportunities to recall following failed appointments and evidence of risk factors emerging, such as significant use of alcohol. A recall should have been initiated following the missed appointment on 20 June 2022. However, relevant senior leader consultations did not take place, and insufficient efforts were made to locate JM. When the recall was initiated, this was because of an informal discussion and PO1’s line manager was not included formally in the process. A delay to signing off the recall, 24 hours later than the specified timescale, meant the recall was not timely and ultimately delayed the opportunity for JM to be arrested by police. 

The findings from this review mirror findings from the recent HM Inspectorate of probation inspections of London PDUs, including Barking, Dagenham and Havering (BDH) PDU where the overall quality of work delivered to manage people on probation was insufficient and we rated the PDU as ‘Requires improvement’.